Canada's Creeping Economic Apartheid

The economic segregation and social marginalisation of racialised groups

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Executive Summary: Canada s Creeping Economic Apartheid

Creeping Economic Apartheid in Canada: the Economic segregation and social marginalisation of racialised groups calls attention to the growing racialisation of the gap between the rich and poor, which is proceeding with minimal public and policy attention, despite the dire implications for Canadian society. The report challenges some common myths about the economic performance of Canada s racialised communities, myths used to deflect public concern and to mask the growing social crisis. It points to the role of historical patterns of systemic racial discrimination as key to understanding the persistent overrepresentation of racialised groups in low paying occupations and low income sectors, their higher unemployment, and their poverty and social marginalisation. Historical patterns of differential treatment and occupational segregation in the labour market, and discriminatory governmental and institutional policies and practices, have led to the reproduction of racial inequality in other areas of Canadian life.

While Canada embraces globalisation and romanticizes cultural diversity, there are persistent expressions of xenophobia and racial marginalisation that suggest a continuing political and cultural attachment to the concept of a white settler society. This unresolved tension is reflected not only in a racially segregated labour market and the subsequent unequal outcomes detailed in this report, but also in the quality of citizenship to which racialised group members can aspire. In recent years, racial and other forms of inequality have been exacerbated by the shift away from an activist role for governments, and towards a free market approach to social problems. This development raises questions about Canada's commitment to the liberal democratic notion of *equal* citizenship as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and to the international obligations under the various United Nations rights covenants and conventions.

Canada s racialised groups[1] are set to become one fifth of the national population early in the new century. Yet even as they become demographically more significant, they continue to confront racial discrimination in many aspects of their everyday lives. Despite comparable average educational attainment, their labour market experience is one of barriers to access, limited mobility in employment, and discrimination in the workplace. They confront a racially segmented labour market in which they are ghettoized into low end jobs and low income sectors. They face denial of accreditation for internationally obtained qualifications and skills. They are confronted with questionable employer demands for Canadian experience, and they sustain above average unemployment and underemployment levels. They bear the brunt of the demands for labour flexibility; many ending up in insecure and low paying temporary, casual, and contract employment at the mercy of often unscrupulous employment agencies. In so doing, they provide a subsidy for the booming economy that rich Canadians have been celebrating lately. An ironic parallel in this increasingly globalized economy can be drawn between their work and the contribution of free slave labour to the emergence of industrial capitalism. The resulting social crisis is what we document here: a persistent income gap, above average levels of poverty, high levels of unemployment and underemployment, overrepresentation in low income sectors of the economy and occupations, and under-representation in well paid jobs. There is also a disproportionate concentration in part-time, temporary, and home work -- particularly for racialised women, and an overrepresentation in substandard and increasingly segregated housing,

to go with higher mental and other health risks, tensions between communities and the criminal justice system, and heightened ***social exclusion*** for whole segments of racialised groups.

This report examines the socio-economic condition of racialised groups in Canada s urban centres, where over 75% of them live.

The report presents an analysis of their economic performance based on their income and unemployment levels, and incidence of low income (poverty). In varying degrees, it also reviews other indicators of socio-economic performance such as housing, health, education, contact with the criminal justice system, representation in the media, and political participation. While the report recognizes particular experiences based on ethnicity and gender, it presents a generalized picture of both the immigrant and Canadian-born segments of racialised communities.

The report utilizes a variety of sources of data. In particular, it uses a new, especially designed run of Statistics Canada s Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics for incomes for 1996, 1997, and 1998, (a period of relative prosperity) and a special run of 1996 census data on selected industries and equity groups from the Labour Standards and Workplace Equity Branch of Human Resources and Development Canada. It also uses occupational data from the 1999 Federal Employment Equity report.

The report also attempts to capture some of the realities of life for racialised groups in Canada s urban centres, where most of these groups live, by presenting some narratives and voices of members of racialised groups and of the organizations that advocate for them. It may be that statistical profiles and numbers do not fully express the extent and impact of the racialisation and social exclusion that the report attempts to address. Hearing some of the voices may offer a broader and deeper understanding of the challenges faced daily by the racialised groups. These stories also speak to the challenge that Canada faces with the growing racialisation of poverty, and the threat it represents to the country's stability and economic progress.

The implications of persistent income and employment inequality, economic and social segregation, and political marginalisation, are a looming crisis of social instability and political legitimacy for Canadian society. That s because social inequality exacerbates social instability and economic decline, and it may even lead to violence, as key institutions in society lose legitimacy among the affected communities. Further research is essential to deepen the analysis and develop more effective governmental and civil society responses before these patterns mature into urban racial enclaves, complete with a subculture of underdevelopment. Such a development is increasingly common in other industrialized countries. For now, it is imperative that the government and key institutions in society assume the responsibility for undertaking a comprehensive, multifaceted response within an antiracism action framework. The need for an aggressive antiracism response cannot be overstated, given the social, cultural, and political nature of the problem. Canadian society and the Canadian political class need to come to terms with the extent to which racialised assumptions continue to inform a broad range of public, economic, and social sector decisions. Such general awareness is essential, along

with the necessary political commitment, to the implementation of effective remedies for the growing social exclusion of racialised groups. Canada's political class needs to embrace this crisis with the same zeal that it has brought to the recurring constitutional crises because of the threat it represents to the Canadian state.

Finally, in a section dealing with possible remedies, the report presents an action plan with an anti-racist focus as imperative for dealing with the crisis outlined in the report.

What s New?: Some of the key findings of the report

Findings based on new data analysed by the Centre for Social Justice.

- There is a persistent and sizeable (double digit) gap between the economic performance of racialised group members and other Canadians over the period 1996-98. According to income data, in 1998 there was a 24% gap in average before tax income and a 20% gap in after tax income. The gap grew from 1996 (23% ion average before tax and 20% after tax). The median after tax income gap grew from 23% to 25%, while the median before tax gap remained statistically stagnant (29% in 1996 and 28% in 1998).

- Income, sectoral occupation, and unemployment data show that a racialised labour market is an endemic feature of the Canadian economy. Characteristic of the racial and gender labour market segmentation is the overrepresentation of racialised (particularly women) members in low paid, low end occupations and low income sectors, and also temporary work. They are especially over-represented in low end service sector jobs and precarious and unregulated temporary or contingent work. Conversely they are underrepresented in high paying occupations and high income sectors.

- The racialised employment income gap is observable both among low income earners and high income earners. It persists among those with low and high educational attainment (among those with less than high school education and also among those with university degrees). It only diminishes to single digits when you compare racialised and non- racialised unionized workers.

Other findings based on the Centre's analysis of special run data and existing studies and reports.

- Income inequalities are a significant contributor to racialised group members' persistent above average poverty rates across the nation, and particularly in key urban areas where they are concentrated. The patterns suggest that a process of racialisation of poverty is underway. These patterns are intensified among racialised women.

- As we enter the new millennium, Canada's reliance on immigration to address labour market shortages, has been intensified by the competitive demands of globalisation. An overwhelming majority of Canada s immigrants come from racialised countries, as the traditional sources countries for Canada s immigrants have changed over the last 30 years. Many immigrants are unable to translate their international qualifications and skills into comparable employment and compensation. While Canada competes for the world's best and brightest immigrants, increasingly it has difficulty meeting immigration targets, as some choose not to act on their immigrant

visas, seek employment in the United States or else choose to live in what are called astronaut families, thus splitting the family, so that they can continue to practice their professions in the 'home' country.

- Demographic data show that with current mobility trends, racialised groups will soon form economically disadvantaged majorities in some of Canada s major urban centres. These centres, which receive most new immigrants, are also the areas where most Canadian born members of racialised groups also reside. This raises issues of representation and socio-political exclusion, as major decision-making structures remain overwhelmingly white.

§ The racialisation of poverty is increasingly manifest in urban centres where racialised groups are concentrated, and in the emergence of racial enclaves and a growing racial underclass. This process is intensifying in increasingly racially segregated neighbourhoods. In an increasingly segregated housing market, racialised groups are relegated to substandard, marginal, and often overpriced housing. The growing social inequalities act as social determinants of health and well being, with higher health risks, barriers to social services, and increased contact with the criminal justice system.

§ The demands for labour market flexibility in the urban 'globalized' economy have disproportionately exposed racialised groups to contract, temporary, part-time, and shift work with no job security, poor and often unsafe working conditions, intensive labour, excessive hours, low wages, and no benefits. Many are employed on exploitative contracts by temporary agencies, with some assigning work based on racist stereotypes. Racialised women are particularly over-represented in Canada's sweatshops -- unregulated piecemeal homework. This labour is a subsidy for many employers at the expense of quality of life for these poorly paid workers.

- While the average educational attainment of immigrants has risen, partly due to strict skill based immigration policy requirements, this has not translated into comparable employment and income opportunities. Of the skilled workers selected in 1998, fully 72% (or 56% including dependants) had university degrees, a rate about four times that of Canadian born households, yet income and unemployment differentials persist between racialised immigrants and other Canadians.

- Immigration status has become a proxy for racial discrimination as employers insist on Canadian qualifications despite operating in an increasingly globalized economy. While European immigrants qualifications routinely go unchallenged, racialised Canadians often lose opportunities because of the perceived value of their qualifications. As a result, racialised group immigrants have a longer immigration lag than non- racialised immigrants.

- Within the general framework of racialised labour markets, and public and social sectors' interaction, particular forms of racism have emerged directed at specific racialised communities. Anti-Black racism, Anti-Chinese racism, Anti-Asian racism,

and Anti-Arab racism are forms of racial discrimination and discourses that further differentiate impacts on racialised groups in the workplace and in social settings.

- Racialisation diminishes the value of Canadian citizenship for racialised groups. While over a third of racialised group members are Canadian born, assumptions of non-Canadian origins are common in public discourse, workplaces, and even employment interviews. Many racialised Canadians are left with a feeling of not belonging, and some choose to avoid civic or public service for fear of questions about their Canadian-ness.

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Definitions of terms frequently used in the report:

Racialised group members – Persons other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or not-white in colour – Includes: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab/West Asian, South East Asian, Filipino, Latin American, Japanese, Korean and Pacific Islanders (based on the Federal Employment Equity Act definition of visible minorities)

Equity groups – Women, Visible Minorities, Disabled people, Aboriginal peoples

Racialisation – Process by which racial categories are constructed as different and unequal in ways that leads to social, economic and political impacts

Systemic racism – In the Canadian context, it refers to social processes that tolerate, reproduce and perpetuate judgements about racial categories that produce racial inequality in access to life opportunities and treatment received by racial minorities. The Supreme Court has established the standard for unequal treatment as impact, not motive or intent.

LICO – Low Income Cut Off - Statistics Canada's generally accepted poverty line

Family income – single earner, dual earners, and multiple income earners

Income Gap – The difference between the average incomes of two identifiable groups e.g. racialised groups and other Canadians

Employment Income – income from wages, salaries, self-employment and

After-tax income – net market income plus transfers.

Median income is the income of the middle person when you arrange all income earners in a row. Half earn more and half earn less. It is a more accurate representation of the middle range.

Average Income is the income of the person or family derived by adding up all incomes and divided by the total number. It tends to be skewed to higher levels due to the fact that at the high end many people earn 100s of times the income of low earners.

Content Overview

The aim of this report is to identify and explain patterns of growing inequities in the economic performance of Canada s non-aboriginal racialised populations, both immigrant and Canadian born, and the related social-economic implications for the communities and the broader Canadian society.

The **Introduction** lays out many of the issues and findings raised in the report. The report situates the economic performance of racialised communities in Canada in a historical context that has generated racially and gender stratified labour markets, persistent barriers to socio-economic and political participation, and an increasingly segregated existence.

Part 1 —Growing racialisation of the economic gap in historical context -- examines these structures, beginning with processes of immigration, characterized by racialised inequalities in access to the country, and explains the gap in income and employment between racialised groups and other Canadians.

Part 2 —Economic condition of racialised communities — A statistical profile. The data consistently show that, according to income and employment indicators as well as other economic performance measures, members of racialised groups are at a disadvantage in Canadian society. The employment and income gap between racialised group members and the rest of the Canadian population is shown to be significant and in some cases growing.

In **Part 3** —**Conventional and alternative explanations for racial inequality — myths and facts**. The report acknowledges competing explanations for the racialised gap in economic performance and presents arguments and evidence to counter some of the often-used myths about racialised groups, especially about immigrants, myths that have been so often repeated that they have had an impact on Canadian government policy making.

Beyond that, in **Part 4 --Socio-economic and political implications --** the report is able to show, using a holistic approach to the study of the economic gap, that, for many, the experience of differential treatment in the process of immigrant integration, which begins with racialised inequalities in access to the country, makes inequalities in labour market participation inevitable and leads to inequalities in access to social goods such as housing, education, and health care. The continuum of inequality extents to contact with the criminal justice system, differential life chances, and unequal civic and political participation. This sets up a condition of **social exclusion** that undermines the objective goal of full citizenship and opens the way for social inequality to translate into social instability.

Part 5 --The role of the state in arresting this condition is crucial, as is the role of other key institutions in society, such as the labour movement, whom the communities will have to rely on to organize the fight for better wages and working conditions. Other social justice organizations within civil society can also support initiatives to empower the racialised communities to assert their voices and full citizenship, as a basis for challenging government policies and private sector practices that perpetuate the structures of socio-economic inequality and exclusion.

Finally, **Part 6 --Recommendations for progress** --offers some principles and ideas as a basis for progressive policy development and advocacy initiatives. The report calls for action on the part of governments and key institutions in Canadian society to avert the adverse social and economic repercussions that will come with the persistence of such racial inequality. It is our hope that the report can also provide advocates for social justice in the racialised communities and in the broader community another tool to use in their daily struggles for the protection of the economic and social rights of all of Canada s people.

As well placed in the the text are portraits of racial inequality in the Best Country in the World to Live In . These portraits counter the often-cited United Nations ranking of countries based on the UN s increasingly questionable Human Development Index. They present some narratives from research in urban Canada describing the experience of living as a racialised group member in Canada. Their voices call into question the high ranking that levels the experiences of communities using averages, and pays little or no attention to the condition of specific segments of societies. This criticism is warranted for racialised groups as well as for women, children, and First Nations peoples, who continue to struggle to assert their social, economic, and cultural rights, which are otherwise guaranteed by the United Nations International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights.

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INTRODUCTION

Emerging realities, old problems: Canada s economy and population are changing

Canada s population has become more ethnically and racially diverse, following key changes in the otherwise Eurocentric immigration policy, which traces its roots to the first colonial contact with the Aboriginal nations. Canada s population growth is now disproportionately dependent on immigration from source countries that are dominated by people of colour. This is a complete reversal of earlier trends that encouraged white immigration. However, this has less to do with political choice, as was the case in the past, and more to do with global immigration trends and globalisation. In fact, Canada's immigration debate continually betrays an anti- racialised group sentiment. The percentage of members of racialised groups in the Canadian population, which was under 4% in 1971, had risen to 9.4% by the beginning of the last decade. That figure rose to 11.2% in 1996 and is projected to be 20% by 2016. Canada s racialised population is mainly concentrated in urban centres, with over 75% living in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal in 1996. According to the 1996 census, people of colour made up 16% of the population of Ontario, Canada s largest province. That number is expected to rise to 25% by 2015. In 1996, racial minorities accounted for 32% of the population of the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) for Toronto. The city itself, Canada's biggest, is expected in the 2001 Census to have a population of racialised communities forming a majority of some 54%. In Vancouver (CMA), 31% of the residents were racialised minorities in 1996, while Calgary (CMA) had 16%, Edmonton (CMA) 13%, and Montreal (CMA) 12%. While 68% of Canada s racialised group members are immigrants, a significant number, 32%, are Canadian born.

The complex dynamics of population change are interwoven with the organization of the Canadian economy. Canada s economy has historically created social class hierarchies that emphasize divisions such as gender and race. Race is a social construct based principally on superficial differences in physical appearance, but it has always been an important part of Canada s population-economy complex. From early European attempts to take control of the land, resources, and trade from the First Nations, which involved restricting their economic participation, to the selective importation of African American, Asian, and Caribbean labour, and the more recent casualization of racialised immigrant labour, race has been and continues to be a major factor in determining access to economic opportunity in Canada.

Canada as a resource rich and labour poor country has historically met its labour shortages by encouraging immigration, but within the framework of an assimilation policy aimed at maintaining a white society . Hence the official categories of 'desirables' and 'undesirables' that dominated immigration policy until recently. The demands of an expanding economy and the slowing of interest in migration to Canada by

different groups of Europeans led to a decision to remove the legal restrictions against non-European immigration in the 1960s. Even then, administrative restrictions continued to be enforced; these demanded that only those with government designated essential skills could qualify. These measures also acted as a proxy for managing the flow of immigrants so as not to threaten the Eurocentric nature of the country. The outcome of these policies was a gender and racially stratified labour market. Indeed many potential female immigrants from the South could only apply as domestic workers, although they had professional and other qualifications[2]

Canada s immigration policy shifted in the 1960s towards a more racially liberal skills based points system that attracted many newcomers from outside Europe. Immigrants with a broad range of skills from the South arrived, only to be subjected to barriers to access in employment -- as documented by a Royal Commission report in the early 1980s -- or slotted into low end job ghettoes, as other research shows. The immigration data show that the increased numbers of skilled immigrants from the South have not experienced economic success comparable to that of European immigrants or Canadians of European heritage. Instead, in a departure from earlier patterns of immigrant economic performance, the lag in economic attainment has become a permanent income gap between racialised communities and the rest of the population. In a pattern that coincides with the influx of racialised immigrant groups, and seems to be holding both during and after the recession years of the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, immigrant economic performance has grown progressively worse over the last quarter century. So while Canada s population is becoming more racially diverse, the country s history of differential treatment of non-European peoples seems to condition a welcome for racialised groups that limits their life chances and access to opportunity in a manner not experienced by previous waves of immigrants, who also came to seek a better life.

Canada s political economy: The growing economic gap is racialised

The Centre for Social Justice s *Growing Gap* reports by Armine Yalnyzian show clearly that, while the Canadian economy was growing faster in the late 1990s than at any time over the last 25 years, Canadian incomes were becoming progressively unequal. There is a generalized growing gap between the top 10% income earners and the rest of the population.[3] The gap between Canada s racialised groups and other Canadians has also grown and become sustained in double digits. What this report shows is that, the income inequality in Canada is also increasingly along racial lines. The impact is a growing socio-economic exclusion of racialised groups, which is manifested in their labour market experiences of higher unemployment, overrepresentation in low end occupations and low income sectors, under representation in managerial, professional, and high income occupations and sectors, and lower incomes. This has had broader effects such as higher poverty rates, lower civic and political participation, higher health risks, lower quality housing, and intensified segregation of neighbourhoods and contact with the criminal justice system. What is important to note here is that these effects are not limited to 'new comers', but are also experienced by many racialised group members who have either lived in Canada for extended periods of time or were born in the country.

Findings on income and racialised communities

The Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) special run of data designed by John Anderson for the CSJ Foundation for 1996-98, a period of relative prosperity, show a sustained double digit between the incomes of racialised group members and other Canadians. This clearly suggests a failure of the market-based approach to dealing with racial inequality. Based on individual earnings, racialised Canadians earned in 1996 a pre-tax average of $19,227, while non- racialised Canadians made $25,069, or 23% more. The median income (showing half earning more and half earning less) gap at 29% ($13,648 to $19,111) suggests an even more profound inequality. The gap grew in 1997 as the racialised group average pre-tax income increase did not keep pace at $19,558, when compared to the $25,938 earned by other Canadians, i.e. a gap of 25%. The median before tax income again betrays deeper inequality, with individual racialised groups' earnings declining to $13,413, while others saw a modest increase to $19,602. The median income gap also grew from 1996 to 1997 to 32%. The growing economy improved the income position of racialised group members in 1998, but the gap did not diminish substantially over the three-year period. Data show an average before tax income for racialised groups of $20,626, which accounted for 76% of the $27,174 the rest of the population earned, for a gap of 24%. The median incomes increased to $14,507 compared to $20,517 respectively, leaving the gap at 28%.[4]

The tax effect was marginal in terms of closing the gap. The average after tax income of the racialised groups in 1996 was $16,053, compared to $20,129 for other Canadians, a 20% gap. After tax incomes grew for both groups in 1997 to $16,438 or 79% of the $20,793for other Canadians, figures still showing a marginal growing gap. But while the median after tax income for 1996 was $12,991 for racialised groups, compared to $16,922 for other Canadians, a gap of 23%, that gap grew in 1997 to 26%, as racialised group members took home less at $12,895, while other Canadians increased their earnings to $17,320. In 1998, taking the tax effect into consideration, racialised groups earned an after tax average of $17,376, i.e. 80% of the $21,694 for the rest of the population. The median after tax income was $13,561 compared to $18,146 respectively, or a still high gap of 25%.[5]

In essence, analysis of the employment income data for this three-year 'economic boom' period (1996-98) shows a growing gap that marginally levelled off in 1998, leaving a substantially high income gap that, if you look at the median incomes for the three years, is as high as 32%.

Racialised groups and unequal access to the workplace

Numerous studies discuss the issue of unequal access to the workplace for racialised groups.[6] It is an important part of what explains this big racialised income gap. The employment gap between racialised groups and other Canadians dramatically demonstrates this unequal access to work opportunities. The unemployment rate in 1991 was 16%, compared to 11% for the general population.[7] The data show that the levels of unemployment were much higher among specific racialised groups, including women

and youth. The 1995 rate for racialised women was 15.3% compared to 13.2% for racialised men, compared to 9.4% for other women and 9.9% for other men[8]. What the data shows is a relationship between systemic discrimination in access to employment and overrepresentation in low income sectors and low paying occupations, despite comparable educational attainment levels. For many racialised group members, education attainment has not translated into comparable compensation, labour market access, or workplace mobility. For immigrants (68% of the racialised group), structural barriers to prior learning skills, and job experience assessment, and denial of accreditation for those with trade and professional qualifications by provincially regulated licensing bodies, in part account for the failure to translate qualifications which are key to their selection in the immigration process, into comparable employment and compensation.

The history of differential treatment experienced by both newcomers and other racialised group members in the labour market means that the impact of systemic racial discrimination is crucial in understanding the emergence of the racialised income and employment gap. In most cases, this experience is shared by Canadian born members of the groups. [9] The data show that immigrant members of racialised groups have more in common, in terms of unemployment and incidence of low income, with Canadian born racialised group members than with immigrants from Europe arriving in the same period. In fact, the income gap between European immigrants and other immigrants is also growing; this suggests differential access to economic opportunity due to discriminatory structures in the labour market. The impact of systemic discrimination in employment has been identified by a major royal commission and by the numerous studies done during the 1980s and 1990s. This prompted some government policy responses, including federal employment equity legislation in 1986. Annual reports under the federal legislation show a continuing pattern of discrimination in employment both in the federal public service as well as in federally regulated sectors such as banking, telecommunications, and broadcasting.[10]

Racialised groups and differential experiences of poverty

According to 1995 Statistics Canada data, 35.6% of members of racialised groups lived under the poverty line, compared to 17.6% in the general Canadian population, i.e., twice the rate of poverty[11].

The rate of poverty among racialised group members in Canada's urban centres was 37.6%, compared to 20.9% for the rest of the population.[12] While we are not able to disaggregate the data further, the picture is even worse when you look at particular groups of racialised group members. Such is the case with racialised women, single parent groups and certain ethno-racial groups, as research has done.[13] Other research -- based on SLID special run data for the CSJ Foundation - that looks at after tax family income shows that, in 1998, some 19 % of racialised community families lived in poverty, compared to 10.4% among other Canadians, i.e., almost double the poverty rate.[14]

The experience of poverty has many social implications and impacts an individual, or on a family s or group s life chances. Low incomes cut into standard basic needs expenditure budgets, dooming many racialised people to substandard and increasingly segregated housing, poor quality diets, reliance on food banks, and used clothing. Some of the effects identified are learning difficulties for the young, social and psychological pressures within the family, increased mental and other health risks, and an array of symptoms of social exclusion, including increased contact with the criminal justice system and an inability to participate fully in the civic and social life of the community, or to exercise democratic rights such as voting and advocacy.

Conventional explanations for racial inequality don't measure up

Conventional explanations for the gap in the economic performance of racialised groups, the income gap, the gap in employment levels, their overrepresentation in low paid occupations, underrepresentation in high income occupations and sectors, and disproportionate exposure to precarious work and poverty, tend to focus on three factors: recent immigration, lack of Canadian experience, and educational attainment differentials. It is commonly argued that, because of these three, recent immigrants initially lag behind other Canadians but are able to catch up over time.

But the experience of the last 25 years is one of sustained low relative economic performance for racialised immigrant groups. Both educational attainment and human capital data for immigrants after the 1970s, when the majority of immigrants to Canada became members of racialised communities, do not support the 'low immigrant quality' contention. A number of recent studies refute the myth that the lower human capital quality of racialised job seekers and/or workers explains these differential experiences in the labour market. While Canadian experience should matter less and less in a globalized economy, it is often noted that, in Canada's major urban centres, far too many cab drivers have professional and advanced degrees. What is the nature of the required experience that excludes people who have previously enjoyed such high levels of success from reasonable access to the labour market?

Racialised immigrant groups are increasingly better educated, yet they face longer immigration lag periods and relegation into casual and temporary work; Canadian born group members are experiencing similar patterns in the labour market. Moreover, the gap in economic performance between racialised and non-racialised immigrants is growing, with a double-digit gap in incomes of 28% over the period 1991-95. The persistence of systemic discrimination, including the use of immigrant status as a proxy for 'low human capital', conditions the patterns of underemployment of a labour force educated above average. But even when dealing with segments that are not as highly qualified for labour market participation (as is often said of some refugee populations, for instance), there are unjustifiable levels of overrepresentation in low income sectors and occupations, casual, contract, temporary, and piece-meal work.[15] These are better explained by differential treatment access to the labour market, which in turn inevitably leads to the growing gap in economic performance and incidence of poverty along racial lines.

The nature of state and civil society responses to racialisation of the economic gap

While studies and report findings show that conventional explanations are not sustainable, they nevertheless continue to be used in many Canadian jurisdictions to support a generalized policy of non-intervention by the different levels of government. Neither the alarming statistics about the socio-economic condition of whole segments of racialised communities nor the racialisation of the growing income gap has mobilized government action beyond voluntary equity programs in select jurisdictions. The federal government's Employment Equity Act came into force in 1986. Most other jurisdictions rely on human rights codes to regulate racially discriminatory conduct. The federal government's antiracism program is also governed by the federal Multicultural Policy, introduced in 1988 and administered by the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism. Provinces have jurisdictional responsibility for employment law, and regulate working conditions through employment standards acts.

But these modest measures have also met resistance. Indeed in Ontario in 1995, the Conservative government repealed the Ontario Employment Equity Act, 1994, as soon as it was elected to power. Recently, the Ontario government also gutted the Employment Standards Act, increasing the average number of work hours possible per week to 60 from 44. As documented by the participation of visible minorities in the Public Service Taskforce, the federal Employment Equity Act, which was amended in 1995, has not adequately addressed the problems of racialised groups in the federal public service. Not only are participation levels still chronically low (5.4%), but the enforcement regime that plagued the original legislation enacted in 1986 was not improved in the 1995 review. Finally, although Canada is a signatory to various international covenants and conventions under the United Nations, including the United Nations Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, the contradictions that Frances Henry and others have characterized as democratic racism have impeded progress in implementing those international obligations.[16]

Two key reasons may explain government non-action. One is the embrace of a market ideology by the different levels of government in the 1990s. The prevailing ideology of neo-liberalism considers the market the final arbiter of social justice and equality. The market determines what is fair compensation for labour, independent of the needs of the individual or family. The idea that the government should make up the shortfall to ensure that citizens have a living income is frowned upon as distorting market conditions. That logic renders the distribution of the wealth created by the society or equality of incomes of little consequence or value to society. Increasingly, governments and representatives of big business define the problem of racism away in the same way they define away poverty, i.e., by shifting the focus to poverty based on absolute levels of material well being — the meeting of the most basic human needs — as opposed to an individual s and/or groups position relative to other citizens or groups.

The more generalized response at the different levels of government has been to deny the impact of racialisation in the workplace and in the public domain. When confronted with evidence of differential treatment leading to racial inequality in economic performance, officials insist on economic growth rather than government action as the solution. But, while economic growth can be a solution to the problems of poverty and low incomes, the uneven distribution of its rewards still suggests a need for action on racial discrimination. It is clear in the case of racialised group members in Canada that growth in the economy has not sufficiently addressed their higher than average levels of unemployment, the income gap, or the levels of poverty they experience. So even within the logic of market supremacy, we are confronted with a case of market failure. But as Reitz and Breton have suggested, the governments' failure to act seems to meet Canadian public approval, making advocacy for state action quite a challenge.[17]

There are flaws in this approach. First, economic growth is uneven and does not benefit everyone or every group equally, so that structural inequities are simply reproduced by the changes in economic performance. Indeed, in recent years, economic growth has actually been associated with the immiseration of some groups of people. For instance, demands for flexibility and technological intensification have led to the growth of part-time, casual, and contingency work, with many workers of colour forced to accept less than minimum wages. It has also forced less skilled workers right out of work. Second, the argument that the distribution of income is irrelevant is not supported by the evidence from around the world. Studies show that the relative economic position of individuals and communities does determine an individual s or a groups life chances.

On the other hand, the response from civil society organizations has lacked conviction. The reality of racism in Canada as a cultural force may explain the failure of social justice and labour organizations to mobilize effectively to respond to the crisis of racial inequality. As Henry and others (2000) have remarked, too often myths about racism get in the way of action and replace collective action with strategies for denial.

Social inequality: An issue of public concern

Social inequality is both a social justice and an economic issue. But it is also an issue of public and political concern because inequality leads to group tensions and instability in society. Studies from around the world as well as some recent Canadian studies show that the most unequal societies are also the most unstable. The higher the level of inequality, the higher is the probability of violence and disorder within society and the family. Inequality does in fact matter. Health and well-being are heavily influenced by the distribution of economic resources, prestige, and social position. Studies show that quality of life appears to be lower in unequal societies, as such societies suffer illness-generating conditions. Socio-economic inequality is one of the most powerful influences on health and mortality rates. The greater the income differences within populations, the greater the health risks. There are risks arising from the conditions of work to which low income earners are subjected, so that the disproportionate participation of groups in that

type of work leads to greater exposure to health risks. This is clearly the case with racialised groups, especially women involved in garment working, domestic work, industrial cleaning, etc. The gender and racial stratification of the labour market definitely has implications for health and well-being. [18]

North American studies show that reducing income disparity decreases mortality rates. Other data show that income inequality,
is also related to other social breakdowns, such as the amount of homicide and violent crime.[19] A final observation relating to income distribution may be that cities with greater inequality are less socially cohesive. The challenge of social harmony is likely greater if the inequality is along racial lines.

The political nature of the problem of a racialised growing gap

Ultimately racial inequality is a political problem and requires political commitments by governments and different sectors of society to address it. An economy showing increasing levels of economic inequality along racial lines challenges the notion of a democracy based on the concept of equality of citizenship. Not only does it devalue the citizenship of some groups in society, but it also raises questions of political legitimacy, and, as those who are economically excluded become more politically assertive, they may seek to reverse the unjust outcomes of the market and government policy using means that may impact the stability of the society. We need to be concerned that the rhetoric of multicultural harmony and embracing diversity that has been a prominent part of government policy over the last 20 years in Canada does not mask the reality of rising inequality between the racialised communities and other Canadians. The challenge falls on organizations in civil society to build a politics that prioritizes racial and other forms of inequality in a holistic political agenda that will shift public discourse away from criminalizing immigration, marginalizing racialised groups and the poor, devaluing non-European human capital, towards strengthening the commitment to use governments as a positive instrument to respond to social problems. The need is urgent to build a progressive coalition that will engage both governments and other actors in society in a meaningful debate about the nature of Canadian society and the place of racialised groups in it. We need to challenge the denial that too often accompanies the discussion of racial inequality and adopt an aggressive anti-racist approach to designing new institutions, policies, and programs for a twenty-first century that will bear true witness to our aspirations to be a diverse and multicultural/ multiracial society.

This report calls for action by the levels of government and key institutions in society to address the socio-economic exclusion of Canada s racialised population and the impact that the growing income and employment gap between that population and other Canadians is having on their full participation in Canadian society. It suggests that, while specific policies and programs are needed to address this racialised gap, the gap in citizenship can only be bridged if all Canadians comes to terms with the tension between the commitment to the ideals of equality as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, and the reality of a persistent nostalgia for a white 'supremacist' society. It is a nostalgia that informs far too many decisions in the labour market, in governments

and public institutions and also in the social sector and in cultural institutions such as the mass media. One suspects that racialised group members recoil with horror when they walk through the headquarters in Toronto (Canada's most diverse city) of one of Canada's pre-eminent cultural institutions, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and are confronted with a boulevard of almost all white media personalities! The place of racialised groups in Canadian society faces greater peril from the everyday discounting of the human capital and value of racialised group members in the workplace, in public institutions, in the social service sector, in civil society organizations, in the arts, in the media, and in government than it does from cross-burning, swastika-wielding Heritage Front members, whose form of aggressive racism Canadian society has already marginalized.

The report offers comment on some of the policy and program responses that have been widely articulated elsewhere, including employment equity, fair access to professions and trades, employment standards legislation, and equitable access to services like health care, education, training, and housing. The report also looks to social institutions such as organized labour to make a more concerted effort to empower the affected communities in the workplaces and sectors in which they are overrepresented or underrepresented, for that matter. The services sector is an obvious target for such organizing efforts, while there is also a need to review barriers to unionized sectors and occupations that are well paying. Unions can lead by bargaining employment equity provisions into their collective agreements. Finally, the report suggests further research in related areas in which systemic discrimination impact is manifested, such as housing, education, the political and judicial systems, social sectors, and the media and Canadian culture.

Part 1: The racialised income gap in historical context

Canada s changing population confronts a historic racial divide

Canada s population and economy are changing, and are prompting new questions about some old assumptions regarding Canadian society. There are also demands for explanations of the new realities that are emerging. Canada s welfare state has undergone massive restructuring as the economy has become more integrated into the global economy. The ethnic and racial composition of the labour force is changing even more rapidly, thanks in part to conditions of heightened globalisation. In 1961, over 95% of Canada s population was of European heritage, largely due to a history of racist immigration policies, but a demographic shift began to appear in the 1970s with the increase in immigrants from Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Over the last 30 years, Canada s population has become increasingly ethnically and racially diverse, as the source countries from which Canada s immigrants come have changed from Europe to countries dominated by people of colour.

In 1996, Canada was home to about five million immigrants, a 14.5% increase since 1991, according to new data from the 1996 census. This increase accounted for more than three times the growth rate of the Canadian born population. Immigrants constituted 17.4% of the population, the largest share in more than 50 years. Of note is the fact that, since the 1970s, increasing numbers of immigrants to Canada have come from Asia and the Middle East. Asian born immigrants accounted for more than half (57%) of the 1,039,000 immigrants who arrived between 1991 and 1996, up from 33% of the immigrants who arrived in the 1970s.[20]

The percentage of racialised minorities in the Canadian population, which was under 4% in 1971, grew to 9.4% by 1991, hit double digits (11.2%) by 1996, and is now projected to be 20% by 2016. With Canada s continued reliance on immigration for population growth and with globalisation escalating, these trends are likely to continue.[21]Canada s racialised groups are mainly concentrated in urban centres, with Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal accounting for about 75% of the total racialised population (Toronto 42%, Vancouver 18%, and Montreal 13%). In 1996, racial minorities accounted for 32% of the population of the Census Metropolitan Area for Toronto, Canada s biggest metropolis For the City of Toronto, which forms the core of the CMA, the percentage of racialised communities is expected to be over 50% by the year 2001. Vancouver was not too far behind, at 31%, while Calgary was 16%, Edmonton 13% and Montreal 12%.[22]

Table 1: Racialised group population as percentage of total Canadian population, 1996

	Total Population	Total racialised group Population	Racialised group as % of total Population	Geographic distribution of racialised group %
Canada	**28,528,125**	**3,197,480**	**11.2**	**100.0**
Newfoundland	547,155	3,815	0.7	0.1
P.E.I	132,855	1,520	1.1	0.0
Nova Scotia	899,970	31,320	3.5	1.0
New Brunswick	729,625	7,995	1.1	0.3
Quebec	7,045,085	433,985	6.2	13.6
Ontario	10,642,790	1,682,045	15.8	52.6
Manitoba	1,100,295	77,355	7.0	2.4
Saskatchewan	976,615	26,945	2.8	0.8
Alberta	2,669,195	269,280	10.1	8.4
B.C.	3,689,760	660,545	17.9	20.7
Yukon	30,650	1,000	3.3	0.0
N.W.T.	64,125	1,670	2.6	0.1

Source: Census 1996 Statistics Canada

Table 2: Racialised population by group, 1996

	Number	%
Total population	3,197,480	100
Chinese	860,150	26.9
South Asian	670,585	21
Black	573,860	17.9
Arab/West	244,665	7.7
Filipino	234,200	7.3
Latin American	176,975	5.5
South East Asian	172,765	5.4
Japanese	68,135	2.1

Korean	64,835	2.0
Not included elsewhere	69,745	2.2
Multiple identities reported	61,570	1.9

Source: 1996 Census data, Statistics Canada

Overwhelmingly, the changes in immigration composition have been most felt by Canada s three biggest urban areas -—Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. The cumulative increase in the number of racialised group members over the last 30 years is most noticeable in the major urban areas, where, in the 1990s, more than 80% chose to settle. They have transformed these areas into diverse cultural centres, and their increased contributions to the life and economies of cities like Toronto have led many Torontonians to proclaim diversity as their city s strength. In 1996, the Toronto CMA, which roughly covers the area that is the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), was home to 1.3 million racial minorities, who constituted 32% of its total population. That number is expected to rise to 1.7 million by the year 2001. Four out of every 10 recent immigrants settled in the Toronto CMA, and 60% of them were from Asia and the Middle East. The other big magnet for recent immigrants is Vancouver, which received 18% of all recent immigrants to Canada between 1991-96, 80% of whom were Asian born.[23] Racialised group members accounted for at least 33% of the residents in 10 of the biggest municipalities in Toronto and Vancouver in 1996. Scarborough, Ontario led the way with 52%. Richmond, (Vancouver) was next with 50%. Markham, Ontario had 46%, the City of Vancouver, 45%, and North York, Ontario, 40%, etc. [24]

Table 3: Racialised group population as a percentage of Census Metropolitan Areas, 1996

CMA	%
Canada	**11.2%**
Toronto	31.6
Vancouver	31.1
Calgary	15.6
Edmonton	13.5
Montr al	12.2
Ottawa-Hull	11.5
Winnipeg	11.1
Windsor	10.0
Kitchener	8.9
Hamilton	7.9
London	7.7

Victoria	7.6
Halifax	6.8
Oshawa	6.0
Regina	5.4
Saskatoon	5.2
St. Catharines-Niagara	3.7
Thunder Bay	2.2
Saint John	2.1
Sherbrooke	2.1
Sudbury	1.8
Qu bec	1.5
St. John's	1.4
Trois-Rivi res	0.9
Chicoutimi-Jonqui re	0.4

Source: 1996 Census data, Statistics Canada

As indicated earlier, during much of the 1990s, over 75% of Canada s newcomers were members of the racialised group communities. This shift in the composition of population change in Canada will have implications for Canada in a number of areas, not the least of which is the economy. Already, with that shift, has come a noticeable lag in economic attainment among members of the immigrant groups. It is a lag that increasingly defies conventional explanation, given that the recent emphasis on a skills based points system for immigrants and an increase in independent class and economy class immigration were supposed to raise the skill level of those migrating to Canada. About 34% of recent immigrants (1991-96) aged 25-44 had completed university, compared to 19% in the rest of the Canadian population. In fact, in 1996, 43% of all recent immigrants aged 25 to 44 were postsecondary graduates (university or college).[25] Even more noteworthy is that these patterns of high educational attainment and poor economic performance seem to be holding both during and after the recession years of the late 1980s and early 1990s. While most groups are doing better during the period of recovery in the late 1990s, racialised groups who are recent immigrants (10 years or less) are doing at best only marginally better, and many are still struggling with high unemployment, low incomes, and family and child poverty.

The complex dynamics of population change are interwoven into the organization of the Canadian economy and into the quality of life both in Canada s urban centres, where the new immigrants have chosen to build new lives, and in the rural areas where many first sought job opportunities. [26] As we enter the 21st century, these changing dynamics will affect the role of governments retreating from the traditional welfare state and their responsibility for the provision of public services such as welfare and settlement services. While some believe they can exert a positive influence on the political, economic, and cultural makeup of society, others remain sceptical, if not downright hostile. There is concern about the preoccupations of those responsible for Canadian immigration policy in the past, who for decades insisted, first officially and later administratively, on racially

based hierarchical classifications that would ensure European dominance [27] Concern about the impact of immigration induced population change has also been expressed by members of the public, who in recent opinion surveys have been showing a growing intolerance for immigrants of colour. However, a majority of those surveyed did not believe that Canada s changing demographic make-up posed a danger to the country. Other research into the attitudes of Canadians regarding recent immigration, which was conducted by Palmer, supports the contention that many Canadians are concerned at least about the economic consequences of immigration, if not about issues of integration [28]

The areas of the country most immediately impacted by the massive demographic changes brought about by recent immigration are Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, and perhaps Alberta. But the impact goes beyond sheer numbers to issues of public policy and identity. Ontario has 37% of Canada s population, but 54% of the immigrant population. Over 26% of the province s people are immigrants, and the province accounts for 57% of the annual inflow into the country, [the majority of whom in recent years come from non-European sources. A recent City of Toronto funded analysis by Michael Ornstein of the 1996 census data showed that racialised group members living in Toronto, Ontario s capital and biggest city, are three times more likely to live in poverty and two times ore likely to be unemployed than other Torontonians.

This poses a challenge in terms of both economic and social public policy.[29] Immigration from Asia was a key factor in helping British Columbia s economy outperform other provinces during the recession in the early 1990s, but it has also been speculated that it was fear of immigration that made many traditional New Democratic Party voters into instant Reformers, and led the party to an electoral breakthrough in 1993.[30] More recently, in British Columbia, where the population is 25% immigrant, and is the destination of 21% of new immigration, Canada s first premier from a racialised group, Ujjal Dosanjh, was chosen by the governing NDP caucus. In Quebec, with 10% of the population immigrant, some in the sovereignty movement have fingered ethnic communities for the razor thin win by the No side in the last referendum, and suggested an inordinate influence on the politics of Quebec.[31] Without accepting this assertion as fact, it may be said that, given the variation of opinion on sovereignty within the racialised communities themselves, the ethnic communities, of which recent immigrants form a sizable part in Quebec, are said to be, on average, more sympathetic to the Canadian federation than those of French-Canadian heritage. Alberta has the third largest percentage of its population made up of immigrants at 15%.

Canadian Political Economy and Canada s Immigration Policy

> (That) Canada should desire to restrict immigration from the Orient is natural; that Canada should remain a White man s country is believed to be not only desirable for economic and social reasons, but highly necessary on political and national grounds. (Excerpt from Report of W.L. Mackenzie King, C.M.G, 1908)
>
> Canada is an underpopulated country by most standards of measurement there is little dissent from the proposition that Canada needs immigrants .without a

> substantial continuing flow of immigrants, it is doubtful that we can sustain the high rate of economic growth and the associated cultural development which are essential to the maintenance and development of our national identity besides the economic and cultural pulls of our neighbour to the south [32]

Canada s labour market polices correspond to the complex of the dynamics of population change that is interwoven into the organization of the Canadian economy. The historical demand for labour either in the urban industrial heartland, the resource extraction hinterland, or the farming rural regions accounts for the successive waves of immigrants from around the world who have made Canada their home over the decades. Canadian immigration policy has traditionally focussed on issues of labour market behaviour — especially ensuring that the inflows do not represent a hardship to the existing work force; selectivity — categories of desirables and undesirables; and assimilation of immigrants, with more recent consideration of skills and labour market criteria such as choice of occupations in determining eligibility, and of human rights and humanitarian criteria.

Key elements of Canada s immigration policy have always been racial and ethnic considerations regarding the inflows. While its primary task was always to meet the country s human resource needs, Canada s immigration policy emerged within the context of the white supremacist culture that informed the founding and development of the Canadian nation. At key moments in the history of Canada, immigration policy served as a clear manifestation of an embedded racism perpetuated by the dominant group against those both within and without its borders. Since 1994, Ekos Research Associates has been polling Canadians about the acceptability of racialised immigrants. In its June 2000 survey, it found that 30% of those surveyed and 45% of those intending to vote for the Alliance party felt there were too many racialised immigrants in Canada. Aside from the fact that one should wonder why it is their right to pronounce on this issue, the blatantly racist premise of the question is justified on the basis of the need to collect information about the challenge of integration for newcomers to Canada.[33] However, it is part of a continuation of racialised discourses that inform immigration policy and the debate about the nature of immigration.

What emerges then is a labour market that is not only based on social class, but is also racially stratified as a result of racially motivated policies that determine access to the Canadian labour market —- both for immigrants and those within Canada. Given the continuing stated commitment by the federal government to continue labour market based immigration policy, it is important that we understand the place of immigration, not just in shaping the Canadian political economy, but in the country itself.

In the pre-Confederation period, slavery was juxtaposed with white only immigration policy in all colonies until 1832. As early as 1784, racial tensions and discrimination against black workers, who objected to earning a quarter of the wages of their white counterparts, led to racial riots in the towns of in Shelbourne and Birchtown in Nova Scotia, and to the exodus of over 1,200 blacks to Sierra Leone.[34] After Confederation in 1867, there are numerous examples of racially motivated immigration policies that

defined the composition of Canada s labour force for years to come. While Chinese immigrants were welcome to work on the building of the railway between 1881—85, in 1885 the Canadian government passed the Chinese Immigration Act, which established the Chinese head tax, with the objective of stemming the tide of Chinese immigrants, who were then seen as competitors for jobs performed by white workers. The amount demanded was increased to a prohibitive $500 in 1903.[35] Additional restrictions were slapped on other racialised immigrants with a federal order-in-council in 1907 that imposed an entry minimum of $200 on South Asian Immigrants. The 1908 Continuous Passage Act sought to impede further the immigration of South Asians, whose immigration status was superior to that of the Chinese, because they were from a country in the British Commonwealth. The act required non-stop journeys from India to Canada and nullified the right of entry to East Indians if their ship either stopped at a port en route to Canada, or if the tickets were not issued in India. An agreement between the Canadian government and the Japanese government stipulated that the Canadian government would not subject Japanese immigrants already in Canada to discrimination if the Japanese government restricted further immigration from Japan. These measures effectively halted the flow of immigrants from Asia.[36] Other prohibitions were imposed on black farmers from the United States even as seasonal migrant farm workers were being routinely imported from the Caribbean in the early 1900s.

The 1910 Immigration Act created a class of undesirables on the bases of perceived inability to successfully integrate and of educational attainment; other bases were the Canadian climate, or social, educational, and labour force requirements. While no countries were listed, the administration of the act relied on the existence of a preferred nations list, and targeted people from racialised countries and warm climates for exclusion. These considerations were clearly proxy to a racialised policy that aimed to keep Canada white . In 1923, in the face of failure to achieve the goal of slowing Chinese immigration, the Chinese Exclusionary Act was enacted, prohibiting Chinese immigration to Canada until 1947. In the post World War II era, the changes to the Immigration Act of 1953 still maintained demands for successful integration in Canada that were based *less* on educational attainment, and more on assumptions of inability to adjust to the Canadian climate, and on social and labour force requirements. While no countries were listed, the administration of the policy continued to rely on the existence of a preferred nations list and particularly targeted people from racialised countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean for exclusion.[37]

The 1962 Immigration Act was a milestone in the recent Canadian immigration history. Promulgated under the Conservative government of Prime Minister Diefenbaker, the act shifted the focus from the racially discriminatory policy of country preference to a policy of admission for skilled immigrants and of reunion for families. While the change resulted in a decline in the inflow of immigrants from Europe at a time of prosperity in European countries, it occurred at a time of relative international scarcity of highly trained manpower and decolonisation in the South. With economic indicators in Canada suggesting that the postwar economic boom was over -- i.e., unemployment was high and investments down -- Europeans were further discouraged from leaving their prosperous

countries for North America. Added to that was domestic pressure to reconcile the immigration policy with human rights legislation — the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 - as well as with the international recognition of human rights enshrined in the United Nations Human Rights Charter and conventions.

Canada responded by opening the door to immigrants and refugees from areas outside Europe; the effect of this was to begin to change the composition of the immigrant pool to its most ethnically diverse composition ever.[38] The independent category increasingly allowed those with skill qualifications but not from the preferred source countries access to Canada. A growing number of talented women and men from the South countries began to choose Canada as their new home.

In 1967, in response to the findings of the White Paper on Immigration released in 1966, the policy shift was institutionalized through the adoption of a nominally colour blind points system .[39] The government s introduction of what were referred to as the "Global Concept regulations removed explicit racial and national preference, emphasized labour market requirements, family reunification, and humanitarian issues, and expanded the independent or unsponsored class through a skills based colour blind points system. Under the points system, admission is granted on the basis of an objective assessment of individual attributes, rather than on race or nationality. Two objectives of the new system were to increase the average skill level of new arrivals and to bring the immigration policy into compliance with national and international human rights regimes. The changes in policy marked an end to the country-of-origin based admissions policy.

Since then, the composition of the immigrants arriving in Canada has resulted in a dramatically changed ethnic and racial profile for immigrants. The composition of the contemporary immigration group changed partly because of the abandonment of official racist immigration policy in the 1960s. The changing global economic economy, coupled with the recovery and stability of European economies, meant that Europeans were now choosing to stay home and participate in the fruits of their reconstruction efforts. Europe s economy presented would-be migrants with real prospects, while the impact of changes in the global economy and political instability forced people from outside Europe to consider immigration to and asylum in Canada. So the source countries shifted from Europe to Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean.[40]

Between 1967 and 1974, the policy change led to a high (74%) acceptance of immigrants in the independent class — the skills tested group. Public opinion in the 1970s prompted a shift towards the incorporation of a humanitarian element in the policy, which is said to have impacted the composition of immigrants admitted — leading to an increase in the family and refugee categories from 24.7% and 1.3% during 1970-74, to 33.8% and 16.6% respectively during the 1990-94 period. The move achieved its objective of insulating Canada from international criticism about the race and geographical specificity of the immigration policy, which was increasingly becoming anachronistic.[41]

Those changes were reflected in the passage of the Immigration Act, 1978, which marked an important moment in recent Canadian immigration history. Canada embraced a more open policy towards asylum seekers, which led to a substantial increase in the number of refugees admitted into the country each year. The policy had an effect on the proportion of assessed immigrants each year. Furthermore, the post-1978 regulations also eased entry requirements under family class by awarding 15 points for the presence of relatives in Canada. The changes were especially significant because the setting of the levels of family class and refugee immigrants remained independent of the needs of Canadian labour markets. The composition of the immigrant pool shifted somewhat towards what some have characterized as a less skilled or lower quality pool[42]

The recession pressures of the early 1980s forced the federal government to cut immigration levels drastically for the year 1983 and to require independent class immigrants to present a validated job offer before their applications could be considered. The government introduced a new category of 'business class' immigrants as part of the independent class in 1986; applicants under the category were required to demonstrate potential for establishing a business in Canada that would hire local Canadians.

As the economy improved, the federal government announced another significant change in 1988, i.e., the expansion of the definition of family class to include never married sons and daughters of immigrant Canadian residents, regardless of age. However, this change was short lived, and was reversed in 1992 in response to a perceived drop in the skill level of the immigrants.[43]

Table 4 summarizes the effects of the above changes on the class composition of immigrant inflows to Canada over the period 1970-94. Changes in Canadian immigration policy have resulted in the two classes of immigrants noted below: the economically assessed classes (independent, business, and assisted relatives), and the non-economically assessed group (family class and refugees). The changing proportions and assumptions about the human capital quality of different groups are an important part of the debate over the efficacy of Canadian immigration policy.[44]

Table 4: Distribution of immigrant Landings by Class, 1970-93

Period of Immigration	Economically Assessed Classes		Non-economically Assessed Classes	
	Independent	Assisted Relatives	Family	Refugee & Designated
1970-74	74.0	NA	24.7	1.3
1970-74	51.0	24.4	24.6	NA
1975-78	32.2	24.2	43.7	NA
1975-79	47.8	NA	42.8	9.4

1980-84	34.7	10.0	37.2	18.1
1985-89	36.4	9.3	36.4	17.9
1990-94	33.8	10.0	39.6	16.6

Source: Akbari (1999); De Silva (1992) The data used here are drawn from available Department of Immigration data on immigrant arrivals by classes since 1980. For the pre1980 period, data were taken from two different sources with slightly different groupings of immigrants in each class; pre1979 sponsored or nominated categories. NA signifies data not available .

Systemic racism and the Canadian political economy

Does racism matter in Canada today? Does it explain the condition of Canada s racialised groups in Canadian society? Does it particularly explain the gap in economic performance, and participation in civic and political life between racialised groups and other Canadians? Numerous studies have come to this conclusion. But not everyone agrees, and those who disagree tend to have the power to influence public policy. Daniel Stoffman s (1993) critique of Canada s immigration implied that Canada s reliance on immigrants of colour had led to a decline in the quality of immigrants coming to Canada and so to the return to immigration policy. Changes in immigration policy aimed at tightening access to Canada for immigrants from the South were imposed soon after.[45] Conrad Winn (1985), in his critique of the Abella Royal Commission Report on Inequality in Employment (1985), argued that there was no empirical support for the premise that Canada s labour market is immobile and that visible minorities cannot make economic progress in it without government intervention .[46] More recently, similar arguments have been advanced by Daniel Stoffman (1993), De Voretz (1989), and Borjas (1994). But there is overwhelming evidence to suggest otherwise. According to Edward Herberg, five of the six highest groups in rankings based on postsecondary educational attainment are racialised groups, and yet they have not been able to translate these skills into compensation, leading to a negative gap between their income and that of non racialised Canadians.[47]

Contrary to some of the arguments above, issues of race and racism have been central to the development of Canadian society. Canada s first settlers were its First Nations peoples, arriving here over at least 11,000 years ago.[48] However, it is the more recent immigrations that have defined the nation, led by Europeans and much more recently by Asians, Africans, Caribbeans, Latin Americans, and Americans. The Europeans who began migrating to Canada in earnest in the 1600s came with a mission to establish a white settler colony upon their arrival. In a process that involved war, conquest and treaty making, they took control of land, resources, and the fur trade from the First Nations. This was followed with systematic policies of economic exclusion, genocide, and segregation aimed at subordinating and eliminating the Aboriginal population, policies that were juxtaposed to policies aimed at assimilating the Aboriginals. The policy of systemic denial of access to resources aimed at Aboriginal nations defined the nature of the country that was to emerge in terms of the emergence of a race and class complex and

of the racialised unequal social and economic outcomes that it conditioned. In a then largely agrarian and mercantile society, the policies that restricted economic opportunity in favour of Europeans created the first racialised economy in Canada, one in which differential access to resources led to improvements in the economic performance of European settlers at the expense of First Nations peoples.

Canada s political and economic development was similar to that of other colonized societies in that it involved the subordination of indigenous peoples as well as genocide against nations; the suppression of their civil, political, and cultural rights, and often the forced use of their labour to extract their natural resources, This historic development of the capitalist economy laid the foundation for the policies of slavery, marginalisation, and socio-economic exclusion of racialised immigrants..

Slavery of both aboriginal peoples and subsequently African peoples was a part of European settlement from the earliest days in the 16th and 17th century. French settlers owned both Aboriginal and African slaves. The graves of hundreds of Pawnee First Nation slaves have been uncovered in Quebec. Slavery was also legal in British North America. The colony of Nova Scotia was founded on ' widespread slave ownership by white Loyalist settlers. In Upper Canada, slavery was widespread and many of the leading British families of the colony such as the Russells and the Jarvis's (after whom a major Toronto street is named) owned slaves even after the first governor of Upper Canada, Lord Simcoe, outlawed the slave trade after 1797. And while children born to slaves were then to be free in Upper Canada, slavery continued in Upper Canada and with different laws in all of British North America until it was abolished in the British Empire in 1832.

The political system and economy that emerged in Canada was based on the concept of a White Settler Society , i.e., the building of an overseas replica of British society , complete with a dominant culture, values, and institutions that mimic those of the home country. [49] These patterns persisted even as the population changed to include significant numbers of Blacks from the United States, who arrived as part of the Loyalist immigration after the American war of independence in enslavement, as freed slaves, or as fugitives through the Underground Railroad. When free Black Loyalists began to arrive in Canada after 1783, they were given only a fraction of the land given to white Loyalists, despite promises of equal treatment (100 acres for whites and one acre for Blacks).[50] Whether as Black slaves or freemen , as Chinese railroad workers, or as South Asian farm workers in the 19th and early 20th. centuries, they fit into a hierarchy of labour that imposed the level of exploitation needed to ensure the accumulation of capital for the purpose of industrial development and nation building.

Other racialised non-Aboriginal groups such as the East Asians and South Asian immigrants began to arrive in Canada in larger numbers in the late 1800s,what they found in place were institutionalized structures of preferential access that impeded their participation in the economy, limiting them to low paying, dead end, mostly unskilled jobs, even though some of them were artisans. The threat of an influx of Asian immigrants provoked the imposition of racist immigration policies such as the head tax,

which was aimed at keeping the hordes out. These policies were the product of a systemic form of racism[51] aimed at maintaining Canada as a white settler colony. What was involved was a social, cultural, economic, and political process whose purpose was to ensure that Canadian society was re-created in the image of a European society.[52] It was a consensus shared by all political opinion among those of European heritage, including such progressives as J.S. Woodsworth, who would later become the leader of the CCF.[53] J.S. Woodsworth suggested that Asians and Blacks were "essentially non-assimilable elements (that) are clearly detrimental to our highest national development, and hence should be vigorously excluded." [54]

An important part of that process was the determination to institutionalize European culture in all facets of Canadian life. European immigration, which was predominantly white, brought with it cultures and social values that became the dominant cultures and values of the land, and in the process subordinated or erased Aboriginal cultures. The establishment of racial hierarchies in the economy and social life involved a process called racialisation, which was used to justify the differentiation of peoples on the basis of socially selected physical traits, for the purpose of acquiring or maintaining an advantage for one group or other.[55]

Race, racialisation, and racial discrimination

Classifications like race, ethnicity, and gender are socially constructed, but their meanings differ in historical and contemporary usage. Canada s diversity in race, ethnicity, gender, and class, has historically been overemphasized through government policies and programs that benefited certain groups and disadvantaged others. Instances of racialised government policies after Confederation in 1867 go as far back as the establishment of the Indian Act in 1876, the imposition of the Chinese head tax under the Chinese Immigration Act, 1885, and the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1923, which banned Chinese immigration until 1947. Racist immigration policies maintained a 'pecking order' that also kept out, as undesirables, African Americans, South Asians, and other racialised peoples, along with Jews and Southern Europeans. More recently, race as a category has received constitutional recognition in the Charter of Rights and Freedom, while human rights codes and employment equity programs have adopted the concept of racial grouping for remedial purposes.

Race is a difficult concept to define because it is mostly a social construction rather than a biological concept. Since human beings have more in common than differences in their biological makeup, what are often used to denote race are arbitrary physical and social traits. The most common are physical traits such as colour, hair texture, and other physical attributes. But this has not dissuaded advocates of racial ideologies from using categories based on race to attribute competencies and deny opportunities to certain races . Proponents of racial ideologies use the categories based on the superficial physical differences to entrench a racial hierarchy, which in turn is used to exploit certain groups and subject them to differential treatment.[56] Racialised communities have often used the common experience that comes from the structures of race and racism to construct identities and to organize antiracism responses.[57]

Mostly, the use of the category 'race', as is the case with the categories of gender and class, has meant privilege for some and oppression and domination for others. It is important to note that these categories and their impacts on society are products of and represent complex interactions with the socio-economic, political, and cultural makeup of each society and period in history. In Canada s case, which was informed by the original white supremacist mission of building a white settler colony, the systematic policies of economic exclusion and segregation were aimed at subordinating, first the Aboriginal population and later other people of colour. These policies justified the little talked about Canadian legacy of slavery. They also determined the undesirability of the immigration of blacks, south Asians, East Asians, and Jews at key moments in the history of Canada. They were the rationale behind the restrictions against black farmers from the United States at a time when the Canadian government was, at its own expense, recruiting farmers from Europe to settle the West. And in the contemporary period, numerous studies have identified the processes of racialisation as central to the differential treatment of racialised peoples in the economy, in the education system, in the criminal justice system, and in social sector institutions. Because of the complex interactions associated with the experiences of racialised peoples, race and the power to define groups of people and their reality intersect with the other categories such as gender and class, especially in the life experiences of racialised women.[58]

The process of racialisation involves the construction of racial categories as real, different but also unequal for purposes that impact the economic, social, and political composition of a society. While in the past, the emphasis was on physical traits, more recently, ethnicity, culture, place of birth, and other social characteristics have become the basis of choice for defining race and determining racial treatment. Giving race social, economic, cultural, and political significance has led to differential treatment and outcomes in Canada. Racialisation translates into actions and decisions within social systems that lead to differential and unequal outcomes, and the entrenchment of structures of oppression. It is this process of making negative race-based judgements when decisions are made at different levels of society that produces racial inequality. The growing inequality between racialised groups in Canada and other Canadians has its systemic origins in the racial inequalities that racialisation produces and perpetuates.

Racial Discrimination

As a system in which one group exercises power over others on the basis of skin colour and other superficial traits, the impacts of racial discrimination have been numerous and persistent in Canadian history. Racial discrimination shaped the early relationships between European settler and Aboriginal peoples. It defined the immigration policies for decades as well as the patterns of settlement. It informed educational policies in many of the provinces. It, among other factor, explains the denial of civil and political rights to Japanese Canadians in British Columbia during World War I, the imposition of the head tax on Chinese immigrants, the denial of landing for the "Komagata Maru", a ship carrying South Asians off the coast of Vancouver at the turn of the century, the race riots

in Nova Scotia in the late 1800s, the segregation of African Canadians in the educational system in Ontario until the 1960s, the treatment of nurses from racialised groups in the 1970s and 80s, the widespread failure to enforce the meritocratic principle leading to denial of employment opportunities for racialised peoples, the documented overrepresentation of racialised group members in the prison system in Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Ontario, persistent differential access to services such as housing, health care, social assistance, recreational facilities, imposition of limits on access to property, and differential treatment in the criminal justice system.

Racial discrimination is systemic, institutional, and cultural. More important for our purposes here, because of its systemic nature, as numerous studies have documented, it is fundamental to the differential outcomes experienced by racialised groups in economic performance, in the education system, in the criminal justice system, and in access to social services.[59]

Absence of motives is no defence for the impact of differential outcomes. As Canada s Supreme Court has stated: it is impact, not motive or intent, that is the proper test of unequal treatment.[60]

The Supreme Court of Canada has also ruled that:

Discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with the group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual s merits and capacities will rarely be so classed. [61]

Further, the Supreme Court Justice Madame L Heureux-Dube clarified the point that:

A distinction is discriminatory within the meaning of section 15 (of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom) where it is capable of either promoting or perpetuating the view that the individual adversely affected by this distinction is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a human being or a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration [62]

In her Royal Commission on Equality report, Judge Rosalie Abella concludes as follows:

Discrimination in this context means practices or attitudes that have, whether by design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual s or group s right to the opportunities generally available because of attributable rather than actual characteristics. What is impeding the full development of the potential is not the individual s capacity but an external barrier that artificially inhibits growth.

It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an intentional desire to obstruct someone s potential, or whether it is an accidental by-product of innocently motivated practices or systems. If the barrier is affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative way, it is a signal that the practices that lead to this adverse impact may be discriminatory. This is why it is important to look at the results of a system [63]

Abella s points of reference are the ideals of equality entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provide a basis for challenging such discriminatory outcomes as racialised poverty. It sets the stage for raising questions about both public policy and the practices and polices of major institutions in society with regard to their efforts to remedy this persistent form of systemic discrimination that denies many Canadians full participation in Canadian society. Some have argued that it suggests a positive duty on the part of the state to deal with these structural disadvantages in Canadian society.[64]

On that point, Abella suggests that:

It is not that individuals in the designated groups are inherently unable to achieve equality on their own, it is that the obstacles in their way are so formidable and self-perpetuating that they cannot be overcome without intervention. It is both intolerable and insensitive if we simply wait and hope that barriers will disappear with time. Equality in employment will not happen unless we make it happen. [65]

Abella s findings of the persistence of racial discrimination in employment are consistent with the findings of Canadian studies and reports that have documented discrimination in employment, in education, in social service delivery, in the criminal justice system, in the media, in housing, to name but a few.

Racial discrimination in employment and incomes has, in particular, been the subject of a substantial body of work. Gillian Creese s study of Chinese workers in Vancouver before World War II found many of the same patterns of structural segregation that exist today. A 1981 study by Reitz, Calzavara, and Dasko on Ethnic Inequality and Segregation in Jobs concluded that, despite higher levels of education, members of the racialised minority groups received lower compensation on average than other Canadians. The report of the Parliamentary Taskforce on the status of racialised groups found that racial discrimination was pervasive in Canadian employment systems. Studies done by Henry and Ginsberg (1984), titled *Who Gets the Job*, and by Billingsley and Musynski (1985), titled *No Discrimination Here,* demonstrated through field research the extent of discrimination in employment in Canada s biggest urban centre, Toronto. Henry and Ginsberg found that whites got three job offers for each one a black applicant got when they sent out actors with matched resumes and backgrounds to meet with employers.[66]

A study by Harish Jain (1985) identified barriers in employment systems, including limited recruitment procedures such as word of mouth, biased testing, stereotypical decision making in the interview process, promotions, transfers, and salary increases. In

the late 1980s, a study by Vorst and others documented the marginalisation and segregated participation of racialised women in the public service, and concluded that a disproportionate number of them worked as cleaners, cafeteria workers, nurses aides, and low level clerical workers. In the private sector, they observed that racialised women were largely ghettoized in private domestic service, light manufacturing and in the low paying service industry. Barriers were also documented in Brand s 1980s study of the race and gendered division of labour in Canada; in Tania Das Gupta's study of the experience of racialised nurses and garment workers; in Agnes Calliste's documentation of racialised nurses in segmented labour markets and railway porters earlier, and in a 1989 Urban Alliance on Race Relations study titled "Canada s Employment Discriminators." [67]

A series of studies by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (1975, 1976, 1980, 1991) targeting employment agencies in Ontario found that many maintained a whites only policy for employers who wanted a screen for race when referring temporary workers. In one case, a review of practices at 15 agencies showed that only three were unwilling to accept discriminatory job orders[68]

A 1989 Ontario government taskforce report on the situation of foreign trained professionals and trades people, titled *Access! Repor*t, echoed the finding of a study in British Columbia by Fernando and Prasad (1986) that many faced barriers in getting credentials to practice in their fields of training and experience, and in converting their educational attainment into economic compensation. Among the many immigrants whose university education and trades training went unrecognized by Canadian authorities were doctors, teachers, lawyers, social workers, engineers, nurses, technicians, plumbers, accountants, and mechanics, to name but a few. [69] In the1990s, according to a department of Employment and Immigration Canada annual employment equity report, the average salaries at all levels of education for racialised group members in management were about 18% lower than those of the Canadian population. Among manual workers, group members earned 10% less than the rest of the population.[70]

A study of racialised men s incomes by Pendakur and Pendakur in 1995 titled, *The Colour of Money,* found that racialised men earned significantly less than white immigrant men. They concluded that the differences could not be accounted for by educational, occupational, or place of training differentials. They also found differences of up to 10% between Canadian born visible minority men and white men.[71] More recently, a series of studies of ethno-racial inequality in Metro Toronto by Ornstein (1997, 2000) show that racialised group members suffer higher than average unemployment rates (up to three time higher for most groups) and higher levels of poverty (again up to three times higher). According to the reports, racialised women fair even worse, with some groups sustaining poverty rates as high as 60%.[72] Yet another study that has focussed on the trends in education, employment, and earnings for racialised groups was done by the Canadian Council on Social Development for the Canadian Race Relations Foundation in 2000. Some of its key findings confirm those in many of the other studies and reports. They speak to unequal access to employment despite higher educational attainment among racialised groups, barriers to commensurate

employment and compensation for those with international training and experience, overrepresentation in low income groups, and underrepresentation in high income groups. These patterns hold even among immigrant populations, with non-racialised immigrants outpacing racialised immigrants in income and access to employment. Focus group research done across the country for the report also confirmed the persistence of racial discrimination in employment.[73] Finally, a recent taskforce report on the participation of racialised group members in the federal government acknowledged that, fifteen years after the introduction of federal employment equity legislation, racialised groups members make still make up less than 5% of the public service; this should be compared to their numbers in the population (11%).[74]

Part 2: The economic condition of racialised communities – A statistical profile

Wage rate differentials are considered the summary statistics that best characterize the labour market disadvantages of paid workers in an identifiable group. With few exceptions, most studies that have dealt with the income differentials experienced by racialised group members have tended to use market income or wage rates of immigrant groups for their analysis. Included here are two important literature reviews by De Silva (1992) and Akbari (1989).[75] More recent work includes studies by Akbari (1992); Anisef, Sweet, James and Lin (1999); Beach and Worswick (1993); Christofides and Swidinsky (1994); Baker and Benjamin (1994); Hou and Balakrishnan (1996); De Silva (1997); Kunz et al. (2000); Pendakur and Pendakur (1996, 1998); and Ornstein (1996,2000).[76]

Here, we attempt to use two important measures of economic performance for racialised groups, both immigrant and Canadian born, i.e., employment or labour market participation and employment income. We see that approach as more comprehensive and more suggestive of a true picture of the condition of racialised group members in the Canadian economy. It also allows us to shift the emphasis away from the debate about measures of discrimination in income and towards a more rounded assessment of the contribution of racial discrimination to the disadvantaged position of the racialised group in the labour market and ultimately in society. The approach also acknowledges the complex of factors responsible for the disadvantage, including prolonged periods of economic downturn, mismatched skill sets, and length of stay in the country. These factors are also likely to be experienced by non-group members, although not necessarily in the same way, because of the prevalence of racism in the labour market. The other benefit is that it allows the analysis to draw from broader research done on the employment barriers faced by racialised group members and the income implications of those barriers. That, we think, is a more constructive basis for policymaking.

Using both the income and employment measures, it is clear that there is a gap between the economic performance of the racialised communities and the rest of the Canadian population. In fact, some data show that that gap is growing. On average, income inequality in Canada is increasingly along racial lines. 1995 Statistics Canada for individual earners shows that about 10%, or about 1.5 million individuals, of all people who reported employment income in 1995, were members of the racialised population. According to the data, in 1995 racialised group members' employment income was $22,498, an amount that is 15% lower than the national average. Employment earnings of immigrants arriving from 1986 to 1990 were $21,538, or 18% of the earnings of non-immigrants. For more recent immigrants, coming after 1990, the employment income was $16,673, or 36% of that of non-immigrants. This gap also coincided with the general cutbacks in the levels of government transfers, either in federal employment insurance benefits or provincial social assistance benefits, during much of the 1990s.[77] For racialised community women average earnings were $16,621 in 1996 compared to

$23,635 for racialised community men and $19,495 for other women and $31,951 for other men. [78]

Table 5: Canada. Income of racialised group individuals, 1995

	Total Population	Racialised group	Difference %
Average	$27,170	$22,498	18%

Source: 1996 Census data

Racialised groups as a statistical category[79]

The numbers and characteristics of persons who are members of a racialised group correspond to the group defined as such in Statistics Canada data, using the term visible minority, as defined by the Employment Equity Act of 1986. The act defines visible minorities as "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour." Under this definition, the regulations to the act specify the following groups as visible minorities: Chinese, South Asians, Blacks, Arabs and West Asians, Filipinos, Southeast Asians, Latin Americans, Japanese, Koreans and Pacific Islanders. In the 1996 census, the identification of the racialised group population was achieved using a new census question that asked respondents whether they were members of one of the population groups defined as a visible minority under the provisions of the Employment Equity Act. In previous censuses, this information was derived primarily from responses to the question on ethnic or cultural origin. In this report, we have supplemented some of that data by looking at source country data as it relates to immigrant populations, especially after 1970.

New data confirms unequal employment income of racialised group members

John Anderson ran data for the CSJ Foundation from the Survey of Labour Income Dynamics for the three most recent years available, 1996-98.[80] This data, based on individual earnings before taxes, shows that in 1996, racialised Canadians earned an average of $19,227; non-racialised Canadians made $25,069, or 23% lower. The 1996 median before tax income gap at 29% ($13,648 to $19,111) shows an even more profound inequality because it factors out the highest and lowest earners. This gap grew in 1997 as earnings of racialised individuals increased slightly to $19,558, a gap of 25% when compared to the $ 25,938 earned by other Canadians. The median before tax income again betrays a widening deeper level of inequality, with earnings of $ 13,413 for racialised groups and $19,602 for others, or 32%.

The tax and government transfers effect was marginal in terms of closing the gap. The average after tax income of the racialised groups in 1996 was $16,053, compared to $20,129 for other Canadians, a 20% gap. After tax incomes grew for both groups in 1997 to $16,438 for racialised individuals or 79% of the $20,793 for other Canadians, with incomes still showing a marginal growing gap. The median after tax income for 1996 was $12,991 for racialised groups compared to $16,922 for other Canadians, a gap of 23%. That gap grew in 1997 to 26%, as racialised group individuals took home less at $12,895, while other Canadians increased their earnings to $17,320.[81] On average, as table 7 shows, the improving economy resulted in only a marginal change, with 1998 figures showing an average before tax income for racialised groups of $20,626, which accounted for 74% of the $27,174 for the rest of the population. The median incomes of $14,507 compared to $20,517 respectively left the gap at 30%. Taking the tax and government transfers into consideration, racialised groups earned an after tax average of $17,376, 80% of the $21,694 for the rest of the population. The median after tax income was $13,561, compared to $18,146 or 25% lower.

Table 6: Canada. Income of racialised persons, 1996, before tax

	Total population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group (b)	Difference (a/b)	
				$	%
Average	24,254	19,227	22,092	2865	23
Median	18,304	13,648	19,111	5463	29

Table 6b: Canada. Income of racialised persons, 1996, after tax

	Total population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group (b)	Difference (a/b)	
				$	%
Average	19,631	16,053	20,129	4076	20
Median	16,394	12,991	16,922	3931	23

Table 6c: Canada. Income of racialised persons, 1997, before tax

	Total population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group (b)	Difference (a/b)	
				$	%
Average	25,126	19,558	25,938	6380	25
Median	18,762	13,413	19,602	6189	31.5

Table 6d: Canada. Income of racialised persons, 1997, after tax

	Total population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group (b)	Difference (a/b)	
				$	%
Average	20,224	16,438	20,793	4355	21
Median	16,756	12,895	17,320	4425	25.5

Table 7: Canada. Income of racialised persons, 1998, before tax

	Total population	Racialised group(a)	Non- racialised group(b)	Difference (a/b)	
				$	%
Average	26,323	20,626	27,174	6548	26
Median	19,700	14,507	20,517	5650	28%

Table 7b: Canada. Income of racialised persons, 1998, after tax

	Total population	Racialised group(a)	Non- racialised group (b)	Difference (a/b)	
				$	%
Average	21,114	17,376	21,694	4318	20
Median	17,501	13,561	18,146	4585	25.3

Source of Tables 6-7b: Centre for Social Justice special run of data designed by John Anderson from Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1999-2000

Some have speculated that the income gap is a function of low educational attainment. However, an analysis of the 1998 low educational attainment and postsecondary education levels shows that the gap between low and highly educated groups is similar, ranging from 22-24%. Based on the employment income data for the year 1998, we are also able to deduce that the proportion of the university educated racialised population in the top 10% of earners is also much lower, 20.6% compared to 31% for the non racialised population.

Table 8: Canada. Average income of persons by education levels, 1998

Educational level	Total Population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group(b)	Difference(a/b)	
				$	%
Less than High School	14,171	11,341	14,447	3106	22
University Degree	31,408	24,484	32,074	7590	24

Table 9: Canada. Median income of persons by education levels, 1998

Educational level	Total Population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group(b)	Difference(a/b)	
				$	%
Less than High School	12,414	9,727	12,666	2939	24
University degree	31,408	24,485	32,074	7589	24

Source Tables 8 & 9: Centre for Social Justice special run of data from Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1999-2000

Tables 10 -13 confirm the structural nature of these income inequalities. Racialised group members are consistently overrepresented in the lower income percentiles and underrepresented in the higher income percentiles. What is clear is that the gap between

racialised groups' incomes and those of non-racialised groups is an ugly reality of Canadian life. A decile analysis of the income data confirms the racial segregation of the income structure. With minor variations, racialised groups are disproportionately concentrated in the lower five income deciles (61.1%) as compared to the rest of the population (49%).

The income gap is largely maintained when you consider disposable (after tax) income suggesting that the tax effect has not sufficiently compensated for the inequality generated in the market. These patterns are repeated for racialised groups 1997 (60.5%) and 1998 (60.5%). The lowest decile also represents the highest single number of racialised group members, i.e., 1996 (15.9%); 1997 (15.9%) and 1998 (15.4%). The figures also hold true for highly educated groups, varying only slightly.

Table 10: Canada. Income of racialised persons by select deciles, 1996. Before tax 1 is the lowest and 10 the highest

Deciles	Total Population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group(b)	Difference(a/b) %
1st	10	15.9	9.2	6.7
2nd	10	12.8	9.6	3.2
3rd	10	11.3	9.8	1.5
4th	10	10.2	9.9	0.3
5th	10	10.9	10	-0.9
6th	10	8.5	10.1	-1.6
7th	10	9.1	10	-0.9
8th	10	8.3	10.3	-2.0
9th	10	7.1	10.4	-3.3
10th	10	5.8	10.6	-5.8

Table 11: Canada. Income of racialised persons by select deciles, 1996, after tax

Deciles	Total Population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group(b)	Difference(a/b) %
1st	10	15.9	9.2	6.7
2nd	10	12.8	9.6	3.2
3rd	10	11.4	9.8	1.6
4th	10	10.2	9.9	0.3
5th	10	10.5	10.0	-0.5
6th	10	8.9	10.1	-1.2
7th	10	8.2	10.2	-2.0
8th	10	8.3	10.3	-2.0
9th	10	7.6	10.3	-2.7
10th	10	6.4	10.5	-4.1

Table 12: Canada. Income of racialised persons by select deciles, 1997, before tax

Deciles	Total Population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group(b)	Difference(a/b) %
1st	10	15.4	9.3	6.1
2nd	10	13.6	9.6	4
3rd	10	12.9	9.6	3.3
4th	10	9.7	9.9	-.2
5th	10	8.9	10.1	-1.2
6th	10	8.6	10.1	-1.5
7th	10	9.4	10	-.6
8th	10	8.0	10.3	-2.3
9th	10	6.9	10.5	-3.6
10th	10	6.6	10.5	-3.9

Table 13: Canada. Income of racialised persons by select deciles, 1998, before tax

Deciles	Total Population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group(b)	Difference(a/b) %
1st	10	14.8	9.1	5.7
2nd	10	12.7	9.7	3
3rd	10	12.7	9.7	3
4th	10	10.6	9.9	.7
5th	10	9.7	10.0	-.3
6th	10	9.1	10.0	- .9
7th	10	8.3	10.3	-2
8th	10	8.2	10.3	-2.1
9th	10	7.1	10.4	-3.3
10th	10	6.8	10.5	-3.7

Source: Tables 10-13: Centre for Social Justice special run of data designed by John Anderson from Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1999-2000

In fact, as Table 16 shows, the only category of comparisons of racialised and non-racialised employee incomes that is single digit is in the unionized sector. The average wages are also comparable to those of employees with university degrees, suggesting that unionization is a serious nongovernmental option to deal with the income gap between Canadians of colour and those of European origin. Yet the challenge there is significant too, given that racialised group members are underrepresented in unionized work. Of the 2,905,100 unionized workers in Canada, only 203,100 are racialised group members, or 7% of the union population (as compared to 11.4% in the population).

Table 14: Employment income of full year/full time racialised persons in unionized workplaces before taxes, 1998

	Total Population	Racialised group (a)	Non- racialised group(b)	Difference(a/b)	
				$	%
Average	44451	41253	44919	3666	8%
Median	41450	38755	42000	3245	7%

Source: Source: Table 14: Centre for Social Justice specially run of data designed by John Anderson from the Statistics Canada, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1999-2000

Commenting on the differences between racialised group incomes and other Canadians, a recent Statistics Canada analysis concluded, Compensating for the differences between visible minority (sic) and other Canadian-born earners reduces the gap between their average employment income from about 30% to 4% . [82] The conclusion raises as many questions as it attempts to answer. First, it is not clear that we can "compensate" for many of the differences because that assumption ignores the reality of the racialised experience in the labour market. Secondly, as Christofides and Swidinsky (1994) have concluded, "raw, unedited evidence" supports the contention that racialised group members, like women, Aboriginal peoples, and persons with disabilities are disadvantaged in the Canadian labour market. Their research, using Employment and Immigration data from 1990 and Statscan Canada Labour market Activity Survey (LMAS) data from 1989, confirms that racialised group members were more likely, on average, to be paid less than other comparable employees.[83] A further analysis, using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) wage regression, demonstrated that "substantial portions of the observed differentials cannot be explained by productivity differences alone." These, according to Christofides and Swidinsky, account for 30% of the wage gap. They attribute the unexplained residuals to labour market discrimination.[84]

Their research also indicates that the labour market disadvantages of racialised women are especially acute. It also suggests that racialised group members not engaged in regular

paid employment routinely face particularly low wage offers — a condition confirmed by anecdotal evidence from those working for temporary employment agencies. A recent report by the Toronto based Contingent Worker Project found that close to 70% of those surveyed from a pool of temporary agency workers, most of whom were racialised minorities, earned less than $1,500 a month [85] These findings are consistent with Fernando Mata s work, which shows that Immigrants, visible minorities and Aboriginal Groups are experiencing great difficulty in terms of socio-economic integration. They are affected by higher unemployment rates, lower incomes and are more likely to be concentrated in manual jobs than other groups. [86] Akbari s (1999; 1989) examination of discrimination in employment experienced by racialised immigrants also confirms these findings, as do numerous studies, quoted above, dealing with inequality in employment.

Lastly, a labour market structure with an overrepresentation of racialised groups in low income occupations and sectors, and underrepresentation in high paid occupations and sectors is bound to produce the documented gap in employment income. An explanation of the income gap that does not address the labour market inequalities is at best incomplete.

The income gap is growing between racialised and non-racialised immigrants

Fully 80% of racialised community earners were immigrants, most of them having arrived after 1965. For the racialised immigrant population, except for the immigrants who arrived in the period between 1956 and 1965, average employment income of the group was lower than that of other immigrants, and the gap was growing. More recent immigrants, a majority of whom are racialised group members, have significantly lower earnings. According to 1996 Census data, in 1995, the average employment income of immigrants who came between 1986 and 1990 was 18% lower than that of non-immigrants. The average employment income of the most recent immigrants, those who came after 1990, was 36% lower than the average earnings of non-immigrants.[87] Table 17 shows a breakdown of the income of the two groups by period of immigration. It is clear that, within almost every period of immigration, this gap was growing, from about 2% for 1966-75 immigrants to 28% for the most recent immigrants. Given the debate outlined previously about the immigration factor in explaining income differentials, it is instructive that the income differential extends to immigrant groups.

Immigration and income differentials

According to the 1996 census, in 1995, four of every five-racialised group earners were immigrants, with almost all arriving after 1965. Of the 2.8 million immigrants who reported employment income, 1.5 million identified as members of racialised groups. While it is still the case that immigrant earnings vary according to period of immigration, there are troubling signs when racialised immigrant earning patterns are considered. Compared to non- racialised immigrants, and also considering compensation in relation to educational attainment, there are significant differentials that suggest the impact of racial discrimination in job attainment and compensation. The overall 1996-immigrant income average was reported at $27,684, which is 5.7% higher than that of non-

immigrant Canadians, at $26,193. Much of the positive differential is attributed to higher education attainment than that non-immigrants and a higher average of older age earners (42years to 36years). An important part of this picture is the earnings of the mostly European pre-1976 immigrants group. Key differences begin to emerge when you focus on racialised immigrant group employment income. While for the total immigrant population, the average income was $23, 928, the racialised immigrant population earned only $18, 044.[88]

Tracking immigrant income by period allows us to determine more clearly the extent of the racialisation factor. Looking at the period during which racialised group immigration has been most intense, i.e., post 1986, we find that the employment income for

immigrants arriving between 1986 and 1990 was $21,538, or 18% lower than the income of non-immigrants. The employment income level falls further for those arriving between 1990-95, to $16,673, or 36% of the non-immigrant income. While it can be argued that the key variable here is period of stay, there are two reasons why that explanation is inadequate. First, the average income of racialised immigrants is lower than that of non- racialised immigrants during both the pre-1986 and post-1986 periods. The critical periods for our purposes are 1986-90 and 1991-95. The employment incomes of non- racialised immigrants for the periods 1986-90 and 1991 — 95 were $24,533 and $20,809 respectively, compared to $19,960 and $15,042 respectively for racialised immigrants. The second reason is that these patterns of difference are consistent with those of racialised non-immigrants, i.e., Canadian born racialised earners. Their employment income for 1995 was $18,565,or 30% lower than that of other Canadian earners.[89]

Table 17: Canada. Number and average earnings of racialised and non-racialised immigrants by period of immigration

Number and average earnings of visible minority immigrants aged 15 and over by period of immigration, Canada 1995					
	Immigrant earners		**Average earnings**		
Period of immigration		**Others**	**Visible minority population**	**Others**	
	Number		**Dollars**		**% Difference**
TOTAL	**1,247,940**	**1,570,080**	**23,298**	**31,170**	**-25.3**
Pre-1956	6,715	213,380	28,378	34,350	-17.4
1956-1965	28,360	341,155	36,910	34,011	8.5

1966-1975	293,485	488,160	32,852	33,399	-1.6
1976-1985	331,970	260,640	24,279	29,286	-17.1
1986-1990	264,420	139,365	19,960	24,533	-18.6
1991-1995	322,990	127,375	15,042	20,809	-27.7

Source: Statistics Canada, The Daily, May 12, 1998

Canadian-born racialised group earners

According to Statistics Canada data, in 1995, just over 253,000 earners in the racialised group population were born in Canada. As Table 17 shows, their average employment income of $18,565 was almost 30**%** below the level reported by all other earners who were Canadian-born. Statscan offers the age distribution factor as a possible explanation for the discrepancy. For while the educational attainment of the racialised group earners was higher than that of other Canadian-born earners, the median age of the group was lower by more than 11 years. Some 45% were under the age of 25, while the figure was 18% for other Canadian-born earners. Less than 10% were between 45 and 64, compared with 25% for other Canadian-born earners. The argument is that older people earn more on average than younger earners, despite educational differentials. Statistics Canada also offered another explanation, i.e., that only one third of Canadian-born racialised group members were employed the full year, full time in 1995, compared with one half of other Canadian-born earners. However, it seems disingenuous to use this as an explanation for lower average incomes, without commenting on the discriminatory nature of work attainment, especially full-time work. The higher levels of part-time, contractual, and contingency work that racialised group members experience are not natural phenomena. What Statistics Canada fails to discuss is the racial discrimination factor, which other studies have cited as an important contributor to both work attainment and lower incomes generally.[90] The Statistics Canada position also fails to acknowledge structural causes of the income gap such as the disproportionate participation in low income sectors and occupations which, as discussed above, many studies have identified as a function of employment discrimination.

The higher levels of unemployment and their implications in terms of disproportionate impacts from cuts to Employment Insurance (EI) benefits contribute not just to the income gap but also to higher average levels of low incomes among the racialised Canadian-born group. Limiting the explanation of the income gap to age and full-time employment differentials therefore fails to deal with the key implications of this finding, which include a high incidence of poverty, especially child poverty, an issue that should be the focus of government policy. In the final analysis, the dispute regarding the factors contributing to the employment income gap does not negate its existence or the fact that it is growing and that it demands public attention

Racialised group families earn less than non- racialised families

According to census data for 1996, racialised husband and wife families earned a median income of $38,308, compared to $52,066 for non racialised families, or an average of $13,758 (26%) more per year. However, interestingly enough, this 26% disadvantage does not occur when the couple is mixed (one racialised group member and one not).[91]

This inequality is quite consistent across most of the major racialised groups. The three largest racialised groups, Chinese, South Asian, and Black all earn roughly the same average. The fourth group largest group, Arab/West Asian, is even lower. [92] However, there are variations within the groups themselves, as some subgroups (both gender and ethnic) sustain lower than average incomes and higher than average unemployment rates.

Racialised Group Employment and Racial Inequity

The disadvantages experienced by racialised groups and the gap in economic performance become ever more clearer when we focus on employment experiences.The labour market reflects the racial differentiation observed in the income data. The differentials in unemployment levels have already been discussed. For instance, while racialised groups made up 11% of Canada s population in 1996, they had an average unemployment rate of 16%, compared to 11% for the general population in 1995. The distribution of recent immigrants, 75% of whom are racialised group members, differs from that of the Canadian population as a whole. In 1996, processing and manufacturing accounted for 15.5% of the recent immigrant population s jobs, compared with 7.6% for the total Canadian population. A third of recent immigrants were in sales and service jobs, compared with just over a quarter of all Canadians.

Historically, racial discrimination has been perpetuated in many ways when it comes to employment. With a racialised labour market, racialised group members are often trapped in the lowest jobs and occupations in terms of economic and social ranking. They are ghettoised in sectors of the economy that pay the least and have the worst workplace conditions. As a group, their workplace experience continues to be, on average, one of the most vulnerable. This condition is often multiplied for racialised, women who face a double negative effect.[93] Historically, the dangerous work Chinese immigrants did on the building of the trans-Canada railway westwards typified racialised group work. Blacks were often restricted to occupations such as sleeping car porter.[94] In the early 20th century, South Asian and Japanese immigrants were restricted to such occupations as labourer or domestic under contracts with fixed quotas, they were denied fishing licenses or access to farm land.[95] To this day, the number of racialised group members working in low paid occupations is disproportionately higher than their numbers in the population. As suggested earlier, there are numerous reports that deal with the issue of racial inequity in employment. They present conclusive evidence to suggest that not only is racial discrimination an endemic feature of the Canadian labour market, it is pervasive in many of the policies and practices in the Canadian workplaces.[96]

Racialised groups and low income and unemployment

An analysis of the unemployment data from the 1996 Census shows the higher levels of low income and unemployment experienced by racialised groups. Statistics Canada shows in 1996 36.8% of women and 35% of men in racialised communities were low-income earners compared to 19.2% of other women and 16% of other men.[97] This trend is confirmed by other research. A recently completed study by Edward Harvey and Kathleen Reil titled "Poverty and Unemployment Patterns Among Ethnocultural Groups." compares, the socio-economic status of 46 different ethnocultural groups, including a wide range of racialised ethnocultural groups as well as non- racialised groups for Canada in 1986 and 1991. The study considers such socio-economic factors as employment income, unemployment and incidence of low income as measured by Statistics Canada s Low Income Cut-off (LICO). The study supplemented the census data for 1986 and 1991 with a wide range of Canadian Studies of ethnocultural groups and immigrants, The International Migration Data Base (IMDB) maintained by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, as well as three broadly representative focus groups organized by COSTI in Toronto and conducted by Harvey and Reil in June 1998. [98]

The study presented three key findings, a) when 1986 and 1991 data are compared, twice as many ethnocultural groups have higher unemployment rates in 1991. In 1986, 46% of the 46 ethnocultural groups had unemployment rates higher than the national average. In 1991, 76% of the 46 ethnocultural groups (35 groups) had unemployment rates higher than the national average. b) Although the overall national poverty level decreased in 1991 compared with the 1986 level, an increased number of the 46 ethnocultural groups experienced poverty in 1991 (contrary to the national trend). c) The same ethnocultural groups remain consistently disadvantaged (compared with the national average) when 1986 and 1991 data are compared on the unemployment and poverty dimensions. The study identified a problem of persistent disadvantage for the ethnocultural groups.

In another soon to be published paper titled Ethnocultural Groups, Period of Immigration and Socio-economic Situation , Edward Harvey, Bobby Siu and Kathleen Reil consider the socio-economic situation of immigrants in 17 ethnocultural groups. Immigrants are compared across five periods of immigration before 1961, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1987, and, 1988-1991 taking into account the fact that of the immigrants coming to Canada, over 70% are members of racialised groups. In this study, both racialised and non- racialised ethnocultural groups are represented across the 17 groups. "[99] Their finding confirm recent studies by the Economic Council of Canada that indicate that more recent immigrants have higher unemployment rates that their Canadian counterparts. The paper assesses the socio-economic situation of immigrants using measures for poverty, employment income and unemployment and concludes that:

- Employment experiences of recent immigrants are more diverse than their earlier immigrating counterparts.
- The socio-economic experience of different ethnocultural groups is not homogeneous. Immigrants of visible minority groups experience greater socio-economic disadvantage compared with immigrants of non-visible minority ethnocultural group.

- Compared with immigrants who immigrated to Canada prior to 1981, immigrants who came to Canada after 1981 have higher unemployment rates, lower employment incomes and greater incidence of low income.

More importantly, their findings suggest that immigrants from racialised ethnocultural groups experience economic disadvantage that is persistent over the 30-year period covered during this study. These findings are similar to earlier findings reported previously in this report. They represent a growing understanding of the congruence of the phenomenon of racialisation and poverty prompting an increasing number of analysts to draw parallels to the concept of the feminization of poverty. In this case, the racial factors disproportionately correlate to the incidence of low income to suggest a racialisation of poverty.

Racialised groups and lower labour force participation rates

Data shows that despite variations within communities, racialised groups have higher unemployment rates. Once the labour force participation rate of the racialised group population is age standardized, its members also have a lower rate of labour force participation, (66%), than that of the non-racialised population.

According to 1991 census data, the labour force participation rate for racialised women was (59%), lower among West Asian and Arab group (50%), while South Asian and Latin American women were at 52%. 1991 census data show that the unemployment rate of racialised groups is 13% (before and after age standardization) higher than that of other adults (10%). The Latin American and Southeast Asian groups, with the lowest labour force participation rates, also had the highest age standardized unemployment rates (19% and 17%, respectively). Unemployment was also high among West Asians and Arabs, and South Asians (each 16%).[100] By 1996 Jennifer Chard shows only 53% of visible minority women were employed or self-employed compared to 63% of non-visible minority women.[101] Among visible minority men 65% were employed compared to 74.1% for other men. And it is amongst youth that the figures are the worst with only 36% of women and 36.4% of men aged 15-24 in racialised communities are employed compared to 52% for other women and 54% for other men. The overall unemployment rates in 1996 were 13.2% men and 15.3% women in racialised communities compared to 9.4% women and 9.9% men in other communities. [102]

Many theories have been advanced to try to explain away the condition of inequity facing racialised groups in the Canadian labour market. Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson have attempted to show that discrimination is, with one exception, statistically significant only when we examine the case of foreign-born racialised group men. They claim that all racialised group members who are Canadian born, except Blacks, and all racialised women earn less, but do not suffer from discrimination.[103] This view of course presupposes that factors such as unemployment, the kind of employment, education, and experience, which are used as criteria to measure and examine the differences, are not themselves the product of discrimination! Others explain away the differences using educational achievement. However, as a recent study by Fernando Mata shows, racialised

group members, both Canadian born and immigrants, did not obtain fair economic and occupational returns from their educational attainments. [104]This is particularly the case with immigrant women and Canadian born racialised women. This contrasts with the fact that data show that racialised group members under 44 are more likely to have a higher educational attainment than other Canadians.

Karen Kelly s work shows that in 1991, some 18% of the racialised group population aged 15 and over had a university degree, compared with 11% of other adults. As well, while the percentage of those with less than high school education was 33% for racialised groups, it was 39% for other adults. Yet even among those aged 25 to 44 with a university degree, adults in a racialised groups are less likely than others to be employed in professional or managerial occupations. Instead, many are concentrated in lower-paying clerical, service and manual labour jobs. [105] In 1996 1% of visible minority women had a degree compared to only 12% for the non-racialised communities. For men the figures are 22% for racialised men and 13.4% for others.[106] It is also important to note that the structures of racial discrimination that generate these inequalities in the workplace also impact access to educational opportunity.

Unequal job distribution by occupations, professions, trade and other job types

An analysis by Anderson of recently published HRDC employment equity data based on the 1996 census shows that racialised group members are underrepresented in many high paid occupations[107]. A study of hitherto unpublished HRDC data also by Anderson also proves that racialised community members are over-represented in low paying sectors of the economy and in the higher paying jobs in those sectors. [108] This sectoral segregation is a major reason for the lower incomes of the racialised group. The underrepresentation in many higher paid occupational categories, though not the case in every category, is a key contributor to the racialised income gap.[109] An analysis of a cross-section of key industries confirms the structural nature of the systemic discrimination that racialised groups endure in Canada s workplaces. Industries like clothing (36.2%), banking services (15%), and clothing and textile show the overrepresentation that is responsible for the low incomes discussed above. On the other hand, racialised minorities are underrepresented in the motor vehicle industry (7%), primary steel (4.2%), and the federal government (5.6%). The other dimension of the inequality is seen in the occupations within the different industries, especially the ones in which racialised minorities are overrepresented. As an example, in banking, where racialised group members are overrepresented at 15%, there are only 155 in senior management or 7%. (See appendices for more detail)

One key category is that of public sector employment. As the industry wide profiles below indicate, in key institutions in the public service, racialised groups are significantly underrepresented. What the analysis shows is that the importance of these discriminatory patterns goes beyond income. It is directly related to the limited participation of racialised groups in the administration of the Canadian state. Indeed it speaks to the social exclusion that these groups suffer in Canadian society.

Below are a few examples of underrepresentation in key public sector institutions, with implications that go beyond compensation inequity.[110] Broad public sector occupations such as police officer and judge are well-paid jobs in Canada. These jobs are concentrated in the major urban areas where most racialised group members live so that the effect of under representation is magnified. Police officers, for instance, serve a key role in the administration of justice — often mediating the integration of various immigrant communities into the mainstream of Canadian life. They are at the centre of the tensions that often arise between marginalized groups and dominant cultural groups. The seemingly chronic underrepresentation of racialised groups can only exacerbate the tensions, often leading to charges of racial profiling and racially targeted policing.[111]

Based on employment equity HRDC data, while some 11% of the population are racialised group members, only 15 out of 1,975 fire chiefs are from racialised groups, a percentage of less than .8%! The same goes for police chiefs; 135 out of 4305 or 3% of police chiefs are from racialised groups. While 1.5% of fire fighters across the country are from racialised group communities (335 to 22, 095), there are 1850 of 54 785 police officers or 3% who are from racialised groups.

Another major category in the administration of justice is judging. While figures show a higher than average level of contact with the criminal justice system for racialised group members, only 90 judges out of some 2,455 across Canada are from racialised groups members, constituting less than 4% of the total.

Occupations with underrepresentation of racialised groups

Table 18 shows a list of some well paying occupations in which racialised group members are underrepresented. Racialised groups accounted for 11% of Canada's total population in 1996.

Table 18: racialised group employment numbers by select occupations in which there is underrepresentation for Canada from the Employment Equity Data Report (Release 2) HRDC 1999

Occupation	racialised Group	Total	%
Lawyers and Quebec Notaries	2885	56,625	5
Secondary School Teachers	8385	155825	5
Elementary /Kindergarten School Teachers	9465	229990	4
Air Pilots	310	11145	3
Air Traffic Controllers	95	4345	2
Police Officers	1850	54 785	3
Fire Fighters	335	22, 095	1.5
Building Trades			
Carpenters	4620	111975	4
Electricians	2330	45850	7

Source: Notes on Visible Minorities and the Income Gap, unpublished paper by John Anderson, Centre for Social Justice 2000

In contrast with the above, Table 19 shows an overrepresentation of racialised groups in lower paying jobs. The total of racial minorities in the population in 1997 was 11%.

Table 19: Racialised group employment numbers by select occupations in Canada from Employment Equity data from the 1996 Census

Occupation	Racialised	Total	%
Light Duty Cleaners	26505	142770	19
Food Service Counter Attendants and Food Preparers	22995	132415	17
Kitchen and Food Service Helpers	26945	111235	24
Harvesting Labourers	4410	11035	40
University Professors	6500	48,000	14
Post-secondary Teaching and Research Assistants	8385	27060	31
Registered Nurses	25095	216335	12

Source: John Anderson, Notes on Visible Minorities and the Income Gap, unpublished paper for the Centre for Social Justice 2000, analysis based on employment equity data from HRDC 1999

Racialised occupational differentials: Occupational profiles by industries

Data from a sample section of Canadian industry demonstrate the structural nature of labour market discrimination against racialised group members. By examining a number of industries by job categories and classifications, we are able to demonstrate the effect of differential access to the labour market, which results in overrepresentation in certain sectors and underrepresentation in others, as well as overrepresentation in certain occupations — particularly low paying occupations -- and underrepresentation in well paying occupations and management level positions. We will focus here on the following industries: banking. computers, retail, textile, auto, and steel.

An examination of the banking, information technology (computers), auto, and steel industries confirms the argument presented in this report, i.e., that there is an underrepresentation of racialised group members at the managerial and supervisory levels of important and well compensated occupations and industrial sectors, and that this is a key contributing factor to the low rates of racialised group incomes and economic performance. Conversely, an examination of the labour structure in the retail and textile industries demonstrates the reverse problem: an overrepresentation of racialised group members in the low paid occupations.

The discriminatory effect is evident in categories such as senior managers, supervisors of skilled trades, skilled trades, and senior administrative personnel. Figures for the other industries generally show a similar rate of underrepresentation at the management and skilled trade levels.

Some industries such as banking, and especially clothing and textile products, show a larger concentration of racialised group members than exists in the population, while others, such as primary textile and general retail, are about proportional in terms of overall numbers.

In terms of its importance to the socio-political fabric of the country, perhaps the most glaring example of structural employment discrimination is the public sector and specifically the federal public service. A recent report identified the 5.3% participation rate of racialised groups, which is less than 50% of their composition in the Canadian population, as indefensible. This finding comes after the introduction of a federal employment equity program over 15 years ago for women, racialised groups, aboriginal people and persons with disabilities.

Racialised group members and the Low Income Cut Off (LICO)

According to Statistics Canada, the incidence of low income among racialised group members was significantly higher the national average over the period 1993-96. Low Income Cut Offs (LICOs) are used by the government to determine the level of income under which a family of an individual is considered to be living in poverty in Canada. Statistics Canada notes that the rate of poverty among racialised groups was 36% in

1995, compared to 19% for the general population. The rate for children under the age of six living in low income families was an astounding 45%, compared to the overall figure of 26% for all children, a rate of child poverty almost twice that in the population. The poverty gap among those in the over 65 age group is also substantial, at 32% among the racialised groups compared to the national average of 19%.[112] Of those who immigrated to Canada after 1976, more than 15% experienced poverty for four years, compared with 4% of those who were Canadian born. In Canada s urban centres, while racialised group members account for 21.6% of the population, they account for 33% of the urban poor. In fact, in some cities like Richmond and Vancouver, British Columbia; Markham, Richmond Hill, Toronto, and Mississauga, Ontario, more than half of those living in poverty are racialised group members.[113]

A recent analysis of the 1996 data for the City of Toronto breaks the economic performance of racialised groups down by nationality based groups to identify deep pockets of low incomes and unemployment among some African and Caribbean groups; South Asian groups; East Asian groups; Arab and Middle Eastern groups; and Latin American groups in Canada s biggest and most prosperous metropolis. The levels of poverty are most acute among women[114] Marie Drolet and Rene Morisette s (1999) findings also show that, while 73.1% of the racialised group members lived above the low income cut off during the last four years, the number for non-racialised group members was 86%.[115]

Table 20: Economic performance of select ethno-racial groups in Toronto, 1996

Name of group	Median income In $	Living below the Low Income Cut off (LICO) %	Unemployment rate %
African, Black, Caribbean	18,400	45	25
Arabs and West Asians	19,000	45	24
Bangladesh, Pakistani, Tamil	12,750	35	23
Central American	17,500	41	24
Vietnamese	16,750	47	21
European	27,500	14	8
Total Population	24,800	23	11

Source: 1996 Census data as cited in Michael Ornstein, Ethno-Racial Inequality in Toronto, 2000. Based on 1996 census data

Again in this case, the Statistics Canada analysis is unable to explain the incidence of low income gap, and simply suggests that The reasons for these differences are unclear. While they discount age and level of education as key factors, they claim, other factors important in determining levels of employment income, such as language skills and relevant work experience, have yet to be assessed. [116] What is missing in Statistics Canada s analysis is a consideration of systemic racial discrimination as a key contributing factor to the lower employment income of racialised groups, which

translates into low income. The explanations offered by Statistics Canada are similar in many respects to those presented routinely by mainstream economists. While they have often been influential in determining public policy, these explanations offer an inadequate understanding of the condition of racialised groups in the Canadian economy and of the implications of the inequities that the group members face.

Part 3: What s wrong with conventional explanations for racial inequality in economic performance

The conventional explanations for the gap in economic performance between members of racialised groups and that of other Canadians focus on a perceived educational gap, labour market information and adjustment gap, and the idea of higher quality human resource capital attributable to training and experience obtained in Canada. Much of the debate has been captured in reports and articles that contrast the earnings of immigrants over the last 25 years with the earnings of those in previous periods, as well as with the earnings of Canadian born cohorts. Of significance is the coincidence of the change in immigration patterns over the 1975 —96 period — from mostly European sources to countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the changes in the documented economic performance of immigrants. But similar patterns are observable among Canadian born racialised group members. Invariably, the discussion of immigrant income differentials has tended to become racialised, focusing on issues such as the economic and social conditions of the source countries of racialised groups -- as the overwhelming majority of newcomers in the post 1970 era -- and suggesting the perceived diminished immigrant quality as the primary explanation for the differences in economic performance.

Most mainstream explanations for the gap in economic performance emphasize three variables: the perceived gap in educational attainment between immigrants and Canadian born, the period of stay of immigrants in the country, and their lack of Canadian experience. The last is a variation of the human capital approach to the removal of structural barriers to access to employment and economic opportunities.[117] These arguments have been sustained despite documented racially discriminatory barriers in employment as identified by a number of reports and studies, including the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment in 1984.[118] When introduced, discussion of racial discrimination has tended to be presented as a separate variable distinctively disconnected even from other factors such as economic change; the interconnectedness and mutually reinforcing nature of these factors has gone unexplored.

What this report suggests is that, in reality, we have a complex of factors combining to create the conditions of inequality that we describe here. Racial discrimination, a social condition that has been historically established in Canada, does combine with other productivity related variables to determine or influence decision making in the labour market. There is ample research that shows that only part of the racial or gender differentials in incomes can be attributed to productivity related individual characteristics of the racialised groups. At the very least, we would propose a research agenda informed by a holistic approach to the problem. In fact, there is a compelling need to review some of the commonly held notions about racialised immigrants' economic performance.

The educational attainment gap argument

Let us begin with the perceived educational gap. The standard argument, as presented by DeVoretz and others,[119] is that, although the Canadian government s stated objective in

adopting the points based immigration policy in the 1960s was to increase the proportion of skilled immigrants admitted into the country, newcomers under the family and humanitarian classes continue to predominate over independent class entrants. Because these immigrants are not assessed according to their potential labour market performance in Canada, the de racialisation of immigrant entry resulted the admission of immigrants with poorer educational attainments than those who came in the past, and poorer educational attainment than Canadian born people. The shift in migrant flows from European source countries to countries with lower average skill levels is assumed to imply lower levels of skills among the racialised newcomers. As a result, the argument goes, not only have the new immigrants had difficulty adjusting to the Canadian economy, their poor performance and the economic performance gap is inevitable. These groups of recent immigrants have thus been held responsible for an overall decline in economic returns from immigration.[120]

The period of stay argument

Secondly, it is suggested that racialised immigrants have only been in the country for a relatively short period of time and so should expect a lower than average level of economic performance. This is the 'rites of passage' argument, often used in reference to other immigration waves and to what are claimed to be historical income gaps between Canadian born population and immigrants in general. It is consistent with a long held notion that difficulties associated with immigration and settlement (the entry effect) account for an economic lag between immigrants and Canadian born people, irrespective of educational attainment. However, while newcomers have lower earnings than Canadian-born at the beginning, because of the assimilation effect , they see an improvement in their income corresponding to the length of stay, and effectively close the gap in 10 to 15 years. Earlier analysis of census data by Kuch and Haessel (1979), Richmond and Kalback (1980), Carliner (1981), and more recently by Chiswick and Miller (1988) and Green and Green (1995), suggest that whatever earning differentials may occur at the beginning tend to disappear over time, and in fact immigrants end up outperforming their Canadian born counterparts.[121] Others, such as Hierbert (1991), also suggest that the length of stay determines not just the level of performance but also the sector-to-sector mobility for immigrants, and so explains the concentrations in low paid ghettos. Looking at ethnic and gender segmentation in the labour markets in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal, he concludes that immigrants who have been in Canada longer are more evenly distributed across occupations and sectors than the newly arrived are. Hierbert is therefore able to attribute the overrepresentation of racialised groups in secondary or non-professional, low skilled occupations and low income sectors almost exclusively to the period of stay in the country.[122]

The quality of human capital argument

Thirdly, Green and Green (1995), Stoffman (1993), Baker and Benjamin (1994), Wright and Maxim (1993), and de Voretz and Fagnan (1990), among others, have argued that members of the racialised groups lack the quality of human capital, sometimes expressed as Canadian experience, that employers consider necessary to the performance

of duties in the Canadian economy.[123] Risk averse employers are said to be less comfortable hiring newcomers because they lack certain intangibles related to job performance. The assumption is that a prospective employee s recent immigration provides additional information about their suitability for the job and productivity beyond what the resume or interview is able to uncover. Because of the assumed lack of familiarity with the Canadian labour market, institutions, and labour processes, immigrant job seekers are assumed to be less productive on average than their Canadian born counterparts, regardless of education. So, rather than go through the process of assessing each individual s competence or human capital quality , a level of relative productivity is attributed to those who fall within the newcomer class.[124] In essence, immigrant status and related race and ethnicity become proxies for low quality of human capital , leading to hiring and promotion decisions that reflect that 'economic consideration.

Myth busting: Responses to conventional wisdom on racialised economic performance differentials

As suggested earlier, the literature on the economics of immigration has been dominated by research on the immigrant/Canadian born earnings differentials and the earnings adjustments of immigrants. This research has attempted to document if immigrants catch-up and eventually outperform or overtake their Canadian born counterparts in terms of earnings performance. Beginning with the work of Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985), the empirical literature has typically dealt with this question by estimating age-earnings profiles. The available literature provides a mixed picture on the earnings performance of immigrants relative to their Canadian born counterparts. Under an older methodology, the standard answer was that, after 10 to 15 years, the average immigrant overtook his Canadian counterpart and thereafter earned more.[125] More recent evidence offers a dissenting view. For example, Bloom, Grenier and Gunderson (1995), using data from the 1971, 1981 and 1986 Canadian censuses, found that recent immigrants experience less earnings growth, and, for all post-1970 immigrant cohorts, earnings assimilation does not occur; that is, their earnings may never catch up to those of the Canadian born. They attribute this earnings collapse to declining immigrant human capital and the recession of the 1980s, which reduced the absorptive capacity of the labour market. But they also attribute the decline to discrimination, a factor too many dismiss or ignore.

Myth busting No.1: Race does still matter

Clearly some of the arguments as presented above call for myth busting. To begin with, many of the studies in question ignore the fact that the development of the Canadian economy, and especially the incorporation of immigrant labour in the economy, has historically been racialised. As discussed above, using the example of immigration, that reality must be the context within which the debate on the nature and causes of the gap in economic performance should be held. The outcome of various racially motivated government policies have been the racial stratifications of the Canadian economy — with racialised groups participating disproportionately in a small range of occupations and

sectors of the economy, and being over represented in some sectors and underrepresented in others.

As discussed previously, many economists and analysts have acknowledged the extent to which Canadian immigration policy is sensitive to socio-economic factors. The setting of annual targets often reflects directly the public mood about the economy and concerns relating to integration. What is curious is that few bother to account for the increased incidence of racial discrimination as a response by the host country dealing with an influx of racialised group immigrants — incidences documented widely throughout Canadian history, in sociological studies looking at immigrant integration and settlement, and more recently in studies looking at ethno-racial relations. Only a few studies raise the issue directly, including of course the public opinion surveys that test for attitudes towards immigrants. Akbari (1989), for instance, has also argued that the increase in migration from the South is inevitably bound to raise fears , and that the incidence of racial discrimination is likely to rise as a consequence of international migration, given the historical racialised context of Canadian society.[126]

Edna Bonacich's work on split labour markets as a source of conflict, while based on the American labour market, are clearly relevant to the study of the racialised Canadian labour market. The suggestion that split labour markets exist where the cost of labour differs along racial lines for the same or similar work rings true in Canada. Historical and current accounts of lower wages for the same or similar work by Chinese and South Asian workers in British Columbia, Black railway porters across Canada, domestic Filipino workers, racialised nurses in Ontario and the ever growing ranks of contingent workers in many of Canada's urban areas are undisputed. Examples of displacement and exclusion especially during tough economic times are also widely documented, especially in the literature dealing with the economic impact of immigration. [127]

The experience of racism in the labour market is also captured by those who use the segmented labour market approach to explain the existence of gender and racially defined segments in the labour market. Here, jobs and industries are divided into primary and secondary (or peripheral) sectors and occupations on the basis of differentials in wages, employment stability, and potential for promotion, working conditions, unionization and job rights. These are complemented by looking at the levels of barriers to mobility both within and from sector to sector. So while in the primary sector you have higher wages and employment stability, for instance, in the secondary sector work is 'marginal', low paying with little protection and often seasonal. Workers confront a reality of little or no bargaining power and intensified exploitation.[128] The approach helps identify the racialised patterns of labour market participation. Not only are racialised groups incorporated into the labour force from the low end, they are disproportionately exposed to low wages, low skill work in many of the least compensated sectors. They are also last hired and first fired and many find themselves in contract, temporary and part-time work.

Finally, an analysis of the results of Henry and Ginsberg's 1984 study which examined access to employment by evenly matching black and white job seekers for entry positions in a number of establish companies shows convincingly that white applicants received

three job offers for every offer a black applicant received. In additional field-testing using phone interviews, many callers of South Asian or Caribbean heritage were screened out before they even received in-person interviews.[129]

A follow up study titled *No Discrimination Here* (Billingsley & Musynski, 1985) found that discrimination was demonstrated in recruitment, promotional and termination practices. It was able to document the perceptions of employers and personnel managers, about a third of who felt that racial minorities did not have the abilities whites had, even without interviewing them.[130]

Myth busting No. 2: Questions about methodology

Secondly, the arguments are susceptible to methodological flaws that call their reliability into question. To begin with, the neo-classical approach that economists use to discuss differentials in the earnings of immigrants is based on assumptions of perfect competition in the labour market, assumptions that clearly are not sustainable. The Canadian labour market is indeed distorted by, among other factors, racism on the part of employers, as well as numerous barriers to access that have been widely documented. Barriers such as narrow recruitment channels (for example, overreliance on word of mouth hiring that tends to reproduce the composition of the workplace), subjective employment practices and procedures, biased testing, racial stereotyping in the interview processes (using race as proxy for evaluating future job performance), among others, deter access to workplaces and mobility in them.[131] What seems pervasive is the persistent choice made by analysts, economists, and researchers to ignore any causal attribution of systemic racial and gender discrimination, which is widely documented elsewhere, as a factor in the differences in income and economic performance. It is hard to believe that the persistence of racial discrimination in all aspects of Canadian life, which is the subject of government and civil society campaigns, would not translate into barriers to economic opportunity. How it somehow doesn t register for many doing research on the economic impacts of immigration may after all not be such a mystery, given the pervasiveness of racism in Canadian culture. A common explanation is the orientation of the economic discipline, although the proponents of these arguments are not exclusively economists.[132] While it is true that economic models that discern discrimination in employment on the basis of race or gender have been the subject of much debate, there are measures like the residual method, which has become widely used.[133] What one is left with are questions about the subjective nature of the choices that researchers make and the extent to which they are informed by their social environment.

In terms of methodology, the proponents of the mainstream arguments also rely on limited actual data to draw mostly inferential conclusions, especially about immigrant income differentials. However, this methodological shortcoming does not preclude the disproportionate effect their work has had in driving public policy. When these studies expressed concerns about the quality of immigrants to Canada, as they did in the early 1990s, the government responded by shifting the focus away from family and refugee class immigrants and towards independent class and business class immigrants. It is an

argument s power of resonance with social attitudes, not its validity, that prevails. The early 1990s advocacy also led to a process of revamping the immigration legislation that has culminated in the recent tabling of Bill C-31 in Parliament. A key aim of the new legislation, as stated by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, is to attract the best and brightest to Canada.[134]

In a recent article, Akbari (1999) zeroed in on the paucity of actual data that these studies rely upon to support their conclusions about differentials in economic performance.[135] This is especially important given the extent to which competing explanations are dismissed out of hand on empirical grounds. Akbari has argued that many of the conclusions that suggest a decline in skills levels among post-1967 immigrants, the group with the most racialised members, are largely inferential. He points out that only two studies have actually analyzed relevant data to support the stated conclusions. They are Coulson and DeVoretz s (1994) study of the human capital (skills) content of immigrants who arrived in Canada during the periods 1967-73, 1974-79, and 1979-87 looking at the intended occupations of immigrants at the time of entry and the corresponding levels of education; [136] and the study by Green and Green s (1995) of the occupational composition of immigration. [137]

Coulson and DeVoretz s study concludes that the values of skills transfers to Canada have been declining since 1974, with the largest decline occurring over the 1979-87 period. They attributed the decline to the 1978 Immigration Act, which further eased entry restrictions on family reunification and refugee classes. Coulson and DeVoretz s study used actual educational attainment data for each intended occupational group of immigrants who had arrived since 1978. Earlier immigrants listed educational attainment only as either a university degree or no degree held. For the pre-1978 arrivals, they made assumptions regarding the levels of university education attained, and this made the accuracy of their conclusions subject to certain assumptions. Their conclusions also depended on the assumption that an immigrant's stated intention at the time of arrival to work in a particular occupation matched the educational qualifications normally required for that occupation in Canada, even though some might be higher and others lower.

The Green and Green study covers similar ground. Green and Green found a negative trend in the inflow of professional immigrants into Canada. Assuming a high correlation between educational attainment and intended occupations, the implication of the study is a corresponding decline in the educational trends of new immigrants in the post-1967 period.

The Green and Green study also based its conclusion on the intended occupations reported by the immigrants at the time they acquired landed immigrant status. However, the authors are careful to note that the listed occupations may have been purposeful misrepresentations of actual intentions to get the required number of points for entry.

Myth busting No. 3: Educational attainment of immigrants remains high

Claims about declining educational attainment and immigrant quality for recent immigration periods are also found in many widely cited studies, and they necessitate a second look at the educational attainments of immigrant inflows into Canada. To start with, both of the studies presented above considered skills transfers of only those immigrants who declared their intentions to practice as professionals. The assumption the studies use is that non-professional immigrants have lower human quality , and that their migration suggests that Canada has admitted less educated immigrants since the mid-1970s. What seems more accurate are studies on immigrant quality that have analyzed the economic performance of an average immigrant on the basis of a broader educational attainment standard and without specific regard to their status as professionals. This is so especially because of the barriers that professionals face in accessing employment in their fields and also because of the demands for flexibility in the C21st economy. I include here a recent study by Akbari (1999) as well as an earlier one by Bankey Tandon (1978).[138] Akbari's study deals with the educational attainment of new arrivals in Canada from 1956 to 1994, and Tendon s is a study of the Ontario labour market in 1977. Both report a discrimination effect demonstrated by the gap in economic performance, between non- racialised Canadians and racialised immigrants, educational attainment notwithstanding. Tandon also identifies variation among earnings of immigrants from different countries, and a gap between Canadian born people and immigrants from some areas, such as Asia, Latin America, Southern Europe, and the West Indies, a gap that narrows but is not eliminated by length of residence.[139]

Akbari s study is instructive because he uses a range of data covering the period 1956-94 and uses census data as well as landing documents of the immigrants to analyze educational attainment over a longer period of time than most other studies. This data is then compared with the educational attainment of the Canadian born group. Overall data show that the percentages of new immigrants with only high school education or less have been falling over the period of analysis, while percentages of immigrants with university degrees have been rising. These trends refute the generally held view that changes in immigrant admission criteria that took place in Canada after the mid-1960s, which resulted in more admissions under family and refugee class schemes, caused a decline in immigrant 'quality,' as measured by immigrants' educational attainment. The period immediately after the 1978 Immigration Act, which resulted in a rise in refugee class immigrants, did cause a rise in the percentages of those who arrived with lower schooling and a fall in the percentage of those who held university degrees. However, these percentages have improved since the early 1980s.

First, let us examine a comparison of the above results with those of native born Canadians. This comparison is important for at least two reasons. Some recent writers in Canada have drawn this comparison in a way that may misinterpret the data. For instance, Stoffman (1993) wrote, "In 1971, immigrants were three times as likely to have a higher education as native-born Canadians, but by 1986 that advantage had disappeared."

The above statement gives the impression that (a) recent immigrants are less likely to have an educational level higher than that of native-born Canadians and (b) recent immigrants are less educated than earlier immigrants. In fact, Stoffman is referring to a decline not in immigrants' absolute amount of education, but in the extent of their education relative to that of the Canadian born.

Another reason for comparing the absolute educational levels of immigrant inflows at their time of entry with the educational attainment of native-born Canadians is that, in the past, government documents recognized that immigrants had attained higher educational levels than native-born Canadians, and so there was not any resulting decline in the educational attainment of the overall population. For instance, a 1951 census publication (Statistics Canada, 1951) noted that among adults aged 35 and over who had arrived in Canada over the period 1946-51, around 12.7 % had 13 years or more schooling, while for the corresponding native born population, this percentage was only 7.8. "Thus, it would appear that the addition of immigrant residents of the 1946-51 period did not lower educational standards in Canada." [140] It is therefore important to establish if the policy changes since the 1960s, which shifted the country of origin mix, as well as the immigrant class mix, adversely affected the "educational standards" in Canada.

Akbari used census data on the educational attainments of native-born Canadians to compute percentages corresponding to those of immigrants in Table 21. These are reported for the census years 1961, 1971, 1981, 1986, and 1991 in Table 22. For immigrants, these data are presented by their time of arrival, since they date back further (1956) than do the time-of-landing data. Furthermore, the immigrant data for the periods 1966-68 and 1969-70 are grouped into one interval - 1966-70; for the periods 1976-78 and 1979-80, data are grouped into one interval - 1966-1980. This grouping eases comparison with data on the Canadian born that are available for the census years. It is observed that, over the entire period of analysis, immigrants arrived in Canada with higher educational levels than those held by resident native-born Canadians. The percentages of immigrants arriving with high school education or less have always been lower than those of native-born Canadians, while the percentages of immigrants arriving with university degrees have always been higher.

Table 21: Education levels among immigrant inflows to Canada

	High School or Less Education		University Degree (%)	
	By period of Arrival a	By period of landing b	By period of Arrival a	By period of landing b
1956-65	89.3	NA	5.5	NA
1961-68	79.3	NA	12.4	NA
1969-70	70.2	NA	19.0	19.0
1971-75	NA	NA	NA	17.3
1976 -78	47.6	NA	19.2	17.5
1979-80	55.1	62.5	15.9	12.3
1981-85	47.4	56.4	20.6	15.8
1986-90	NA	52.3	NA	19.0
1991- 94	NA	53.0	NA	20.3

Source: Akbari (1999) data derived from Statistics Canada census data: 1961, 1971, 1981, 1986, 1991, as well as landed immigrant data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The difference between the two sets of flow figures is denoted by (a) and (b) where (a) represented data obtained from Census sources and (b) data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The objective is to have figures for periods not captured by one or the other source [141]

Note that the period immediately after the Immigration Act of 1978 resulted in a rise in refugee class immigrants and caused a rise in the percentage of those with lower schooling. This has been the basis for a lot of speculation about immigrant quality. However, these percentages improved after 1980.

Table 22: Educational Levels in the Canadian-born population, aged 25 and older

Period	High School or Less Education (%)	University Degree (%)
1961	92.0	3.5
1966	91.1	4.7
1971	89.7	5.4
1976	69.1	7.5
1981	63.3	9.1
1986	56.3	10.5
1991	53.7	10.6

Source: Akbari (1999) Data for 1961 are based on 1961 Canadian Population Census and are reported in Pandekur (1995). Data for 1966 are based on Statistics Canada (1966). Data for 1976 are based on the 1976 Canadian Population Census, as reported in Statistics Canada (1976). Data for 1971, 1981, 1986, and 1991 are based on the respective years' Canadian population censuses, micro data.

The data indicate that, over time, the gap in the educational attainment levels of immigrants and Canadian born has been narrowing. This has been interpreted by some, for instance Stoffman (1993), to misinterpret this narrowing of the gap in the case of university degree holders and suggest that recent immigrants are less educated than those who arrived in the past. However, data presented in the Akbari s study clearly show that this narrowing of the gap is due not to a decline in the educational levels among immigrants, but to increasing education levels among Canadian born people.

A comparison of immigrants' educational attainment data at the time of landing since the mid-1980s with the educational attainment of Canadian born residents does not change the main conclusion obtained above. As the tables show, although the percentages of immigrants having only high school education or less at the time of landing since the mid-1980s have been remarkably similar to those of the Canadian -born, the percentages of university degree holders have been significantly higher for immigrants than for the Canadian born.

In 1996, 53% of new entrants were either skilled immigrants (81%) or business class immigrants (19%).[142] According to Statistics Canada data, immigrants are now more likely to have a university degree than Canadian born people. Up to 34% of recent immigrants aged 25 to 44 had completed university, compared to 19% in the comparable Canadian born population.[143] Moreover, beyond that group as a whole, the immigrant population is older and as such has a larger proportion in the working age group. A larger share of the working age population and participation rates comparable to the Canadian born group would suggest a larger than average share of income. But despite these characteristics, immigrants arriving since 1986 experience some of the highest poverty rates. This reality suggests that racial barriers are playing a major role in creating these conditions of poverty

Myth busting no.4: Discrimination in employment, not human capital, explains differences in economic performance

Human capital explanations suggest that gender and race differences in job placement arise from individual differences in productivity acquired through education, labour force experience, and job tenure (Becker 1957). The assumption is that there is a relatively efficient sorting of individuals by the labour market into jobs that are commensurate with human capital characteristics. Human capital explanations for gender and race wage inequality have a long history of providing useful insight into the job allocation process. We don t argue here that education, training, and experience are not linked to job requirements; the point to be made is that they are not the sole determinants of the differentials in economic performance. Particularly in the case of race inequality in the labour process, race differences in human capital acquisition reflect historical discrimination and class disadvantages, and provide a partial explanation for employment and income inequality.

In 1984, the Abella Commission on Equality in Employment stated that the differences in unemployment rates and incomes between racialised group members and other Canadians should be understood as 'social indicators' of job discrimination and that, furthermore, such discrimination can be characterized as systemic.[144] The report led to the enacting of the Employment Equity Act, 1986, which was motivated by the goal of removing inequalities in income and occupational status between racialised and non-racialised groups, among others. Henry and Ginsberg s (1985) study, using an experimental technique called correspondence testing showed both how one could measure the incidence of racial discrimination in employment in Toronto in 1984, and also proved its prevalence.[145]

Howland and Skellariou's (1993) study of wage discrimination and the occupational segregation of racialised groups also found a significant discriminatory impact across occupations, one that was reflected in the wage differentials they encountered. While their examination indicates a divergence in the relative labour market experience of the groups studied, they concluded that employment discrimination explained wage differentials, although to relatively different degrees. The earnings gap was as high as 21% for Black men within the same occupation though lower for Blacks and South East

and South Asian women. But they observed that these differentials mask dramatic earnings differences across occupational categories. According to them, looking at the men, within-occupation pay differences appear to explain the greater part of the ethnic earnings gap. Within the intra-occupational differential, 'wage discrimination' was consistently the largest component. For women, intra-occupational earnings differentials appear to explain the greater part of the ethnic earnings gap. Wage discrimination was the largest factor explaining the earnings disadvantage of South and South East Asian women. Differences in the levels of occupation determining endowment characteristics between White and Asian women played a significant role in the earnings disadvantage of these women. They concluded that for all groups, policies aimed at reducing discrimination within occupational categories would be effective. For racialised women, it would appear that anti-discrimination policies should have a twofold thrust, primarily to reduce the within-occupation earnings discrimination and secondarily to provide training programmes to extend the career ladders confronting ethnic minority women.[146]

Their conclusions are consistent with the finding of Christofides and Swidinsky (1994), whose research suggests that productivity differentials alone do not account for the economic performance differential. With the help of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) wage regression analysis, and using Employment and Immigration data from 1990 and Statistics Canada Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS) data from 1989, they were able to demonstrate that substantial portions of the observed differentials cannot be explained by productivity differences alone . According to Christofides and Swidinsky, these differences, including, age, education, language, marital status, province, occupation, and weeks worked account for less than 30% of the wage gap; instead, they assign the residuals (70%) to factors such as discrimination.[147] They attribute the unexplained residuals to labour market discrimination and confirm that racialised group members were more likely, on average, to be paid less than other comparable employees. Recent comment on this subject by de Silva suggests that the role of quality differences in education in the wage differentials is underestimated. However, given the evidence of superior educational attainment and the discriminatory factor attached to international training, de Silva s objections are not conclusive [148]

What is apparent is that recent immigration is increasingly used as proxy for race, colour and place of origin in a way that is consistent with the racialised structures that evaluate productivity in the Canadian labour market. .

Discriminatory practices as exclusionary social closure processes

The second explanation that relates to discriminatory practices in employment focuses on exclusionary social closure processes.[149] In general, the social closure explanation suggests that status groups create and preserve their identity and advantages by reserving certain opportunities for members of the group. Exclusionary practices reserve the best positions and most desirable opportunities for members of more powerful status groups. An important implication of the social closure argument is that advantaged white male employees seem to benefit from, and thereby struggle for, exclusionary practices.

A well known organizational closure argument is associated with the dual economy theory as well as with neo-classical economic theory's discussion of '"tastes'" for discrimination (Becker 1957).[150] In general, the argument is that high resource organizations can afford to employ higher paid white male labour. Racialised peoples, and often enough women, are systematically denied access to the most favourable employment organizations. Both the dual labour market and neo-classical traditions present discriminatory behaviour by employers as a way of preserving white, male privilege. In essence, employers are responding to pressures from advantaged employees or to their own discriminatory preferences when they refuse to hire women or members of minority groups. Again the general argument is that employers discriminate in hiring, generally with encouragement from white male employees, and allocate jobs to women and racialised group members that require skills lower than those they may actually have. The more highly skilled and otherwise advantaged jobs are reserved for white males.

Access to Professions and Trades

As part of the immigration process, the Canadian government s Occupations List details the number of points awarded for each recognized occupation and the required training. The number of points assigned to various occupations is intended to reflect demand in the Canadian labour market. The Occupations List is updated regularly to reflect Canada s changing labour market needs.

This approach to selecting immigrants has brought many highly educated people to Canada. Of the skilled workers selected in 1998, fully 72% had university degrees. Even factoring in their dependents 15 years of age and over, the rate of university attainment among skilled immigrant households is 59.6%.[151] This rate is more than four times the rate of university graduates among Canadian born households (13.3%)[152]
°
Historically newcomers from European countries have done well economically once they have settled in Canada. A 1995 study of the earnings of immigrants who arrived from 1946 to 1986 shows them consistently earning more than their Canadian born peers (Akbari 1995: 120).[153] (Akbari 1995, 120)However, the picture is not so rosy for racialised immigrant professionals and skilled trades people whose occupations are regulated here, and especially for those arriving after 1986. A 1989 Ontario taskforce found that most encounter barriers to access to their professions and trades.[154]

Gaining recognition of foreign credentials is a major challenge for international trades people and professionals. Barriers to the regulated professions imposed by the governing bodies, lack of assessment infrastructure for foreign educational, training, technological, and professional standards, and lack of familiarity with regulatory bodies, employers, and academic institutions mean many of the immigrants most highly assessed in the Occupations List face major and sometimes insurmountable barriers to obtaining occupational licenses. The result is a highly educated and experienced underclass of immigrant professionals and trades people who are unemployed or underemployed in Canada.

For instance, a Citizenship and Immigration Canada report indicates that, between 1991 and 1994, 10,279 immigrants arrived in Canada who listed civil, mechanical, chemical, or electrical engineering as their intended occupation.[155] But by April 1996, according to Statistics Canada, only 5,770 of the immigrants who arrived between 1991 and 1996 were practising these professions. The rest are unaccounted for, meaning that nearly half (44 %) of the immigrants who came to Canada between 1991 and 1994 intending to work as civil, mechanical, chemical, or electrical engineers were not so employed in 1996. This experience is not limited to engineers but repeated times over with other professionals and trades people[156]

Barriers to Entry to Trades and Professions

Immigrants with professional education and experience encountered decisive blockages in accessing work corresponding to qualifications. This remains an outstanding problem in Canada even with a long history of resettlement that points to a high degree of resistance at the gates of the professional employment market. As Cumming (1989) and Lam (1996) have argued, this issue demands the coordinated attention of policy makers at different levels of government, and intervention with mechanisms that would facilitate immigrant transition. Such intervention would enable their skills and qualifications to be transferred and not be wasted, for the benefit of the immigrants, their communities, and the Canadian economy. As the current Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Elinor Kaplan, continues to demand the very best immigrants for Canada, it is important that what is a brain drain for countries in the South doesn t simply become a brain waste in Canada and a loss for both source and receiving countries. Many advocacy organizations have been calling on the federal government departments responsible for the selection of immigrants to coordinate with provincial ministries, provincially regulated professional licensing bodies, trade councils, employers, and communities in order to design mechanisms that will ensure that incoming immigrants enter the labour market at levels that utilize their skills.[157]

The mismatch between the skills and education of foreign trained professionals and trades people, and their actual occupations once in Canada, creates substantial costs, both to individual immigrants and their families, and to Canadian governments, businesses, and the economy. According to a Price Waterhouse report (1998) commissioned by the Ontario government, failure to recognize foreign academic credentials alone (not to mention foreign work experience) causes losses to the Ontario economy due to (a) Increased costs to the welfare system, and social service losses to employers who are unable to find employees with the skills and abilities they desperately require. There are also costs associated with unnecessary retraining for foreign trained individuals (b) The loss of potential revenue from foreign trained individuals who are unable to work and contribute to the tax base and other parts of the economy.

The same report cites an Australian study of the economic impact of not recognizing foreign credentials:

Similar to Ontario in demographic, socio-economic, cultural and immigration characteristics, Australia quantified the loss to their national economy, due to the non-recognition of foreign degrees, as ranging from $100 million to $350 million (US) in 1990. This represents 200,000 immigrants who failed to gain recognition and never returned to their pre- migration occupations").

The arrival each year of so many well-qualified immigrants also could counteract the much-debated brain drain of Canadian educated workers to the U.S. if the credentialism policies were reduced. According to Dr. Ivan Fellegi, Chief Statistician of Canada: "University educated migrants coming to Canada outnumber those leaving for the US by four to one" (1999).

A 1994 federal government study by Fernando Mata breaks down a number of significant human and social impacts resulting from Canada s failure to recognize the credentials of immigrants:

˚˚˚ *Ethnic/race relations impacts*: racialised immigrants who find themselves shut out of their occupations feel individually and collectively alienated as victims of institutional discrimination. This alienation results in mounting tensions between themselves and members of other groups who are not excluded. Moreover, as long as minority professionals continue to be barred from practising their professions, youth from those communities will lack effective role models, and this lack perpetuates the problem. [158]

˚˚˚ *Human rights impacts*: Many foreign trained professionals and trades people, as well as immigrant agencies, argue that policies and practices that limit access to accreditation and access to trades and professions contravene the protections accorded by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and by provincial human rights legislation.[159]

˚˚˚ *Immigrant integration impacts*: Lack of recognition of an immigrant s occupation often leads to underemployment and reduced income. In addition, "professional accreditation barriers for immigrant women and refugee groups are often insurmountable." For women, this lack of recognition arises from factors related to both their legal entry status and the added burden many of them face due to gender and family roles. For refugees, having to present original certificates and documents in order to be accredited often makes the situation even worse. Because many such documents may have been destroyed or lost in their flight from persecution, and because they cannot return to their countries of origin to retrieve them or request new ones, refugees may simply abandon their hopes of achieving the recognition of their professional credentials in Canada.[160]

˚˚˚ *Mental health impacts*: According to the report, these impacts "may be the most harmful to society. The 1988 Report of the Canadian Task Force on Mental Health Issues singled out the barriers to trades and professions as major factors leading to an erosion of skills, loss of technical idiom, and diminishing confidence in one s capabilities." Desperation has even driven affected immigrants to conduct hunger strikes

to bring attention to their situation and to instigate change. The mental health problems often result in physical health problems related to stress.[161]
°°° What is evident is that there remains a massive disconnect between Canada s immigration program objectives and the reality facing many immigrants on arrival "makes a mockery of efforts by the immigration department to recruit well-educated immigrants." (Richmond 1994: 145).

Table 23: Refugees in professional/management occupations in the country of origin and occupations in Canada when interviewed

Occupations in country of Origin	Occupation in Canada
Accommodation services manager	Machine operator
Banking manager	Accounting clerk/Taxi driver
Computer systems analyst	Property Administrator
Dentist	Welder
Economist	Truck driver
Editor	Sales assistant
Engineers	Labourer/Cleaner/ Drafting technician/Dispatcher Delivery driver/Gas worker/Drywaller/
Financial accountants	Foodservice /Cleaner/ Hairdresser/Courier/Accounting clerk/Nursing aide/Mechanical assembler/Machine operator
Graphic artist	Sales clerk
Journalists	Labourers
Judge	Secretary
Land surveyor	Survey technician
Lawyer	Paralegal/Labourer
Librarian	Labourer/landscaping
Manufacturing manager	Labourer
Musician	Retail supervisor
Armed forces officer	Meat cutter/Mechanical assembly
Pharmacist	Health services aide
Registered nurses	Nursing assistants/Social service Workers/Cleaner/Sales Clerk/Decorator/Food service
Retail/Sales manager	Labourer/Flight attendant/ Early childhood educator/ Tailor/Metal contractor/Purchasing agent
Scientist	Service station attendant
Social worker	Food server
Specialist physicians	Nursing aides/Cleaner/Medical lab
School teachers	Cleaner/Social service workers/Early childhood educator/Kitchen helper/Accounting clerk/Labourer/
College lecturers	Customer service clerk/Electrical mechanic/Meat cutter/Welder
Veterinarian	Nursing aide

Source: Survey of Settlement Experiences of Refugees by Abu-Laban et al.(1999) [162]

Part 4: Socio-economic implications of the racialised gap

This report embraces the now established view of poverty as encompassing not only low income and consumption but also low achievement in education, health, nutrition, and other forms of human deprivation. On the basis of what people say poverty means to them, the experience of poverty includes powerlessness, marginalisation, voicelessness, vulnerability, and insecurity. This understanding of poverty and its causes suggests that these different dimensions of poverty interact in important ways so that, to make progress in ending its impacts, poverty must be attacked in all its many dimensions.

Segregated housing and the racialisation of neighbourhoods

Research shows that the quality of a neighbourhood significantly affects the life chances of its residents.[163] In Canada, studies show that people of European heritage live in neighbourhood with superior social qualities while Asians and blacks experience inferior social qualities, despite the high relative costs of the housing. Fong and Gulia s study using the 1991 Census data and Statistics Canada special tabulation (1994) considered the effects of socio-economic resources on neighbourhood qualities among racial and ethnic groups. Conventional notions suggest the existence of perfect competition in the housing market, claiming that economic resources translate into equal access to housing, Studies by Fong (1997) and Balakrishnan and Selvanathan (1990) show a relationship between neighbourhood qualities and socio-economic status. The studies show that locational stratification varies along racial lines. Balakrishnan et al, show how racialised groups experienced higher levels of residential segregation, even when their economic status improved. Fong and Gulia s 1996 study shows that groups with lighter skin colour reside in better neighbourhoods than groups with darker skin colour. The differences relate to differential abilities to convert both socio-economic resources into neighbourhood qualities as well as differential access to resources and information. Fong and Gulia conclude that differences in the neighbourhood qualities of racial groups are influenced by resources, acculturation and locational stratification that reflect the discriminatory experiences of some of the groups in the housing market.[164]

Poor neighbourhoods and racialised groups

Since the 1980s, there has significant research both in the United States and Canada focussing on the extent to which concentrations of neighbourhood poverty are increasingly identified with racialised communities. Included here are studies by Hajnal (1995), Massey & Dento (1993), Ley and Smith (1997), Murdie (1998) and Kazemipur & Halli (1997,2000) among others[165].

The proliferation of racialised neighbourhoods with high poverty levels coincides with a growing racialisation of the housing market in Canada s urban areas. These concentrations in turn correlate to social isolation and the attendant social ills identified by a recent investigation of 1996 Canada Census data by Kazemipur and Halli (2000).[166] Kazemipur and Halli s study which focused on racialised groups and immigrants found correlation between neighbourhood poverty and such racialised groups as Chinese, Black,

Vietnamese, Spanish-speaking. The only other groups with equally high correlation were Aboriginal people and Polish. In fact they found mostly negative correlation for those of European origin like Germans, British, Dutch, Swedish, Finnish and Jewish. On the other hand, they found a positive correlation among immigrants arriving since the 1970 when Canadian immigration began to shift substantially towards source countries predominated by racialised groups.

The study also shows that the overrepresentation of the mostly racialised group and immigrants in poor neighbourhoods acts as a barrier to economic success, hampers children s education opportunities and raises overall health risks. The study concludes that the overrepresentation of racialised groups in poor neighbourhoods compromises their quality of living conditions and civil services like education, health care, recreational services; may lead to a sub-culture that may impede the opportunities of future generations by limiting access to networks in which, for instance, job opportunities are routinely presented through word of mouth; and may lead to a breakdown in social institutions, increased unemployment, over policing and contract with the criminal justice system, teenage pregnancy, family disruption, family violence and crime.

Since the 1980s, there has significant research both in the United States and Canada focussing on the extent to which concentrations of neighbourhood poverty are increasingly identified with

More recently, a 2000 study by Fong and Shibuya using 1991 census data found a high level of racialised neighbourhood segregation, especially for poor racialised group members. It found a high segregation of blacks and moderate to high segregation of South Asians. The findings show a close relationship between racial and low income segregation, but also a vulnerability by some groups to the process of gentrification in major cities.[167] Fong and Shibuya suggest that racial and ethnic segregation reflect both the social economic status of racialised groups but also patterns of social relations, in the sense that minority group members are labelled undesirable as neighbours leading to 'spatial distance' between the majority population and the minorities. This is often intensified by fears that undesirables in a neighbourhood depress property values.

Their study concludes that residential racial segregation occurs due to discriminatory practices against racialised group members, especially the poor, in the housing market. They are then left to inhabit marginal housing stock n segregated neighbourhoods. It found that Blacks were the most residentially segregated group of the racialised groups studied and also that there was a clear correlation between race and poverty status as function of segregation.[168]

A 1988 Quebec Human Right Commission study matched pairs of white and black actors, in a search for housing. Of the 73 cases tested, 31 showed blatant overt discrimination. Discrimination was confirmed when the black actors were told there were no vacancies and the white actors given the apartment soon after. Discrimination also took the form of differential rental fees and conditions.

In Vancouver, a study in the early 1990s in the midst of increased immigration from Hong Kong, found that Chinese immigrants were blamed for the increases in house prices and often faced accusations of unneighbourliness. Attempts by local residents and councils to use zoning by-laws and regulations to limit the expansion of mostly Chinese neighbourhoods showed how even affluent groups can be racialised.[169]

What the studies show is a growing tendency in urban Canada towards residential segregation that is reinforced by the low income status of many racialised groups. The implications are higher social risks and further social exclusion and economic marginalisation.

Social inequality and instability

Numerous studies have investigated the claims made here, i.e., that (1) increased income inequality leads to increased social and political instability, and that (2) the increase in social and political instability negatively affects economic progress. Most have been done in the world s developing areas, mostly between states. They suggest hat income inequality is strongly and systematically related to the character of social relations and to the nature of the social environment in a society.[170] More recently though, some studies have been done that make comparisons between industrialized countries. Lester Thurow s work is representative, in that it considers the relationship between inequality and instability in the ties between Western countries. His view is captured in his claim that "free markets (also) tend to produce levels of income inequality over the nation's history that are politically incompatible with democratic governments." [171] Putman has also argued recently that "Equality is an essential feature of the civic community" [172]

Even more relevant are recent articles by William Dugger, Christopher Niggle, and Caroline Rodriguez, which examine the issue within the United States.[173] Caroline Rodriguez s work has empirically tested the relationship between income inequality and social and political instability, as well as between this instability and economic progress among different regions of the United States. The results show that there is a strong relationship between income inequality and the amount of property and violent crimes, which she uses as proxies for social and political instability. Her work also shows that there is an inverse relationship between instability and economic growth meaning that inequality affects the levels of economic growth a country can attain. Niggle s survey of empirical literature finds that economic, social, and political institutions influence the relationship between income inequality and economic progress. More importantly, Dugger s research shows that economic inequality in the United States is (a) a product of social processes involving racism, sexism, and nationalism, and that (b) it has a cumulative effect on the level of social stability and cannot be addressed simplistically by either federal or state governments.

In the Canadian context, a study by Dunn and Dyck (1998) have investigated the social determinants of health in Canada's immigrant population using Canada's National Population Health Survey (NPHS). Specifically, they looked at the differences in health status and health care utilization between immigrants and non-immigrants, immigrants of

European and non-European origin, and immigrants of less-than-ten years and greater-than-ten years residence in Canada. They adopt a perspective which suggests that the most important determinants of human health status are not medical care inputs and health behaviours (smoking, diet, exercise, etc.). Rather, they are social and economic characteristics of individuals and populations. Although there investigation is not conclusive, they strongly suggests, based on a reading of varied literature that mechanisms related to societal power relations, social identity, social status, and control over life circumstances are highly influential on the differential distribution of health status across social strata. The literature on social inequalities in health demonstrates a positive correlation between social status and health status.[174] There is also a wealth of other empirical research by mainstream and critical social scientists that space does not allow us to cite here that supports our argument that growing income inequality leads to social and economic instability, which then leads to lowered economic growth.

Studies have long established a relationship between economic status and the life chances of groups and communities. The social inequalities associated with racial discrimination in North America have also been related health status. The World Health Organization has stated clearly that the state of economic development is a strong determinant of the health situation of a country . The same goes for inequality in socio-economic status — the scale of social and economic differences among groups in the population. The more equal the society is, the healthier it is. Social inequality translates into health inequality[175]. Social inequality particularly affects the social fabric. Health tells us about the differentials in the quality of life enjoyed by different groups in society.

The implications for racialised groups are obvious. Such social causes of health deterioration as depression, anxiety, alcoholism, drug dependency are related to differences in social status as are mortality causes such as suicide, homicides, accidents, etc. Material inequality is a major determinant of the social welfare with its impact on health being but one of the social costs it imposes on the victims of this inequality. Others can be seen in access to basic needs such as shelter, nutrition, and clothing. Beyond that, education and social participation also become less accessible, meaning that the level of citizenship is also compromised. Another equally troubling dimension to the outcomes of social inequality is contact with the criminal justice system.

The role of human capital, including health and nutrition, are important in poverty reduction strategies. People become poorer as a result of bad health or health crises, but being poor also makes people less healthy and more exposed to risk. In the Voices of the Poor consultation exercise recently conducted by The World Bank, ill health emerged as one of the main reasons why households believe they end up in poverty.

Health status and nutritional are a fundamental part of well-being.
Health improvements for the poor can improve outcomes for everyone, since widespread communicable diseases among the poor raise risks for everyone, and since high priority activities that improve the health of the poor, such as immunizations and environmental health interventions, benefit everyone. Health and nutrition inputs can improve outcomes, but so can activities in other sectors. Education, the environment,

availability of housing, and meaningful employment also contribute to better health, so achieving goals for the poor depends in part on actions in these other sectors.

The racialisation of poverty in Canadian urban centres

The **2000 World Development Report** defines poverty as an unacceptable deprivation in human well-being that can comprise both physiological and social deprivation. Physiological deprivation involves the non-fulfillment of basic material or biological needs, including inadequate nutrition, health, education, and shelter. A person or family can be considered to be poor therefore if s/he or they are unable to secure sufficient amounts of goods and services to meet these basic material needs. The concept of physiological deprivation is closely related to, and extends beyond, low monetary income and consumption levels. Social deprivation widens the concept of deprivation to include risk, vulnerability, lack of autonomy, powerlessness, and lack of self-respect. Given that local definitions of deprivation often go beyond physiological deprivation and sometimes give greater weight to social deprivation, local populations (including poor communities) should be engaged in the dialogue which leads to the most appropriate definition of poverty in a country.

"Poverty is not knowing where your next meal is going to come from, and always wondering when the landlord is going to put your furniture out

Poverty is always praying that your husband must not lose his job. To me that s poverty

According to 1996 census data racialised group members experienced higher rates of poverty compared to other Canadians, with a rate in 1995 twice that of other Canadians (35.9% compared to 17.6%). While poverty among racialised communities varies from province to province ranging from 24.3% in Newfoundland to a high of 52.2% in Quebec, these groups consistently face higher average rates of poverty than other Canadians in all the provinces. In the three provinces with the highest concentration of racialised group members, the situation was as follows: In Ontario, with the highest population of racialised communities, the rate was 34.3% compared to 14.6%, in British Columbia, it was 32% compared to 16.9% while in Quebec, it was 52.2% compared to 21.5% in the rest of the population. Along with racial discrimination, unequal labour force participation, occupational segregation, age distribution of the population, unemployment rates, and educational levels are often cited as contributing factors.

Table 24: Poverty rate by racialised group status, by province, 1995

Province	Poverty rate racialised groups	Poverty rate members of other groups
Newfoundland	24.3%	21.3%
P.E.I	28.0%	15.1%
Nova Scotia	37.9%	18.1%
New Brunswick	34.2%	18.9%
Quebec	52.2%	21.5%
Ontario	34.3%	14.6%
Manitoba	31.3%	19.7%
Saskatchewan	29.9%	18.0%
Alberta	31.9%	16.9%
British Columbia	32.0%	16.9%
Canada	35.9%	17.6%

Source: D. Ross, K. Scott, P. Smith The Canadian Fact book on Poverty (Canadian Council on Social Development, 2000). Based on Statistics Canada 1996 Census data

Another way to look at the experience of poverty among racialised groups is to look at immigrant incidence of poverty. As documented above, racialised groups compose the disproportionate number of recent immigrants (post 1970s). According to 1996 census data, two thirds of racialised group members were immigrants (68%). The Census also showed that both racialised group members and immigrants earned less than their counterparts.[176] Data also shows that immigrants were more likely to be poor than Canadian born — on average 30% living in poverty as opposed to 21% of Canadian born

The population of immigrants that arrived in the last 15 years, 1986 to present are particularly vulnerable to high rates of poverty. This population is also largely made up of racialised group members. Studies of urban areas where they are concentrated show both the incidence of racialised group s immigration to Canada s cities and their experience with poverty.[177] Canadian Council for Social Development study released in 2000 clearly documents the prevalence of poverty among immigrants, new comers and refugees. While the most recent arrivals are most disadvantaged, suffering 52.1% poverty, the rate for those in the country for 15 years is 35% compared to a Canadian born rate of 21%. The rate for immigrant populations arriving before 1986 is slightly loser than that of the Canadian born group. [178] Which raises the question of whether the

period of stay is responsible for the differences in levels of poverty. Arguably, it is to some extent, however, the racial composition of the immigration pool has changed dramatically over the last 25 years, and even more intensely over the last 15 years. Given the previous patterns that documented income parity and in many cases an advantage for immigrants during the pre-1970s period, period of stay cannot be the only explanation. Another possible explanation is educational attainment differentials. However, most of the immigrants in the post 1991 group gained entry through a strictly enforced point system, which favoured those in the economic class.

Table 25: Population of immigrants in Canadian cities by arrival period and poverty status. Source: Canadian Council on Social Development (2000) based on Statistics Canada Census data 1996.

Total Population			Proportion of population		Percentage Rate of Poverty
	Total	Poor	Total	Poor	
Canadian Born	12,147,000	2,972,200	70%	62%	21.6%
Immigrants And Refugees	3,627,000	1,129, 500	29.8%	38%	30.0%
Immigrants	3,627,000	1,129,500	100%	100%	30%
Pre-1986	2,094,000	411,700	59.8%	39.1%	19.7%
1986-1990	551,400	193,300	15.7%	18.4%	35.1%
1991-1996	981,800	510,500	27.0%	45.1%	52.1%

Finally, the poor are also increasingly exposed to homelessness in urban areas. A recent taskforce report on homelessness in Ontario's Peel region investigated homelessness among a number of racialised communities including Punjabi, Vietnamese, Tamil, Spanish Speaking and Caribbean. Its findings suggest that the problem of homelessness is growing in these communities, especially among refugees. It was particularly concern about the levels of displaced seniors, abused women, the unemployed and those with mental illness and substance abuse problems. [179]

Civic and political participation

The majority of immigrants who settle in Canada obtain Canadian citizenship, usually within three to four years after immigrating to Canada. Of all immigrants eligible to become Canadian citizens, 83% had done so by 1996.[180]
Yet this has not translated into active participation in the civic and political life of Canada. Many factors explain this reality, not the least of which are barriers that exist in the political processes at the different levels of government. Racialised group members are underrepresented in the public service sector, accounting for only 5.4% of employees in the federal government (compared to 11.4% in the population), in spite of legislation aimed at increasing the numbers of group members in the service and their mobility within it.[181] These socio-economic, political and cultural barriers translate into a form of exclusion, which extends beyond the lack of representation in the decision-making bodies of the Country. Socio-economic exclusion impairs societal (economic, political and civic) participation and undermines the objective of full citizenship. This in turn has implications for the ability of these communities to make claims on the decision making institutions meaning that issues of inequality go undressed and their condition simply exacerbates. While the levels of participation are low on average for most racialised communities, they also vary from community to community and also break down along gender lines.

For immigrant communities, the process of integration is one in which immigrants become part of the social, cultural and institutional fabric of society.[182] Societal participation here is used in a holistic way to refer to processes of resettling persons in the economic, socio-cultural and civil/political spheres, and the deployment of social capital in the formal and informal institutional spheres of the society.[183] These processes are partially overlapping, and include labour market participation and related activity (e.g. educational), social interaction, acculturation, and electoral and civil activism, which form the foci of scrutiny in both cases.

For many of the racialised communities, the processes of integration have not achieved the central goal of empowering them to participate fully in Canadian society. The communities have articulated empowerment goals based on three institutional imperatives: access (openness to visible minorities), representation (proportionate to numbers in the population), and equity (equality of opportunity and removal of systemic barriers[184]

Part 5: The Role of the State

The state has responded to issues of racial discrimination and inequality in a variety of ways. Much of the response has focussed on mechanisms to deal with individual incidences of racial discrimination. However, increasingly, responses aimed at systemic forms of discrimination and targeting disadvantages experienced by groups, have become more prevalent.

At the federal level, Bill of Rights, Charter of Rights and freedoms, Multiculturalism Policy, Canadian Human Rights Act, federal Employment equity Act, federal service employment equity program.

The Multiculturalism Act represents the federal government s definitive statement on the changing nature of the country. However, while acknowledging that fact, the Act and the policy it mandates have not addressed issues of racial discrimination, instead implying a form of neutral diversity and harmony among equals.

The *Federal Employment Equity Act* introduced in 1986 has had mixed results. Successive Annual Employment Equity reports show that the progress made after 15 years, has not matched the growth in the numbers of racialised group members in the Canadian population.[185] Most experts have suggested that the weak enforcement regime is to blame.

In fact, as the report of the Taskforce on the participation of Visible Minorities in the Federal Public Service shows clearly that the federal employment equity program has performed even more poorly than a number of the employers the federal government regulates. The report, which looked at current levels of representation, current rates of hires and promotions, and current separation rates, found that representation of racialised group members has increased only marginally, from 4.1% in 1990-91 to 5.9% in 1998-99 even though representation in the population had increased to nearly 12% by 1996. Some of the largest department, Department of National Defence (3rd largest); Correctional Services (4th), and Fisheries and Oceans (6th), have the lowest representation at 2.8%, 2.8% and 2.6% respectively. The report found low representation of racialised group members in the executive category, at 3% and low rates of progress over the 8year period. The representation in the key feeder groups was 3.7%. The report also found low rates of external recruitment of racialised group members and identified this as the most significant barrier to improved representation. The report concluded that at the rate of hires, the federal service will not achieve equity until after 2023 and to meet its goal of parity by 2005, 1 in every 5 recruits will have to be from the racialised group population.[186]

At the provincial level, the focus has been on Human Rights Commissions. Some provinces have introduced employment equity programs and anti-racism programs. Ontario introduced a comprehensive employment equity legislation in 1994, which was subsequently repealed by the conservative government in 1995.

CHRONOLOGY OF FEDERAL ACTION RELATING TO RACIAL INEQUALITY

1960 Passage of the *Canadian Bill of Rights*

1963 Establishment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

1969 Book IV of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission Report emphasizes the bilingual and multicultural nature of Canada

1971 Introduction of Canada's Multiculturalism Policy

1977 Passage of the *Canadian Human Rights Act*

1982 Adoption of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*

1984 Special Parliamentary Committee Report, *Equality Now*, calls for a Multiculturalism Act and establishment of a national research institute on multiculturalism and race relations issues

1985 Royal Commission Report on Employment equity, the Abella Report calls for employment equity legislation

1986 Passage by Parliament of the *Employment Equity Act*

1988 Passage of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*

1996 Government establishes the Canadian Race Relations Foundation

1996 New *Employment Equity Act* passed

1998 Government tables Bill 69, *An Act to Amend the Canadian Citizenship Act*

1999 Government announces renewed Multiculturalism Program

Part 6: Recommendations for Progress

The appropriate response to the crisis that has been detailed in this report would require both the different levels of government and other institutions in society to commit to addressing the issues of racism and racial discrimination in Canadian society. What is required is a level of political will that has not been demonstrated to this point. Any adequate response must adopt an anti-racism framework as a basis for dealing with a problem that will only become more critical as racialised group members increase in number in Canadian society. It must address issues of citizenship which lie at the heart of this crisis of what has been described as democratic racism. In the final analysis, the threat posed by the routine decisions informed by racial assumptions and prejudice in workplaces, service delivery, and government stacks up greater than the harangues of the self proclaimed white supremacist Heritage Front. Canadian society, its cultural institutions like the media and the processes of policy making have got to confront the spectre of racial inequality before it confronts the nation.

Many of the recommendations here demand a multi level of government and civil society approach. The few outlined below are really just the start of a process that should involve all sectors of society not just racialised groups. Both governments and civil society organizations need to be more acutely aware of the crisis the findings in this report (as well as similar) represent. There is a need for a sense of urgency to arrest the situation before its outcomes become inevitable. Above all else, the issues raised by this report cannot be the subjects of the same type of official marginalisation that many in the racialised communities feel today.

Royal Commission on Racial Inequality In Canadian Society

Royal Commissions have had the ability to focus the attention of the Canadian population on issues of vital importance. Racial inequality is such and issue in the twenty-first century. It demands the resources of some of Canada's best minds as well as an openness of mind to ensure that it is discussed by as many people as possible in both passionate and dispassionate tones, but above all, allowing racialised group members the right to speak and not be marginalized even in this endeavour.

Employment Equity

The problem of discrimination in employment lies at the heart of access to the workplace for many racialised group members. The need to remove barriers to access to access to employment has been identified by many reports but the responses have lacked the commitment necessary to be adequate to the task. The Federal Employment Equity Act remains poorly enforce and needs new attention. The enforcement mechanisms in the federal employment equity act need to be strengthened. At the provincial level, the mistakes of the federal act should not be repeated. Mandatory employment equity program should be introduced to deal with the failure of the market place to equitably allocate employment opportunities and incomes.

Strengthening Employment Standards Legislation

Contingency work is becoming a key feature of the Canadian labour market. Because of the disproportionate exposure of racialised group members to these precarious forms of work, they stand to benefit from the strengthening of labour and employment standards by provincial governments. This is ever more urgent as globalisation intensifies employer demands for flexibility. The protections against abuse by unscrupulous employers and employment agencies can contribute to the improvement of the economic performance of racialised group members

A National Urban Strategy

Most racialised group members live and work in Canada's urban centres. The crisis of racial inequality is likely to first manifest itself in tensions in these communities. Because they are also the engines of Canada's economy and because many racialised group members' cheap labour subsidizes them, the imperative for a National Urban Strategy within an Anti-racism framework is unparalleled today. A national urban forum would focus attention on the condition of Canada's urban centres and bring the different levels of government as well as civil societal organizations, including organizations representing racialised groups, debate together to prepare a strategy that will guide the development of Canada s urban centres. The call for a national forum recognizes the urgency of the issues pf racialised poverty, a segregated labour market and increasingly segregated neighbourhoods and their implications for Canada s social stability and economic growth. It also recognizes the complexity and multi-layered nature of the challenge we face. Central to these discussions should be the issues of persistent inequality in the labour market and urban poverty and especially racialised poverty.

Streamlining Access to Professions and Trades

Numerous studies show that the Canadian economy is attracting some of the world's best and brightest only to disappoint them by failing to streamline the processes of accrediting their qualifications. Many are choosing to leave their families here so that they can maintain their professional careers. If they are to make a commitment to Canada, Canada needs to reciprocate by allowing them the opportunities to practice their trades and professions. It is clear that for Canada to continue to attract the best and the brightest from around the world, their skills have got to be utilized. That means that the barriers to access to regulated professions and trades have got to come down. Provincial and federal legislative and program initiatives is necessary to deal with these persistent barriers to many racialised group members being able to convert their educational attainment into comparable compensation and employment. While the federal government is responsible for immigration, it needs to concern itself with what is happening to those new immigrants it competes for.

Increasing the Supply of Affordable Housing

Canada is unique in the Industrialized world as a country without a National Housing program. The research shows that Canada s racialised groups have difficulty accessing the limited stock of housing in very tight housing markets in the major urban centres. The role of the state in providing affordable housing is indispensable. It is imperative that a national affordable housing program be re-established and that its elements address specifically the segregationist nature of the housing market in Canada s urban centres.

Strengthening Access to Child Care

A national childcare program with national standards has been a feature of public discourse for the past decade. Yet jurisdictional wrangling and bureaucratic inertia has been cited as an impediment to delivering childcare to the many who need it. Addressing the demand for childcare is a key element in dealing with the low levels of earnings among especially racialised women and the resulting disproportionate level of poverty. Action by the federal government and provincial governments is urgently required. Some provinces have established what may be best practices that need to be studied.

Anti-racism Programs

The level of provincial and national support for anti-racism programs has diminished significantly over the 1990s. Moreover, its starting point was barely adequate to meet the need for anti-racism action in cities and neighbourhoods. The federal Department of Multiculturalism has an important role in mobilizing federal support as well as support form other levels of government to this end. A federal urban strategy must include support for anti-racism initiatives at the local, provincial and national levels

Community Economic Development

Increased participation in Canadian life for racialised groups depends on the level of development in the communities. Community institutions are essential to ensuring that racialised communities mature into strong organs for community empowerment. Federal programs aimed at successful integration have tended to be restricted to the newest members of the racialised communities, often at the expense of support for established institutions and service agencies. Federal, provincial and municipal funding for ethno-cultural organizations involved in community development as well as ethno specific service delivery organizations needs to be reinstated and raised to levels adequate to the task.

Unionization

The role of unions in improving the lives of working people is well documented. For Canada s racialised group members to make significant progress in the labour market,

they need the power of collective bargaining. The responsibility therefore falls on the leadership and members of Canada s organized labour to seize the opportunity and meet the challenge of empowering an increasingly marginalized and socially excluded segment of our society. Unions can bargain employment equity provisions as well as lead organizing drives in the sectors of the economy in which racialised groups are overrepresented.

Civil Society Organizations

Unions, and other progressive agents of change in society need to recognize the implications of the changing demographical landscape of Canada. They need to engage the difficult issues of opening up leadership channels for racialised groups so that the organizations that fight for social justice reflect, in their leadership and their membership, the changing reality of Canada. Racism is a cultural phenomenon to which change agencies are not immune. Adopting an anti-racism stances, undertaking anti-racism programs, and empowering those who they fight for, will require a new attention to self-assessment for many such organizations. Social justice groups must be in the forefront of a new progressive coalition against racial inequality. They must show the other sectors in society that it is possible to empower racialised members and draw on their resources to re-establish a progressive agenda for Canada, one that responds to all forms of oppression.

Appendix 1

Portraits of inequality: Painting a picture of racialised existence in the best country in the world to live

This part draws from some available research including qualitative research to give voice to the real experiences of racialised peoples as they struggle against historical manifestations of systemic racism in the workplace, in housing, in services, in the criminal justice system, in civic and political participation. Much of that research is part of a future project. A future project could concentrate on the qualitative dimension of the research.

Below are some of the examples of how racism manifests itself in the lives of many members of the racialised groups. Some are stories being told by and about those experiencing racism and racialised poverty. Others are examples of fieldwork done to demonstrate the reality and impact of racial discrimination in employment, in housing, in the criminal justice system, in service delivery etc. For instance, most contingent workers are low income earners, many of them women, many asylum seekers running to Canada from regimes that routinely abuse their human rights and put their lives at risk only to be routinely subjected to exploitation by temporary agencies. Many trades people and professionals are not able have been denied access to practice in their fields of training and experience. Lots of racialised women are expected to accept unsafe work as garment worker, domestics or cleaners. Many more work in sweatshops or as home workers in the clothing and textiles industry. Many well-educated racialised job seekers settle for cab driving, work as newspaper carriers, after years of frustrating job searches.

Too many racialised group members carry the tremendous burden of the injustices in the Canadian political economy that this space cannot be fully articulated in this limited space. With limited job prospects and insecure work arrangements, many racialised group members also suffer disproportionately when governments decide to remove income and other supports that would compensate for too low or limited incomes. Many They also become the disproportionate victims of all the other socio-economic effects of living in poverty, such as higher health risks, marginal housing, family violence, contact with the criminal justice system, to name but a few. Suffice it to say that, while they need bigger platform, which may become available in the future, their voices need to be heard today, by many of us who don t know nor appreciate the depth of their experiences. Their stories of struggle and resistance as they deal with oppression and exploitation also need to be heard

For a few years now, Canada has celebrated its United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) status as the best country to live in . It is important to note the extent to which HDI methodology gives the impression that average indicators apply to all peoples and communities. The impact of such assumptions is to erase the reality of those living in poverty, the homeless, those dealing with gender and racial discrimination and its

socio-psychological and health impacts, from Canada s record. Two key principles are ignored by such indices: one is that, poverty is primarily a household and community characteristic first and foremost — a fact easily lost in national average indices. What would be more accurate would be to measure how well the country or province succeeds in dealing with specific barriers that constrain poor households and poor communities. To the extent that the label detracts from a societal commitment to fight against poverty and racism, this moniker does a disservice to the country.

Secondly, what the victims of poverty and racial discrimination themselves are saying about their condition and experience is never heard. It is essential to listen to the poor in making such evaluation, in order to really understand the problems associated with poverty. Many poor people in Canada s urban centres today identify racism as a major factor in generating exposure to poverty.

Racism and racialised women's experiences in the workplace

Racialised women have what has been described as a 'double jeopardy' experience in the workplace. Not only do they have to content with racism but also sexism in employment. There have been numerous studies done that have exhaustively dealt with this experience. Some have approached it by looking at the experience of immigrant women while others consider the experiences of racialised women workers as domestics, community workers, nurses, garment workers, workers in the hospitality industry, teachers etc. Most of them confirm the experience of having to confront the dual oppressions of race and gender discrimination.[187]

Gendered racism has always been embedded in the Canadian labour markets and manifested in many ways. It reflects the persistent racist and sexist perceptions of gender-determined roles in the economy. Racialised women are often portrayed as less competent, less skilled, less disciplined (because they take too much time off work to fulfil parental duties), and mainly secondary wage earners. All these perceptions go against the empirical evidence that clearly documents racialised women as increasingly more educated than racialised men, for instance, working longer hours than men and with greater responsibilities and largely 'primary' wage earners, many in single family situations. Gendered racism means that racialised women as subject to further marginalisation and ghettoization. In predominant female occupations like nursing, studies show persistent discrimination as racialised nurses face barriers to management positions, and find themselves over concentrated in nurse's aide, orderly work, and other low end positions [188]

Racially segregated labour markets explain the segmentation of racialised women workers into the helping and nurturing occupations in which they are the victims of pay inequity for work of similar value in other sectors. They provide an understanding of how the experience of racialised women in the workplace is further compounded to include social marginalisation, low end and low skill jobs, exclusion from secure, well paid employment, powerlessness Racism and sexism, clearly interact with class to define the place of racialised women workers in the labour market, even in relation to other women

workers. As studies show, their experience is evident in such occupations as nursing, garment work, domestic work, community service, and such sectors as the health sector and the service sector, which are female dominated but within which their access to management is still limited and they find themselves disproportionately in low skill, low end jobs. Not only do they end up being underpaid, their mobility is limited, when it comes to supervisory responsibilities.

These structures tend to reproduce themselves as employers insist on particular racialised group workers in the belief that they are best suited to perform certain functions. The documented requests made by employers to Employment Agencies for specific racial groups for specific jobs is further evidence of these racist preferences. [189] Along with the prevalent segmentation of racialised women workers into health and social service sectors, to go with the commercial service sector, increasingly, racialised women are to be found in the precarious environments of contingent work - causal, part-time, contract work, often acquired through Employment Agencies that pay exploitative wages on contracts that clearly disempower them.

Contingent, temporary, contract and part time work

Contingency work has become a major feature of the Canadian Labour market at the beginning of the twenty-first century. By the end of the 1990s, a greater proportion of people were either contract employed, self-employed, or doing temporary work than at the beginning of the decade. While the form of work is not new, it departs from previous decades. Full time employment growth in accounted for only 18% of new job growth between 1989 and 1998, compared to 58% during the preceding decade. Meanwhile, self-employment accounted for 58% compared to 18% in the 1980s.[190]

The changing nature of the Canadian labour market is a response to the demands for increased flexibility, brought about by the intensified globalisation of the Canadian economy. The dramatic increase in self-employment and contract work has had a dramatic impact on racialised group members, especially racialised women. Not only do disproportionate numbers of racialised group members depend on contract, part time and contingency work, but the work is precarious, unregulated, involving long hours and low pay. Many of the workers in the service industry and light manufacturing are increasingly in temporary contracts from Employment Service Agencies, which pay them a fraction of what they earn in the jobs they are assigned to and hold them to those contracts even when their employers require their services permanently.

Table 26: Employed in Canada by Class of Worker, 1989 -1998 (in thousands)

	1989	1992	1997	1998	% increase 1989-98	% new jobs
Total employment	13,086	12,842	13,941	14,326	9.5	
Self-Employment total	1,809	1,936	2,488	2,525	39.6	57.7
S.E. no paid employees	822	904	1,282	1.351	64.3	42.6
Employees full-time	9,449	8,937	9,349	9,679	2.4	18.5
Employees part-time	1,828	1,969	2,103	2,122	16.1	18.8

Source: Statistics Canada Labour Survey quoted in Jackson, Robinson, Baldwin and Wiggins, Falling behind: The State of Working Canada, 2000, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2000 pp 56-60

A small number of self-employed workers earn well enough to be above the Canadian average. However, in 1995, 45% of those listed as self-employed earned less than $20,000, while only 6.7% earned $100,000 or more. Non-permanent worker's hourly wages were 82% of permanent workers and 64% of their weekly wages. [191]

A report released recently by the Toronto based Contingent Workers Project shows that the City's economy has consistently relied on under and unemployed immigrant workers to fill contingency jobs because of the discrimination they face in regular work environments. In many respects, the City's recent boom has been subsidized by the access to this pool of cheap labour. The report claims that contingency workers often need multiple jobs to make ends meet, find it difficult to access Employment Insurance benefits, and are often forced to work at home doing piece meal tasks. It claims that:

(There are) as many as 1,238,800 non-standard workers in the greater Toronto area. A large proportion is new immigrants who are being channelled into self-employment and temporary work. We are beginning to see that these forms of work play a key role in the creation and maintenance of ethno-racial segmentation in the city s workforce and an ethno-racial polarization income [192]

Contingent workers are found in a variety of arrangements, most of which are largely exploitative. The concept of flexible work with has become popular with globalisation has translated into new challenges for low income workers, especially those in with the most marginal and tenuous hold on the labour market. Not only are working conditions so severe, the wages are often below the provincially mandated minimum wage. In 1995, 45% of self-employed workers in Canada earned less than $20,000 a year.[193] Many of the workers are considered self employed or individual contractors and are contracted by temporary employment agencies which pick and choose, often based on racial categories,

who will work where.[194] Because racialised group members suffer disproportionately high levels of unemployment, they tend to be over represented in temporary and casual work arrangements with low piecemeal and hourly payment. Many provide manual labour and deliver newspapers or food, while others clean dishes or buildings. Some have converted their own homes into sweatshops for the clothing industry. Many routinely suffer chronic limb and back injuries, while others are exposed to toxic cleaning substances without proper protection and little recourse since they are paid for the hours they work and cannot afford to either complain, take time off for medical attention or to look for other employment. As a result, not only are they caught in a cycle of poverty, they face higher health risks.

Racism and Canada's mainstream media

The media is one of the most powerful institutions in Canadian society. It has the power to socialize young and old alike, define communities, and influence negatively or positively the behaviour of those who make decisions that affect racialised group members daily. Canadian mainstream media is not immune to its own cultural racism, as many studies have shown. Media determines the significance of a group by including or excluding it from its coverage and its members from its pages or screens. A Media Watch study of women and racialised group members in the media concluded that in the two weeks of newscasts monitored in the winter of 1993, racialised group reporters appeared only 3.9% of the time (2.6% for males and 1.35% for females). Media Watch report Front and Centre: Minority representation in the media , 1994.

The media is a key institution in the creation of the images that soon enough become realities that define racial minorities and their place in Canada. It perpetuated the racial ideologies that justify racialisation and inspite of many criticisms, continues to either 'disappear' or render invisible racialised group members, when it comes to, say, advertising and positive roles, while its coverage of crimes involving racialised group members is often excessive and sensationalized.

A recent study into racism in Canada s media by Henry and Tator (2000) titled *Racist Discourse in Canada s Print Media* examines, using case studies, linkages between racism, popular discourse and the media. It concludes that racialised group members are under represented and largely invisible in the media; that when they appear they are often misrepresented and stereotyped, and that despite claims of objectivity and neutrality, media institutions and those who work in them and run them allow their values, beliefs and interests to routinely impact the production of news and the images it portrays.[195]

Criminal justice system

Numerous studies have considered the differential treatment of racialised groups in the criminal justice system. The evidence is overwhelming that racialised group members receive differential treatment in the criminal justice system.[196] The numerous Royal Commissions, taskforces and studies confirm the systemic nature of racial discrimination in the administration of justice as manifest through the over representation of racialised

group members in arrests by police, imprisonment before trial, differential treatment in how charges are managed by crown attorneys and in sentencing by judges, overrepresentation in prison admissions and differential treatment while incarcerated. Policies such as targeted policing impact the poor and racialised communities disproportionately.

In fact, more recently, some institutions in the Criminal Justice System have been accused of racial profiling and research is underway to establish the extent to which racial profiling is widely employed by police and prison. The over-representation of racialised group members in the penal system contrasts sharply with the under-representation in the ranks of lawyers, crowns, judges and police officers. Employment Equity in the criminal justice system remains a major challenge for Canadian society, even as Canada s urban areas with their disproportionate racialised populations become hotbed of confrontations between the groups and those responsible for the administration of justice.

Minorities and poor people regularly encounter discrimination in their contact with the criminal justice system. The Ontario Commission on Systemic Racism in the Criminal Justice System surveyed the views of Blacks, Aboriginal people, Chinese, Vietnamese people and found that many believed that they were treated differently in the Criminal justice system. These sentiments mirror findings by numerous reports on Policing and racial minorities in Ontario. Reports in Nova Scotia, Manitoba, law Reform Commission of Canada, dealing with racism in the criminal justice system.

In Canada's urban centres, this has led to tensions between minorities and Police. Blacks and Aboriginal people can be found in the criminal justice system (jails, courts) in disproportionate numbers and as has been remarked by Esmeralda Thornhill, holder of the Dalhousie University Law School Black Studies chair,

"By some unspoken societal consensus, a generalized negativity towards Blackness persistently links Black skin with criminality…All too frequently, Black skin colour becomes the initiating catalytic factor which jettisons Black people into the Criminal justice system."[197]

What Thornhill is talking about is the disproportionate incarceration of Blacks in Canada's prisons. The Ontario Commission in Systemic Racism in the criminal justice system found that: While Blacks were 3% of Ontario population, they were 15% of the jail population; Black imprisonment increase 204% between 1986-92 and whites on drug offence, were twice as likely as Blacks to be released while Blacks were three times more likely to be denied bail. The commission also found that whites found guilty were less likely to serve time and those sentences got lighter sentences for similar infractions

In the urban centres, issues of overpolicing - targeted policing, (with a common expressed within the communities referring to a charge called driving while black (DWB), to express the prevalence of unexplained police stops). Other experiences that point to systemic racism that includes disproportionate police shootings and killings of

racialised group members as documented in Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, as well as differential treatment in arrests.

Racism is also manifest in racially biased decisions by judges, lawyers, jurors, court officials, police officers, prison officials as well as biased Jury selection processes, differential sentencing and widespread lack of representation. Police forces play the role of sentinels for dominant culture. They are the oppressive instruments responsible for keeping the marginal populations in line. That is the starting part of the CJS process. Systemic racism plays out in these encounters. Society tends to support Police force. Few are convicted for crimes against minorities. Police display racist attitudes in their interaction with racial minorities. A recent police association advertisement in the Toronto subway before a municipal election stereotyped Latin American community members as gangsters.

Racism is implicitly manifest at different points in the decision making process in the criminal justice system. These include arrest, charging, bail, jury selection trial, sentencing and incarceration. The Law Reform Commission of Canada has acknowledged that the problem of racism in the criminal justice system as exemplified by who holds the positions of power, lack of access to police protection in some neighbourhoods, police harassment, and differential treatment in sentencing. In a 1992 report, it says that:
"Racism in the justice system is a consistently expressed and central concern to Canada's minorities", further, " the racism of which these groups speak mirrors attitudes and behaviours found in Canadian society as a whole"[198]

As a powerful institution in Canadian society, the criminal justice system often stands accused of perpetuating racism and the disempowerment of racialised group members, through a process referred to as criminalisation. The general profiling of group members often leads to their contact with the system and its differential outcomes. It is yet another important institution in Canadian society that continues to reinforce the racialised tendencies in Canadian culture.[199]

Speaking to the Canadian experience of racialisation

Racism is ..built into virtually every institution of our society, with very deep roots. Despite a rhetoric of tolerance of difference in our country, those in power have always used racial identity as a way to disempower those who are visible different from them

Submission of the Human Rights Committee of the United Steelworkers of America to the Canadian Labour Congress National Taskforce on Anti-racism, March 30 1996

Racism is a pernicious reality. A person would have to be stupid. Complacent or ignorant not to acknowledge its presence — not only individually but also systemically and institutionally Four Supreme Court of Canada judges upholding the acquittal of a black youth by Canada s first black female judge, Corrine Spark, who observed during the case that police officers are inclined to lie or overreact in their dealings with members of racialised groups

It is important, I believe, to acknowledge not only that racism is pervasive but that at different times in different places, it violates certain minority communities more than others Stephen Lewis report to the Premier on Race Relations in Ontario, 1992 pp3

Racism exists in Canada and has been an integral part of Canadian society for a long time. It is a powerful social force operating in the daily lives and social relations of Canadians Toronto Multicultural Coalition for Access to family Services, 1994

Racism is an ideology rooted in colonialism and oppression and permeates society
Carl James, University Professor, Toronto, 1996

We see the state interfering in a very direct way with the capitalist production process. This was done by regulating labour supply, specifically one which could be super-exploited and kept passive by the denial of political and legal rights rationalized by racist arguments Tania Das Gupta, University Professor, Toronto, 1994

"It was clearly recognized with regard to immigration from India to Canada that the native of India is not a person suited to this country, that, accustomed as many of them are to the conditions of a tropical climate, and possessing manners and customs so unlike those of our people, their inability to readily adapt themselves to surroundings entirely different could not do other than entail an amount of privation and suffering which render a discontinuance of such immigration more desirable in the interests of the Indians themselves" (Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie, 1947).

"The people of Canada do not wish to make a fundamental alteration in the character of their population through mass immigration. The government is therefore opposed to large scale immigration from the Orient, which would certainly give rise to social and economic problems" (Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie, 1947)

What we are dealing with, at root, and fundamentally is anti-black racism. While it is true that every visible minority community experiences the indignities and wounds of systemic discrimination throughout Southern Ontario, it is the Black community that is the focus. Stephen Lewis report to the Premier on Race Relations in Ontario, 1992 pp 2

My husband leaves at 5:00Am and gets back at 6:00pm. I don t get back from my shift until 12:30AM. Then I have to get up with my husband at 4:00AM to get him off to work. In the morning, I do the housework and cooking before I leave for my shift Temporary worker, Toronto, 2000

The agency I am with right now is fine, but I signed up with another one that didn t call me back. I found out from other workers that I shouldn t have told them that I had children. They don t keep you on their list if you have children. They think it takes too long to find child care when they call you . Contingent working mother, Toronto, 2000

I have worked for these people since I came to this country but I am still so behind in my rent that I can t sleep at night [200]

Home care workers in one agency could only take 36 hours of paid leave a year. This is an occupation that is surrounded by sick people and workers are not immune to illness. You get this double message. The client doesn t like it if you go over with a cold, but then the management doesn t want you to call in sick Home care worker, 2000 pp35

A temporary worker had a short-term assignment in a workplace where he worked with chemicals. He was not given health and safety training and was not provided with goggles. He was splashed with chemicals and was told by the doctor that he was very lucky that he did not lose his sight. Breaking the Myth Of Flexible work, 2000 pp35

Homecare workers don t get the wages, benefits or protections that hospital workers do..many juggle working for two or three agencies and pay for their own travel time going from client to client Deena Ladd, Coordinator, Contingent Workers Project, Toronto

It s easy for an agency not to call a worker back because they don t fit in Kumutha Balasingam, temporary agency worker, Toronto

Balasingam s agency has sent her to a microchip factory, an electronics warehouse, and a cabinet factory. The Cabinet factory pays the temp agency $9 an hour for her work. The agency pays her $5.50. If the machines are down, there is no pay. If someone s hurt, there no pay Lynn Spink, Living on the Edge: The Not So Casual World of Contingent Workers in Our Times, July/Aug 2000. Balasingam is a pseudo name for a temp worker in Toronto

Jonathan Judah is a Toronto Star newspaper carrier. When he started the Toronto Star used to pay fro gas, plastic bags and elastic bands, and didn t penalize carriers when the customer failed to pay. Today, Judah must cover these cost himself

Irrespective of where you live (in Canada), the majority of us who have gone to look for an apartment in any major Canadian city can relate to a situation where they are told there are no vacancies only to learn that a white person was offered the space Toronto Activist

More recent immigrants, particularly those from Developing world residing in Ontario and Quebec, have substantially lower rates of home ownership even when age and period of immigration is controlled Ray & Moore (1991) pp19

Because landlords routinely demand a guarantor for new comers who have only worked for a short period of time in the country, I have found that it is sometimes easier to get newcomers a mortgage than an apartment to rent. Toronto activist and Real Estate broker

A study carried out in Kitchener-Waterloo concluded that many people are experiencing difficulties in accessing rental housing as a result of racial discrimination Hulchanski, (1993) pp12-13

It s a nice building but you will never be able to get any of my clients in there I ve been there with many people and, miraculously, the vacancies disappear every time Amina Ahmed, Housing help worker, Toronto, 2000

Racial segregation is alive and well in Toronto, a city so proud of its rich and growing ethnic mix that it adopted the motto Diversity, Our Strength only a few years ago Margaret Philp, Globe and Mail Reporter, Toronto, 2000

Whether conscious or not, poor Blacks and South Asians are winding up clustered in some of the most rundown buildings in Toronto, the closest the city comes to ghettoes Margaret Philp, Globe and Mail, 2000

What we are ending up with is a rental market cut into layers: the tope, middle class white: the middle, middle-class other colour: and at the bottom, we have immigrants in poorly maintained buildings paying rent not necessarily that much lower M.S. Mwarigha, program director, Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation, Toronto, 2000

The poles suffer discrimination that most poor people suffer if you are poor and you have an accent and you don t speak English too well, you re going to be excluded by some landlords But as soon as your skin is black, there is no comparison between the level and extent of discrimination David Hulchanski, University of Toronto professor specializing in urban housing research, Toronto, 2000

Discrimination is a much more serious problem than people want to admit. It s rarely discussed, but it s quite extensive. David Hulchanski, University of Toronto professor

There is much racial stereotyping and generalizations of victims, ethno-racial community members and immigrants by mainstream service agency workers. Consequently visible minorities are not serviced as individuals with individual needs but are often burdened with negative images such as the helpless victim, and the ignorant immigrants Toronto Multicultural Coalition for Access to family Services, 1994

Who gets arrested?

Forty-five per cent of Vancouver police officers do not believe that discrimination against non-whites is a problem in Canada and 91% of Vancouver police officers believe that people should not blame their ethnic or racial background for their problems
Ungerleider (1994) pp97

It is alarming to learn that, of the individuals we interviewed. Almost two out of three reported having been assaulted or threatened with assault by police officers Actual assaults included being beaten, slapped, punched and maced. Threats included death threats Committee to Stop Targeted Policing which interviewed homeless people, racialised people, Aboriginal people, people with mental health issues in Toronto, 2000

"On Sunday March 5th 2000, three young men of African descent were harassed and brutally beaten by MTHA security guards and Toronto police. As in many of these cases, bogus charges of resisting arrest were laid against these three young men.

On Monday, January 22nd 2001, two of these young men will appear in court on the charges. The community is asking for support from anyone and everyone who is interested in social justice.

The police and security forces in Toronto and elsewhere in North America are notorious for their racist and prejudiced policing. These young men have two strikes against them. They are of African descent and they live in a lower income neighbourhood".

Who gets covered?

the effect of inaccurate portrayals of immigrants in the media is to heighten xenophobic and racist tendencies and to entrench prejudices against immigrants and racial minorities. These attitudes have been identified as influencing public opinion, public debate and policy making Nation of Immigrants documents**,** Ontario Council of Agencies Service Immigrants (OCASI)

The white-only mentality of the Canadian establishment is weird when you consider that this is one of the most racially diverse societies on earth What we get in Canadian media is a fantasy Equality Now, 1984 pp 91

The controversy surrounding Show Boat represents the tip of the iceberg of black resentment towards their overwhelming negative portrayal in both the advertising and news content of our popular culture and media. Other minorities, too carry a catalogue of complaints — Sikh Canadians, Muslims Canadians, Hindu Canadians, Arab Canadians and others Haroon Siddiqui, Toronto Star, April 24, 1993

When visible minorities appear in our newspapers and TV public affairs programming, they emerge as villains in a variety of ways — as caricatures from the colonial past, as extensions of foreign entities, as troubled immigrants in a dazzling array of trouble spots: hassling police, stumping immigration authorities, cheating on welfare, or battling amongst them selves or with their families Haroon Siddiqui, Toronto Star, April 24, 1993

In a study of visible minority and native Canadian inclusion on CBC and CTV newscasts it was concluded that during more than four weeks of a national news programs, only 20 out of 725 interviews solicited the opinions of non-white subjects not specifically about people or stories from their communities Perigoe & Lazar (1993) pp. 267

In a study of media coverage of gangs, it was found that gang related media stories focus on Asian gangs, notably in conjunction with condemnation of Canada s immigration Policy. Out of 144 stories almost half (71) focussed on Asian gangs. Fasiolo & Lecteur (1993) pp 1,10

The media often emphasizes race negatively for visible minorities The blackness or the orientalness of a criminal is always identified whereas the Caucasian criminal s whiteness is never mentioned. White people constitute the norm and any deviation from that norm is considered to be inferior, immoral and wrong Toronto Multicultural Coalition for Access to family Services, 1994, pp. 18

This is a shame, nut the truth. A sanitized, bloodless form of ethnic cleansing is the best we can hope for Barbara Amiel, commenting on multiculturalism, 1995

All those anxious, pushy Orientals with outstretched palms and camp-smarts, try to warm their way into the West. They lack the stoic simplicity of the African refugees who crisscross that continent in eternal agony, seeking refuge from famine and civil war without bothering us for more than the odd blanket Barbara Amiel, MacLean s, 1989

Who gets organized?

The face of the unemployed, unorganized and organized workers have changed Those fighting for progressive alternatives in Canadian and international economic and social

policies can no longer ignore this reality, unless they choose to be irrelevant to the wishes and aspirations of a significant part of our population Louis Iffel, anti-racism activist, Winnipeg, 1996

The struggle against racism requires that unions recognize they are the most critical organizations to economic and social transformation in Canada and that racism is fundamentally a strategy for worker exploitation instigated by employers. Workers of Colour —Support Network Brief presented to the Canadian labour Congress National Anti-racism Task force March 2, 1996

We are tired of being told that we do not have money to send a person of colour to a conference..What about the dues my sisters and brothers, that I have given to my union CLC Taskforce on Anti-racism participant, Winnipeg, 1996

In our struggle for inclusion and representation, I am tired of waiting for the labour movement to show concrete results. Although I know that part of our anti-racism work is for our children, I also want to see the results of m activism that I can be proud of in my lifetime Max Aranguiz, Anti-racism activist, Edmonton, 1996

If unions are about representation, how do we hold our unions accountable for ignoring the many critical issues and recommendations which have been brought forward by Aboriginal peoples and people of Colour with the support of union members but have been sitting on the shelf for years Bev Johnston, anti-racism activist, Toronto, March 31, 1996

"*Some of the new Canadians are skilled, but there is no way for them to join the workforce. It takes years to get qualification papers considered to be the Canadian equivalent. I was a laboratory assistant for a while but now there are no jobs available. I can t even find a security job. We need jobs for people trying to make ends meet*. [201]

An examination of the manager level occupation categories in the banking industry in 1988 shows that the percentage of those making more than $40,000 ranged from 1.4% at the Banque Nationale to a high of 6.6% at the bank of Nova Scotia
Pool, (1990) Visible Minority report pp 23

Visible minority student enrolment at the University of Toronto was almost 40%, yet less than 10% of its faculty were members of racial minority groups At York University..even fewer members 6.4% were from racial minority groups
Henry and Tator (1994) pp 78

Racial minorities experience a glass ceiling at senior management.. racial minority men and women experience occupational segregation which limits their upward mobility
Stephen Lewis report to the Premier on Race Relations in Ontario, 1992 pp 18

Only 24 training positions are now open in Ontario to foreign doctors whose numbers exceed 500 counting conservatively. Why can t we set up additional programs to evaluate

immigrant physicians and allow them to write the same examinations Canadian graduates write? The fear that somehow immigrant doctors are inferior is based on prejudice and ignorance tinged with arrogance. Forty years is long enough to prove that immigrant physicians could adapt and could contribute. I would like to present a historical sketch of the premed class of 1952 at the National Taiwan University. Twenty-six of us came to North America for postgraduate training. Six became general practitioners. The rest are all board certified in various specialties, many with advanced degrees in their fields.....If we had arrived on the shores of Canada today, we would be forced by xenophobia and parochialism to live our lives as lab assistants or taxi drivers. I challenge Dr. Lai to present a more impressive cohort to justify his contention that we are pointless whiners. It is painful to see the way we waste our precious human resources when there is a crying need in this province for more medical manpower. In a letter to the Medical Post by a Taiwanese trained doctor who has worked in Canada as a doctor for nearly 40 years after experiencing substantial difficulties in getting his foreign credentials recognized:

Who gets the apartment?

A 1988 Quebec Human Right Commission study matched pairs of white and black actors, in a search for housing. Of the 73 cases tested, 31 showed blatant overt discrimination. Discrimination was confirmed when the black actors were told there were no vacancies and the white actors given the apartment soon after. Discrimination also took the form of differential rental fees and conditions.

In Vancouver, a study in the early 1990s in the midst of increased immigration from Hong Kong, found that Chinese immigrants were blamed for the increases in house prices and often faced accusations of unneighbourliness. Attempts by local residents and councils to use zoning by-laws and regulations to limit the expansion of mostly Chinese neighbourhoods showed how even affluent groups can be racialised.[202]

Discrimination often arises when those with discernible accents call to inquire about advertised rental accommodation. In cases where the accents are not discernible, it often occurs when the applicant arrives in person.

Irrespective of where you live (in Canada), the majority of us who have gone to look for an apartment in any major Canadian city can relate to a situation where they are told there are no vacancies only to learn that a white person was offered the space
Toronto Activist

More recent immigrants, particularly those from Developing world residing in Ontario and Quebec, have substantially lower rates of home ownership even when age and period of immigration is controlled Ray & Moore (1991) pp 19

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Appendix 2

Industrial Tables from Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC 1999 from John Anderson, "Notes on Visible Minorities and the Income Gap", unpublished paper for the Centre for Social Justice, 2000

Geography: CANADA	Industry: Total - All Industry **Total**	**(%)**	**Male**	**(%)**	**Female**	**(%)**	**Aboriginal People**	**(%)**	**Visible Minorities**	**(%)**
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**15,547,115**	**100**	**8,332,190**	**53.6**	**7,214,925**	**46.4**	**321,740**	**2.1**	**1,593,635**	**10.3**
Senior Managers	151,545	100	119,995	79.2	31,550	20.8	3,975	2.6	11,005	7.3
Middle and Other Managers	1,193,810	100	792,860	66.4	400,950	33.6	12,170	1.0	112,205	9.4
Professionals	2,165,530	100	1,024,890	47.3	1,140,640	52.7	28,585	1.3	225,405	10.4
Semi-professionals & Technicians	953,390	100	493,035	51.7	460,355	48.3	19,415	2.0	86,495	9.1
Supervisors	189,485	100	87,930	46.4	101,555	53.6	2,640	1.4	18,600	9.8
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	542,525	100	453,680	83.6	88,840	16.4	6,550	1.2	19,490	3.6
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	842,270	100	123,665	14.7	718,605	85.3	13,415	1.6	61,450	7.3
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	713,890	100	409,580	57.4	304,310	42.6	13,490	1.9	87,455	12.3
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	1,158,330	100	1,095,960	94.6	62,370	5.4	29,440	2.5	78,395	6.8
Clerical Personnel	1,721,610	100	499,590	29.0	1,222,020	71.0	27,345	1.6	199,590	11.6
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	1,917,705	100	616,455	32.1	1,301,250	67.9	43,325	2.3	202,175	10.5
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	1,784,855	100	1,407,080	78.8	377,775	21.2	48,150	2.7	212,560	11.9
Other Sales & Service Personnel	1,579,825	100	721,225	45.7	858,600	54.3	45,265	2.9	207,810	13.2
Other Manual Workers	632,345	100	486,250	76.9	146,090	23.1	27,975	4.4	70,990	11.2
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.	-' Amount too small to be expressed									
Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada	Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC									

Geography: CANADA

Industry: Major Group 18 - Primary textile industries

	Total	(%)	Male	(%)	Female	(%)	Aboriginal People	(%)	Visible Minorities	(%)
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**20,335**	**100**	**13,910**	**68.4**	**6,425**	**31.6**	**60**	**0.3**	**2,030**	**10.0**
Senior Managers	165	100	150	90.9	15	9.1	-	0.0	10	6.1
Middle and Other Managers	810	100	685	84.6	120	14.8	-	0.0	40	4.9
Professionals	640	100	460	71.9	180	28.1	-	0.0	30	4.7
Semi-professionals & Technicians	910	100	590	64.8	325	35.7	10	1.1	40	4.4
Supervisors	130	100	95	73.1	35	26.9	-	0.0	-	0.0
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	1,365	100	1,205	88.3	155	11.4	-	0.0	110	8.1
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	475	100	85	17.9	390	82.1	10	2.1	30	6.3
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	60	100	35	58.3	30	50.0	-	0.0	10	16.7
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	2,090	100	1,995	95.5	90	4.3	10	0.5	150	7.2
Clerical Personnel	1,405	100	620	44.1	785	55.9	-	0.0	130	9.3
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	335	100	255	76.1	85	25.4	-	0.0	15	4.5
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	8,600	100	5,410	62.9	3,190	37.1	30	0.3	1,185	13.8
Other Sales & Service Personnel	360	100	310	86.1	55	15.3	-	0.0	45	12.5
Other Manual Workers	2,975	100	2,010	67.6	965	32.4	-	0.0	245	8.2

-' Amount too small to be expressed.
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.

Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC

Geography: CANADA

Industry: Major Group 19 - Textile products industries

	Total	(%)	Male	(%)	Female	(%)	Aboriginal People	(%)	Visible Minorities	(%)
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**38,060**	**100**	**20,295**	**53.3**	**17,765**	**46.7**	**245**	**0.6**	**9,185**	**24.1**
Senior Managers	515	100	450	87.4	60	11.7	-	0.0	70	13.6
Middle and Other Managers	2,260	100	1,720	76.1	540	23.9	15	0.7	345	15.3
Professionals	815	100	470	57.7	345	42.3	-	0.0	70	8.6
Semi-professionals & Technicians	1,195	100	665	55.6	530	44.4	-	0.0	170	14.2
Supervisors	390	100	255	65.4	135	34.6	-	0.0	65	16.7
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	1,845	100	1,370	74.3	475	25.7	10	0.5	385	20.9
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	940	100	80	8.5	860	91.5	-	0.0	60	6.4
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	110	100	75	68.2	30	27.3	-	0.0	10	9.1
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	2,035	100	1,445	71.0	590	29.0	-	0.0	410	20.1
Clerical Personnel	3,400	100	1,350	39.7	2,050	60.3	-	0.0	645	19.0
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	1,525	100	970	63.6	560	36.7	10	0.7	115	7.5
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	16,695	100	8,035	48.1	8,665	51.9	160	1.0	5,125	30.7
Other Sales & Service Personnel	830	100	560	67.5	270	32.5	10	1.2	250	30.1
Other Manual Workers	5,495	100	2,850	51.9	2,645	48.1	30	0.5	1,450	26.4

-' Amount too small to be expressed.
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.

Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC

Geography: CANADA

Industry: Major Group 24 - Clothing industries

	Total	(%)	Male	(%)	Female	(%)	Aboriginal People	(%)	Visible Minorities	(%)
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**125,480**	**100**	**31,045**	**24.7**	**94,440**	**75.3**	**655**	**0.5**	**45,410**	**36.2**
Senior Managers	1,490	100	1,120	75.2	370	24.8	-	0.0	190	12.8
Middle and Other Managers	5,640	100	3,405	60.4	2,235	39.6	10	0.2	1,200	21.3
Professionals	920	100	460	50.0	460	50.0	-	0.0	200	21.7
Semi-professionals & Technicians	3,910	100	1,075	27.5	2,840	72.6	35	0.9	800	20.5
Supervisors	765	100	370	48.4	390	51.0	10	1.3	120	15.7
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	4,480	100	1,790	40.0	2,685	59.9	20	0.4	1,210	27.0
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	1,735	100	195	11.2	1,540	88.8	10	0.6	275	15.9
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	405	100	80	19.8	325	80.2	-	0.0	130	32.1
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	8,355	100	2,140	25.6	6,215	74.4	40	0.5	1,960	23.5
Clerical Personnel	9,375	100	3,485	37.2	5,890	62.8	55	0.6	2,825	30.1
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	3,805	100	1,595	41.9	2,210	58.1	35	0.9	680	17.9
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	67,915	100	9,585	14.1	58,325	85.9	370	0.5	27,990	41.2
Other Sales & Service Personnel	3,025	100	1,545	51.1	1,485	49.1	10	0.3	1,510	49.9
Other Manual Workers	13,640	100	4,195	30.8	9,445	69.2	60	0.4	6,315	46.3

-' Amount too small to be expressed.
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.

Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC

Geography: CANADA

Industry: SIC 323 - Motor vehicle industry

	Total	(%)	Male	(%)	Female	(%)	Aboriginal People	(%)	Visible Minorities	(%)
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**65,160**	**100**	**56,465**	**86.7**	**8,690**	**13.3**	**520**	**0.8**	**4,545**	**7.0**
Senior Managers	175	100	180	102.9	-	0.0	10	5.7	10	5.7
Middle and Other Managers	1,915	100	1,690	88.3	225	11.7	0	0.0	130	6.8
Professionals	3,260	100	2,600	79.8	655	20.1	10	0.3	325	10.0
Semi-professionals & Technicians	1,135	100	1,020	89.9	110	9.7	0	0.0	75	6.6
Supervisors	325	100	265	81.5	60	18.5	0	0.0	10	3.1
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	3,120	100	2,965	95.0	155	5.0	20	0.6	180	5.8
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	765	100	275	35.9	485	63.4	10	1.3	40	5.2
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	85	100	70	82.4	15	17.6	0	0.0	-	0.0
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	9,160	100	8,880	96.9	280	3.1	70	0.8	495	5.4
Clerical Personnel	3,100	100	2,040	65.8	1,060	34.2	20	0.6	155	5.0
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	325	100	295	90.8	30	9.2	0	0.0	-	0.0
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	39,345	100	33,995	86.4	5,355	13.6	330	0.8	3,015	7.7
Other Sales & Service Personnel	1,480	100	1,350	91.2	130	8.8	15	1.0	55	3.7
Other Manual Workers	960	100	840	87.5	125	13.0	35	3.6	45	4.7

-' Amount too small to be expressed.
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.

Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC

Geography: CANADA

Industry: Major Group 64 - General retail merchandising industries

	Total	(%)	Male	(%)	Female	(%)	Aboriginal People	(%)	Visible Minorities	(%)
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**230,500**	**100**	**64,575**	**28.0**	**165,920**	**72.0**	**6,235**	**2.7**	**25,220**	**10.9**
Senior Managers	465	100	350	75.3	120	25.8	-	0.0	70	15.1
Middle and Other Managers	21,570	100	10,160	47.1	11,415	52.9	430	2.0	2,515	11.7
Professionals	2,795	100	1,240	44.4	1,555	55.6	25	0.9	515	18.4
Semi-professionals & Technicians	2,295	100	850	37.0	1,445	63.0	25	1.1	295	12.9
Supervisors	8,445	100	2,275	26.9	6,170	73.1	100	1.2	710	8.4
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	185	100	140	75.7	50	27.0	-	0.0	25	13.5
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	2,355	100	185	7.9	2,170	92.1	60	2.5	250	10.6
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	5,190	100	1,720	33.1	3,465	66.8	195	3.8	475	9.2
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	2,880	100	2,265	78.6	615	21.4	90	3.1	325	11.3
Clerical Personnel	33,565	100	9,205	27.4	24,360	72.6	645	1.9	3,965	11.8
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	84,135	100	15,915	18.9	68,220	81.1	1,390	1.7	8,985	10.7
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	6,945	100	5,435	78.3	1,505	21.7	180	2.6	780	11.2
Other Sales & Service Personnel	58,960	100	14,515	24.6	44,445	75.4	3,065	5.2	6,265	10.6
Other Manual Workers	700	100	310	44.3	385	55.0	30	4.3	45	6.4

-' Amount too small to be expressed.
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.

Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC

Geography: CANADA

Industry: Major Group 70 - Deposit accepting intermediary industries: Banks and Credit Unions

	Total	(%)	Male	(%)	Female	(%)	Aboriginal People	(%)	Visible Minorities	(%)
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**304,000**	**100**	**74,980**	**24.7**	**229,015**	**75.3**	**2,580**	**0.8**	**44,575**	**14.7**
Senior Managers	1,985	100	1,590	80.1	395	19.9	-	0.0	150	7.6
Middle and Other Managers	52,890	100	26,135	49.4	26,750	50.6	255	0.5	5,100	9.6
Professionals	31,980	100	15,230	47.6	16,750	52.4	115	0.4	6,350	19.9
Semi-professionals & Technicians	1,580	100	900	57.0	680	43.0	-	0.0	265	16.8
Supervisors	11,460	100	1,995	17.4	9,470	82.6	65	0.6	1,500	13.1
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	45	100	35	77.8	10	22.2	10	22.2	-	0.0
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	31,320	100	5,920	18.9	25,400	81.1	205	0.7	3,720	11.9
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	430	100	200	46.5	235	54.7	-	0.0	20	4.7
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	340	100	285	83.8	55	16.2	10	2.9	40	11.8
Clerical Personnel	168,430	100	20,845	12.4	147,585	87.6	1,885	1.1	26,975	16.0
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	895	100	360	40.2	535	59.8	10	1.1	110	12.3
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	390	100	290	74.4	100	25.6	-	0.0	45	11.5
Other Sales & Service Personnel	2,165	100	1,145	52.9	1,020	47.1	20	0.9	285	13.2
Other Manual Workers	85	100	60	70.6	25	29.4	-	0.0	10	11.8

-' Amount too small to be expressed.
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.

Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC

Geography: CANADA

Industry: SIC 772 - Computer and related services

	Total	(%)	Male	(%)	Female	(%)	Aboriginal People	(%)	Visible Minorities	(%)
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**147,480**	**100**	**99,995**	**67.8**	**47,485**	**32.2**	**700**	**0.5**	**24,210**	**16.4**
Senior Managers	3,640	100	3,205	88.0	440	12.1	-	0.0	325	8.9
Middle and Other Managers	13,800	100	9,980	72.3	3,820	27.7	35	0.3	1,455	10.5
Professionals	74,345	100	56,300	75.7	18,045	24.3	220	0.3	13,685	18.4
Semi-professionals & Technicians	16,265	100	13,925	85.6	2,340	14.4	110	0.7	2,625	16.1
Supervisors	1,285	100	550	42.8	735	57.2	10	0.8	145	11.3
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	95	100	75	78.9	20	21.1	-	0.0	15	15.8
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	6,435	100	855	13.3	5,580	86.7	60	0.9	765	11.9
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	8,655	100	6,440	74.4	2,210	25.5	55	0.6	1,195	13.8
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	460	100	410	89.1	50	10.9	-	0.0	40	8.7
Clerical Personnel	18,860	100	5,860	31.1	13,000	68.9	175	0.9	3,295	17.5
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	1,920	100	1,360	70.8	560	29.2	20	1.0	190	9.9
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	820	100	510	62.2	305	37.2	-	0.0	275	33.5
Other Sales & Service Personnel	690	100	395	57.2	300	43.5	10	1.4	140	20.3
Other Manual Workers	195	100	125	64.1	65	33.3	-	0.0	55	28.2

-' Amount too small to be expressed. Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.

Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC

Geography: CANADA	Major Group 81- Federal government service industries									
	Total	(%)	Male	(%)	Female	(%)	Aboriginal People	(%)	Visible Minorities	(%)
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**394,585**	**100**	**227,620**	**57.7**	**166,965**	**42.3**	**9,335**	**2.4**	**22,195**	**5.6**
Senior Managers	5,620	100	3,625	64.5	1,990	35.4	105	1.9	330	5.9
Middle and Other Managers	40,805	100	31,160	76.4	9,645	23.6	420	1.0	1,475	3.6
Professionals	69,030	100	41,990	60.8	27,040	39.2	1,200	1.7	6,590	9.5
Semi-professionals & Technicians	26,630	100	18,020	67.7	8,610	32.3	715	2.7	1,415	5.3
Supervisors	7,805	100	3,415	43.8	4,390	56.2	135	1.7	410	5.3
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	1,830	100	1,695	92.6	135	7.4	45	2.5	35	1.9
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	39,695	100	11,860	29.9	27,835	70.1	835	2.1	2,305	5.8
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	18,410	100	15,375	83.5	3,035	16.5	795	4.3	510	2.8
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	9,160	100	8,755	95.6	410	4.5	240	2.6	180	2.0
Clerical Personnel	91,815	100	24,490	26.7	67,330	73.3	2,505	2.7	6,415	7.0
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	66,295	100	54,325	81.9	11,975	18.1	1,515	2.3	1,970	3.0
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	6,995	100	6,070	86.8	925	13.2	285	4.1	135	1.9
Other Sales & Service Personnel	7,990	100	4,755	59.5	3,235	40.5	315	3.9	360	4.5
Other Manual Workers	2,500	100	2,085	83.4	410	16.4	225	9.0	70	2.8

-' Amount too small to be expressed.
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.

Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC

Geography: CANADA	Industry: SIC 291 - Primary steel industries								
							Aboriginal People		Visible
	Total	**(%)**	**Male**	**(%)**	**Female**	**(%)**		**(%)**	
Total - Employment Equity NOC	**41,360**	**100**	**38,320**	**92.6**	**3,035**	**7.3**	**335**	**0.8**	**1,**
Senior Managers	175	100	170	97.1	-	0.0	0	0.0	
Middle and Other Managers	1,585	100	1,485	93.7	100	6.3	0	0.0	
Professionals	2,240	100	1,860	83.0	380	17.0	0	0.0	
Semi-professionals & Technicians	1,495	100	1,455	97.3	35	2.3	0	0.0	
Supervisors	345	100	280	81.2	70	20.3	0	0.0	
Supervisors: Crafts And Trades	3,105	100	3,050	98.2	55	1.8	10	0.3	
Administrative & Senior Clerical Personnel	675	100	155	23.0	520	77.0	0	0.0	
Skilled Sales & Service Personnel	195	100	175	89.7	20	10.3	0	0.0	
Skilled Crafts And Trades Workers	10,560	100	10,470	99.1	85	0.8	125	1.2	
Clerical Personnel	3,375	100	2,180	64.6	1,195	35.4	20	0.6	
Intermediate Sales & Service Personnel	325	100	270	83.1	55	16.9	0	0.0	
Semi-skilled Manual Workers	9,525	100	9,350	98.2	180	1.9	110	1.2	
Other Sales & Service Personnel	865	100	755	87.3	105	12.1	10	1.2	
Other Manual Workers	6,885	100	6,660	96.7	225	3.3	50	0.7	
-' Amount too small to be expressed.									
Totals may not equal the sum of components due to rounding and suppression.									
Source: Unpublished data, 1996 Census of Canada									
Prepared by: Data Development, Labour Standards and Workplace Equity, HRDC									

Endnotes

[1] This term is used to describe non-aboriginal people of colour, also referred to by Statistics Canada and in the Federal Employment Equity Act as visible minorities.
[2] Das Gupta, T., The Political Economy of Gender, Race and Class: Looking at South Asian Immigrant Women in Canada in Canadian Ethnic Studies XXVL, 1 (1994): 59-73.; Brand, D., Black Women and Work: The Impact of racially Constructed Gender Roles on the Sexual Division of Labour in Fireweed (25): 35.
[3] Yalnyzian, Armine, The Growing Gap, Centre for Social Justice. 1998.
[4] Based on a special run of Statistics Canada Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), 1996, 1997, 1998, designed by John Anderson for the Centre for Social Justice, 1999-2000.
[5] bid.
[6] The list of reports and studies dealing with racial inequality in employment runs from the 1981 study by Reitz, J, L. Calzavara & D. Dasko, Ethnic Inequality and Segregation in Jobs (Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1981) through the Canadian Parliamentary Taskforce on the Participation of Visible Minorities in Canada titled Equality Now (1984); the Abella Commission report Equality in Employment (1985); the Henry & Ginsberg reports Who Gets the Job and No Discrimination Here (1985); Urban Alliance on race relations and Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto report A Time for Change (1990); to the most recent Federal government's Taskforce on the Participation of Visible Minorities in the federal Public Service (2000). These, and many more, all conclude that racial discrimination was pervasive in Canada's employment systems. Further, that, as Judge Abella remarked, "Strong measures were needed to remedy the impact of discriminatory attitudes and behaviour".
[7] Dibbs, Ruth and Leesti, Tracey, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics: Visible Minorities and Aboriginal Peoples, Statistics Canada, 1995.
[8] Jennifer Chard, Women in Visible Minorities, in Women in Canada, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, 2000: A gender based statistical report.
[9] Some exceptions exist though. Japanese Canadians are often cited as one. For comparison, according to 1996 Census data, two out of every three Japanese-Canadians (44,000) are Canadian born, while the ratio among African-Canadians. is two out of every five African-Canadians (241,000). — That is closer to the racialised group average of 68% (immigrants) to 32% (Canadian born).
[10] Various Annual Reports, Employment Equity Act; See also federal Taskforce on the Participation of Visible Minorities in the Federal Public Service, 2000
[11] Statistics Canada, 1996 Census: Sources of Income, Earnings, The Daily, May 12, 1998.
[12] Lee, K. Urban Poverty in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 2000).
[13] Ornstein, M., Ethno-Cultural Inequality in Toronto: Analysis of the 1996 Census (Toronto: Access and Equity Unit, City of Toronto, 2000)
[14] Dibbs, Ruth and Leesti, Tracey, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics: Visible Minorities and Aboriginal Peoples (Statistics Canada, 1995).
[15] Anderson, J. & J. Lynam "The Meaning of Work for Immigrant Women in the Lower Echelons of the Canadian Labour Force" in Canadian Ethnic Studies XIX (2) 1987 pp67-90; Vosko, L Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); T. Das Gupta, Racism and Paid Work (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1996)
[16] Herny, F., C. Tator, W. Mattis, T. Rees, The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 2000). The authors suggest that the concept of democratic racism explains the co-existence of the principles of liberal democracy, such as equal rights for all, and the reality of racial discrimination in Canadian society.
[17] Reitz, J & R. Breton "Prejudice and Discrimination in Canada and the United States: A Comparison" in V. Satzewich (ed) Racism & Social Inequality in Canada (Toronto: Thonpson Educational Publishing, 1998) pp47-68. The authors cite a 1987 survey of attitudes about the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom in which 63.3% of those surveyed agreed that it is not the government's job to guarantee equal opportunity to succeed.
[18] Yanz, L., B. Jeffcott, D. Ladd & J. Atlin, Policy Options to Improve Standards for Women Garment Workers in Canada and Internationally (Ottawa: Status of Women, Canada, 1999); Vosko, L Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment relationship; T. Das Gupta, Racism and Paid Work

(1996); Sennett, R, & J. Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Knopf, 1973).
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[20] Statistics Canada, The Daily, November 4, 1997.
[21] Statistics Canada, The Daily, February 17, 1998. The 1996 Canada Census data (Statistics Canada) provide the most comprehensive information about the racial breakdown of Canadian society. Previous censuses asked a variety of related questions, either about ethnicity or about the ancestral country of origin. We have used all these sources to offer approximate numbers of racialised group members in the Canadian population at different times in history.
[22] Statistics Canada, The Daily, February 17, 1998.
[23] Statistics Canada, The Daily, November 4, 1997.
[24] Statistics Canada, The Daily, February 17, 1998.
[25] Statistics Canada, The Daily, April 14, 1998.
[26] Satzewich, V. Racism and the Incorporation of Foreign Labour: Farm Labour Migration to Canada Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1991).
[27]Stasiulis, D. & Jhappan, R., The Fractious Politics of a Settler Society: Canada in Unsettling Settler Societies, eds. D. Stasiulis & N. Yuval-Davis (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 55-131; Stasiulis, D., The Political Economy of Race, Ethnicity and Migration in Understanding Canada: Building on the New Canadian Political Economy, ed. W. Clement (Montreal: McGill-Queen s University Press, 1997); Bolaria, B.S. & Li, P., eds., Racial Oppression in Canada (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988); Kage, J. , On the Eve of a New Canadian Immigration Act, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, Toronto, 1974.
[28] An Ekos/Toronto Star poll conducted in June 2000 found that 30% of those surveyed believed that there were too many immigrants of colour in Canada; Palmer, D. Determinants of Canadian Attitudes Towards Immigration: More Than Just Racism? in Canadian Journal of Behavioural Sciences 28(1996):180-92.
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[30] See Soberman, L., Immigrants and the Canadian federal Elections of 1993 in H. Troper & M. Weinfeld, Eds., Ethnicity, Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
[31] Speech by Jacques Parizeau on referendum night in 1995 in which he blamed money and ethnic groups for the sovereignty loss.
[32] The White paper on Immigration: Canadian Immigration Policy (Ottawa: Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1966).
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[49] Stasiulis and Jhappan (1995) suggest that the white settler society construct may not be applicable to Canada because of the ethnic and racial diversity of the immigrant population, a diversity that prompted the construction of the racial/ethnic hierarchy. Yet it seems a European dominant variation may have been the compromise the British were prepared to live with, given the French presence and ethnic European diversity. What is clear is that the early and persistent rejection of Blacks, South Asians, East Asians, and Jews as candidates for immigration even as the government was actively recruiting immigrants in Northern Europe suggests a commitment to a Eurocentric settler colony.

[50] Winks, 1871. The outcome of this unequal treatment was desperation, destitution, race riots (which burned down the black community quarters) and immigration for some back to Africa. The economic and social vulnerability of African-Canadians in Nova Scotia to this day can be traced to those initial racist actions.

[51] Systemic racism refers to the creation and use of racial categories for the purpose of engendering differential treatment and decisions that have the impact of unequal outcomes. The process involves the social construction of races as different and unequal, followed by the institutionalization of norms,

processes, and a social system that generates actions and decisions that produce racial inequality.
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[54] See Woodsworth, J.S., Strangers Within Our Gates or Coming Canadians (1909), reprinted (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972)
[55] Li, Peter, Race and Ethnicity in Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, ed. Li, P. (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 3-20; Calliste, A, & Sefa Dei, G., eds., Anti-Racist Feminism (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2000); Omi, M. & Winant, H., On the Theoretical Status of the Concept of Race in Race, Identity and Representation in Education, eds., C. McCarthy & Crichlow, W. (New York: Routledge, 1993).
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[57] The Canadian Ethnocultural Council and the National Coalition of Immigrant and Racial Minority Women is an example as is the Ontario Alliance for Employment equity made up of representative organizations advocating for equity in employment for racial minorities, persons with disabilities, Aboriginal people and women.
[58] Calliste, A. & Sefa Dei G., Anti-racist Feminism: Critical Race and Gender Studies in Anti-Racist Feminism, eds. . Calliste, A. & Sefa Dei, G. (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2000) pp 11-18
[59] See Abella, R., Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1984); Equality Now! Report of the Special Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1984); Report of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia,1989); Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: Province of Manitoba, 1991); Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Province of Ontario, 1995); Report of the Canadian Task Force on Mental Health Issues Affecting Immigrants and Refugees (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1988); A Time For Change: Moving Beyond Racial Discrimination in Employment (Urban Alliance on Race Relations and The Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, 1990);
[60] Ontario Human Rights Commission Versus Simpson-Sears, Ltd. (1985) 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.), p 549.
[61] Andrews Versus Law Society of British Columbia (1989) 56 DLR 1 (S.C.C.), p. 18 as cited in Eboe-Osuji, C., Ferrel & others V. Attorney General of Ontario, Factum (1996), p. 12.
[62] Egan Versus Canada (1995) 124 DLR 609 (S.C.C.), p. 638 as cited in Eboe-Osuji, C., Ferrel & others V. Attorney General of Ontario, Factum (1996), p.12.
[63] Abella, R., Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1984), p. 2.
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resistance in Nursing: African-Canadian Women" in Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 33 (3) pp361-90; A. Calliste, "Nurses and Porters: Racism, Sexism and Resistance in Segmented Labour Markets" in A. Calliste & G. Sefa Dei, eds. Anti-Racist Feminism (Halifax, N.S.: Fernwood Publishing, 2000) pp143-164UARR, Canada s Employment Discriminators, Currents: Readings in Race Relations 5 (2) 1989: 18-21; Creese, G., Organizing Against Racism in the Workplace: Chinese Workers in Vancouver before World War II, in Racism in Canada, ed. McKague, O. (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1991).
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[70] Employment and Immigration Canada Annual Report, Employment Equity (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1992).
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[72] Ornstein, M., Report on the Ethno-racial Inequity in Metropolitan Toronto: An Analysis of the 1991 Census Data (Toronto: Access and Equity Centre of Metro Toronto, 1997); Ethno-racial Inequality in Toronto: Analysis of the 1996 Census (Toronto: Access and Equity Centre of Metro Toronto, 2000).
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[87] Statistics Canada, the Daily, May 12, 1998. The situation is different when you discount the variation in the average earnings of immigrants by period of immigration. The much higher incomes of pre-1976 immigrants push the overall average earnings to $27,684, which was 5.7% higher than for non-immigrants ($26,193).
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[91] Analysis from Notes on Visible Minorities and the Income Gap, unpublished paper by John Anderson, Centre for Social Justice, 2000.
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[98] Harvey, E. & Reil, Kathleen, "Poverty and Unemployment Patterns Among Ethnocultural Groups, " upcom*ing issue of* Canadian Journal of Ethnic Studies.
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[103] Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, Wage Opportunities for Visible Minorities in Canada. Statistics Canada, Ottawa 1998
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[105] Kelly, Karen. 1995 op.cit. .

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[107] John Anderson, unpublished paper for the Centre for Social Justice, 1999. .
[108] Ibid., The sectors chosen for the study were picked in conjunction with Maria Wallis.
[109] For instance, university professors and the postsecondary research and teaching categories show a

demographic overrepresentation of racialised group members.
[110]

[111] See Ontario Commission on Systemic Racism in the Criminal Justice System Report (1995); Clare Lewis report, Pitman report, Marshall report, Manitoba Aboriginal Justice; Committee to Stop Targeted Policing (2000).
[112] Statistics Canada, 1996 Census: Sources of Income, Earnings, The Daily, May 12, 1998.
[113] Lee, K., Urban Poor in Canada: A Statistical Profile (Canadian Council on Social Development, 2000), p. 38.
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[121] De Silva, A. Earnings of Immigrants: A Comparative Analysis (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1992) contains a good literature review of some of these arguments; Kuch, P. & Heassel, W., An Analysis of Earnings in Canada: 1971 Census (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1979); Richmond, A. & Kalback, W. Factors in the Adjustment of Immigrants and their Descendants (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1980); Carliner, G., Wage Differences by Language Group and the Market for Language Skills in Canada, Journal of Human Resources 16, 3 (1981): 384-399; Chiswick, B. & Miller, P. Earnings in Canada: The Roles of Immigrants' Generation, French Ethnicity and Language, Research in Population Economics 6 (1988): 183-228; Green, A. & Green, D., Canadian Immigration Policy: the effectiveness of the point system and other instruments, Canadian Journal of Economics 28 (November 1995): 1006-41; de Voretz, D. & Fagnan, S., Some Evidence on Canadian Immigrant Quality Decline: Foreign-born versus Resident-born Earnings Functions for 1971-86 in mimeo, July 27,1990.
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[125] See Abbot and Beach (1993), DeVoretz(1989), Akbari(1987), and Chiswick and Miller(1988).

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[127] Bonacich, E. "Advanced Capitalism and Black/White relations in the United States: A Split labour market Interpretation" American Sociological Review 41 (1976) pp34-51;

[128] R. Edwards Contested Terrain (New York: Basic Books, 1979); For further discussion and critique of segmented labour market theories, see das Gupta, T. Racism and Paid Work (1996); Vosko, L. Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

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[132] For instance, David Stoffman (1993), a journalist, has been an influential proponent of these views.

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